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Abstract 
'Legal Knowledge-Based Systems: New Directions in System Design' 
Michael Aikenhead 
Doctor of Philosophy 
2001 
This thesis examines and critiques the concept of 'legal knowledge-based' 
systems. Work on legal knowledge-based systems is dominated by work in 
'artificial intelligence and law'. It seeks to automate the application of law and 
to automate the solution of legal problems. Automation however, has proved 
elusive. In contrast to such automation, this thesis proposes the creation of legal 
knowledge-based systems based on the concept of augmentation of legal work. 
Focusing on systems that augment legal work opens new possibilities for system 
creation and use. 
To inform how systems might augment legal work, this thesis examines 
philosophy, psychology and legal theory for information they provide on how 
processes of legal reasoning operate. It is argued that, in contrast to conceptions 
of law adopted in artificial intelligence and law, 'sensemaking' provides a useful 
perspective with which to create systems. It is argued that visualisation, and 
particularly diagrams, are an important and under considered element of 
reasoning and that producing systems that support diagramming of processes of 
legal reasoning would provide useful support for legal work. 
This thesis reviews techniques for diagramming aspects of sensemaking. In 
particular--this thesis examines standard methods for diagramming arguments 
and methods for diagramming reasoning. These techniques are applied in the 
diagramming of legal judgments. A review is conducted of systems that have 
been constructed to support the construction of diagrams of argument and 
reasoning. Drawing upon these examinations, this thesis highlights the 
necessity of appropriate representations for supporting reasoning. The 
literature examining diagramming for reasoning support provides little 
discussion of appropriate representations. This thesis examines theories of 
representation for insight they can provide into the design of appropriate 
representations. It is concluded that while the theories of representation that 
are examined do not determine what amounts to a good representation, 
guidelines for the design and choice of representations can be distilled. These 
guidelines cannot map the class of legal knowledge-based systems that augment 
legal sensemaking, they can however, be used to explore this class and to inform 
construction of systems. 
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u If you'd argue' with me, 
it would help me decide." 
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1 Introduction 
There ain't no rules around here! We're trying to accomplish something! 
Thomas Edison 
Imagine a scenario - it is 19:00 and the young associate hunched over her 
computer has just been handed a file concerning the biggest client of the firm 
for which she works. She has a memorandum to prepare for an 08:30 meeting 
the following morning and two hours until the last available train connection. 
Unfortunately, the file concerns an unsettled area of law. The pressure to 
quickly, clearly, concisely and forcefully clarifY the client's position is countered 
by the apprehension of sleeping on the office couch. 
Fortunately, she has been trained to use the firm's knowledge tools. 
Approaching her computer with its flat, dormant screen, she traces her finger 
across the touch pad on her keyboard. The screen wakes. ·Faced with an empty 
canvas, she is free to begin sketching the arguments that will save her client. 
Placing the central issue in the case at the centre of the screen, she frames and 
re-colours it in order to highlight its importance. Dragging boxes with the 
touch pad and then linking them to the issue with a few fmger taps, she 
enlarges upon the central issue and begins to decompose it into constituent 
sub-issues and to note questions and concerns raised by each. As they arise, she 
outlines arguments that resolve the issue in her clients favour and, anticipating 
objections, to each of these she links those counter arguments she thinks likely 
from the opposing party. Rocking back in her chair, she contemplates the 
network of issues, questions and arguments glowing on the screen. The only 
annoyance is that her client is clearly in the right and she is being forced to 
spend valuable evening hours proving the obvious. If only she can make the 
judge and opposition see things from the same perspective! Leaning forward 
she drags several more boxes onto the screen, linking them to those already 
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there. Linking them to indicate how the client's argument is supported and 
anticipating how the opposition might respond. Slowly, a network of detailed 
arguments builds up. The main issue becomes surrounded by those sub-issues 
that are implicated by it. These sub-issues in turn become embedded in a 
network of arguments for and against her client. Each of these arguments is 
itself slowly decomposed until it is clear how each piece of evidence in the 
dispute fits into the scenario she has constructed. Scrolling back and forth, 
zooming in and out of the argument network, expanding and contracting 
branches, selectively displaying and hiding certain types of branches, a solid 
argument emerges. Indeed, the opposing arguments begin to look feeble. 
Pleased, she commands her desk workstation to save the work. Instantly, the 
argument network is saved on the firms central storage located several floors 
below. 
The following morning and the team gathered to fight the case assembles for a 
joint briefing. Those in the office wander away from the coffee and seat 
themselves around the conferencing table. The faces of those on the opposite 
coast and in other countries flash on screen. Commencing with a short 
discussion of her work the previous evening, the associate recalls the argument 
map she constructed. The firms conferencing system immediately projects the 
map on the 3 by 4 metre screen that occupies the wall behind the podium on 
which she stands. Simultaneously, the map appears on the screen that is in 
front of each team member present in the conference room and on the screen 
in front of each participant at their various global locations. Mentally 
reprimanding herself, our associate notes that she has not found any 
authorities for the arguments in the argument map. The participant in 
Singapore who mumbles a complaint quickly notes this, a complaint 
immediately echoed by the partner in charge of the matter. However, before 
she has a chance to respond, the young solicitor drafted in to gain experience 
in corporate litigation objects to the structure of the argument supporting the 
third issue, and begins to drag and rearrange the arguments on his personal 
screen. The changes simultaneously appear on the screen behind our associate 
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and on the screens of all other participants. Mter a minute the young solicitor 
stops, apparently satisfied with his work. However, the partner is now 
dissatisfied and begins to rearrange the argument map. Another minute of 
activity follows. Now however, one of the American associates thinks he has 
spotted a weakness in the rearranged arguments- viewed as a whole he objects 
that the arguments supporting the first and fourth issues weigh in opposite 
directions. A murmur of agreement flows through the rest of the participants. 
Fearing major dissent, the associate opens a second window on her personal 
screen. This opens the firms information retrieval engine, which she commands 
to retrieve material relating to the same issues. Mter a seconds delay, a 
summary of another memorandum appears on screen as well as a short letter of 
advice drafted a year previously. It is the second that she retrieves in full. 
Another moment and her personal screen divides into two halves. On the left 
remains the argument map under consideration. On the right appears the text 
of the letter of advice. The letter is ten pages long. Never having seen it before, 
the associate glances at the title to verifY that she been given what was 
requested. Satisfied, she types a command and the text of the letter disappears 
and is replaced by the argument map underlying the letter. Dragging, scrolling 
and zooming, she locates the section that covers issues one and four. It is 
apparent from the letter that its author viewed the law in the same way as she 
originally had. The letter's argument map and the argument map she 
originally drafted have the same structure. Relieved, she projects onto the main 
screen and onto the screens of each team member, the structure of the 
argument map from the letter. Mter a few moments spent digesting its 
contents, murmurs of satisfaction replace the previous murmurs of discontent. 
Incontrovertible proof that the argument as originally structured was sound. 
For the argument map in the letter of advice was constructed by none other 
than the firm's legendary expert on such matters. Fifty such cases prepared for 
trial and not one lost. Unfortunately, this expert chose to leave and establish his 
own practice. However, thanks to the firms computer systems some of this 
expertise remains. Mter another hour spent rearranging the argument and 
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retrieving past work, cases, legislation and articles, the participants agree that 
their jointly constructed argument is a winning one, close down their screens, 
farewell the overseas participants, and file out of the conference room. 
Unfortunately, a computer system of the type envisaged above and facilitating 
the type of interactions envisaged remains unrealised. However, such as system 
would be of immense benefit - allowing individuals to more efficiently and 
more comprehensively solve problems, to more efficiently explore their own 
ideas and to more clearly construct and comprehend arguments. Moreover, it 
would allow more efficient cooperation and communication during group work. 
Indeed, the benefit of such systems extends beyond the immediate 
improvement of individual and group work. The ongoing use of such systems 
would drive the capturing of an organisation's knowledge and the construction 
of an organisational memory, cushioning the organisation from staff turnover 
and facilitating ongoing staff education. 
Given the value of such systems how they might be constructed is a maJOr 
question. Providing tools for improving legal knowledge work is vitally 
important. At least smce Loevinger inaugurated jurimetrics', the use of 
computers in law has been the subject of concerted research. 1 Lawyers employ a 
diverse range of computer applications - from the humble word processor to 
complex client relationship management packages. The growth of the internet 
has spawned an array of new applications of computers in law and prompted 
the formation of a diverse range of companies that seek to sell computer 
products to the legal market. Computers are being used in law in more and 
more diverse ways. This work explores legal knowledge-based systems - the 
ways in which computers can be used to improve legal work and to manage the 
increasing complexity of the environment in which legal work occurs. 
1 Loevinger coined the term ~urimetrics' to 'signifY the scientific investigation of legal 
problems, especially by the use of electronic computers and by symbolic logic.'; Lord Lloyd 
of Hampstead, Introduction to Jurisprudence (3rd edition) (1 972) Stevens & Sons, 415-7. 
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1. 1 Underlying thesis 
Amongst the most interesting use of computers in law is the creation of 
'knowledge-based' systems - systems that seek to manipulate legal knowledge. 
However, legal knowledge-based tools have largely focused on the application 
of artificial intelligence. This has proved difficult and limited. The application 
of artificial intelligence is based on a particular conception of the way 
computers should be integrated with human work processes. It is based on a 
conception of computers automating these processes. As currently conceived, 
legal knowledge-based systems seek to automate legal work - to automatically 
perform the complex problem solving that lawyers engage in. Automating the 
reasoning that lawyers perform, however, has proved highly problematic. 
In contrast to this focus on automation, this work exammes an alternative 
conception for the use of computers in law - motivated by the conviction that 
there remain numerous unexplored uses of computers in law. In particular, the 
concept of legal knowledge-based systems remains underdeveloped. In contrast 
to the currently prevalent concept of legal knowledge-based systems based on 
the concept of 'automation', this work proposes a wider concept of legal 
knowledge-based system - a concept based on the notion of 'augmentation'. 
Through exammmg legal theory this work explores the construction of 
jusrisprudentially sound legal knowledge-based systems. In particular, this work 
is concerned with how the diagrammatic presentation of legal information can 
improve legal knowledge work. Work in psychology and cognitive science 
indicates that visualisation of information is extremely beneficial. This work 
suggests that visualisations of legal knowledge, as opposed to the traditional 
'textual' presentation of legal information, can benefit legal knowledge work. 
This work examines how computer systems that support the manipulation of 
diagrammatic representations of legal knowledge can be built to augment legal 
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knowledge work. To date, this use of computers in law remams largely 
unexplored in the literature discussing legal knowledge-based systems. 
As discussed throughout this work, all legal knowledge-based systems are based 
on 'representations' - including representations of how computers should be 
used in law, and how the law and legal reasoning operate. This work examines 
the concept of representations in detail. Legal knowledge-based systems are 
constructed on representations of legal work and legal knowledge and this 
work examines the nature of such representations in detail. In particular, this 
work examines whether there is any systematic way to construct representations 
that could underlie legal knowledge-based systems. Although concluding that 
theory cannot currently determinately specifY representations, representational 
guidelines are available. This work explores and discusses such guidelines. 
1.2 Methodology and Scope 
Examining legal knowledge-based systems necessarily involves drawing from 
diverse sources. The two primary fields informing this examination are legal 
theory and the relatively young field of 'artificial intelligence and law'. 
Descriptive legal theory is examined for information it can provide on how 
legal reasoning operates and hence how computers might be used to augment 
legal reasoning. The field of artificial intelligence and law is the primary field 
which explores the creation of legal knowledge-based systems and research in 
artificial intelligence and law is examined for the light it casts on the 
construction of legal knowledge-based systems. In addition, this work draws on 
research in philosophy, psychology and cognitive science for insight these 
disciplines can provide into processes of reasoning. In particular, these 
disciplines are examined for insight they can provide on the use of 
diagrammatic representations in support of reasoning and problem solving. 
Finally, this work examines research in computer science, and particularly work 
on hypertext, where research on knowledge support tools is comparatively 
advanced. 
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However, while this work is interdisciplinary and examines each of these fields, 
this work is not specifically situated within any of these fields. This work is not 
presented as a contribution to legal theory or the field of artificial intelligence 
and law. Nor does this work propose contributions to research in philosophy, 
psychology or cognitive science. Each of these fields is examined solely for 
contributions they can make to the construction of augmentation tools for legal 
knowledge work. It is difficult to pin a precise label to the field to which this 
work belongs. Although it is a work examining the use of computers in law, it is 
not a 'black letter' examination of the substantive law involved in the resolution 
of problems thrown up by computer technology, as is usually conjw·ed up by 
the phrase 'computer law'. The field of artificial intelligence and law, with its 
concern with legal knowledge-based systems, is perhaps closest to this work. 
However, this work differs in its rejection of the automation paradigm. As far as 
is necessary, it is perhaps most accurate to conceive of this work as an 
examination of legal knowledge-based systems in a broad sense. 
While an examination of legal knowledge-based systems however, this work 
does not report the construction of a new legal knowledge-based system. Nor 
does this work report on the use of any particular legal knowledge-based 
system. Rather, this work is a theoretical examination of the foundations of 
legal knowledge-based systems. This work reports the attempt to clarifY and 
expand the concept of legal knowledge-based system and the attempt to clarify 
the key issue involved in the construction of legal knowledge-based systems -
the construction of representations to augment legal knowledge work. 
This work makes four main contributions o the study and understanding of 
legal knowledge-based systems. First, this work provides a new conception for 
legal knowledge-based systems. This conception argues for a wider 
understanding of what constitutes a legal knowledge-based system than is 
typically adopted. Secondly, this work highlights the potential benefits in the 
use of visualisation for the creation of legal knowledge-based systems. Thirdly, 
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this work reveals the importance of understanding the theoretical 
underpinnings on which the representations underlying legal knowledge-based 
systems are based. Finally, this work distils guidelines from the diverse 
disciplines upon which it draws for the creation of the representations that 
underlie legal knowledge-based systems. 
This work is but a first step in an ongoing process of exploratory construction 
and testing oflegal knowledge-based systems. It is hoped that subsequent work 
will explore in more depth and clarifY the ideas discussed here and commence 
to build and test systems based on these ideas. As such, this work is aimed at 
lawyers interested in the use of computers to improve legal work, it is hoped 
that the alternative vision of the role of computers in supporting legal 
knowledge work presented here will motivate the support of research in this 
area. Moreover, this work is aimed at those interested in the actual construction 
of computer systems to support legal work, by providing a broad outline of the 
types of systems that would benefit working lawyers. 
1.3 Organisation 
This work is organised into seven chapters. Following this introduction, chapter 
two examines research on computer support for legal work, in particular 
focusing on research in the field of artificial intelligence and law. Work in 
artiftcial intelligence and law is particularly interesting because it investigates in 
depth the intersection between legal knowledge work and computing. In order 
to understand the potential benefits that computing provides in law, it is 
necessary to understand current limitations of work on the use of computers in 
law. The examination in chapter two provides an overview of work in artificial 
intelligence and law. It examines three main methods by which researchers 
attempt to automate processes of legal reasoning and highlights some of the 
limitations of this work. In particular, this chapter focuses on the limitations of 
the paradigm of automation on which work in artificial intelligence and law is 
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based. Chapter two proposes an alternative paradigm for the use of computers 
in law - a use of computers based on the augmentation of legal work. 
Chapter three concerns legal reasoning. This chapter examines perspectives on 
law and legal reasoning provided in the jurisprudential literature. In particular, 
this chapter focuses on descriptive legal theory and how such theory has 
informed the creation of computer systems in law based on the use of artificial 
intelligence. This legal theory is founded on an 'objectification' of law. This 
chapter argues that theories of law and legal reasoning which underlie the 
application of artificial intelligence in law are inadequate to found systems to 
augment legal knowledge work. In contrast, chapter three examines an 
alternative perspective of law and legal work, a perspective which places the 
legal thinker at the centre of legal problems solving and in which legal problem 
solving becomes a process of 'sensemaking'. It is argued that when a 
sensemaking perspective is adopted, new issues and questions arise concerning 
legal problem solving. In particular, it is argued that problem representations 
are of central importance and that problem visualisation is an invaluable 
mechanism in problem solving. 
Chapter four builds on the examination of legal theory undertaken in chapter 
three. Chapter four examines methods that have been developed for 
diagramming, for visualising, the structures of argument and reasoning. This 
chapter attempts to apply these methods for diagramming argument and 
reasoning to diagramming legal judgments. Through this attempt to diagram 
legal judgments, chapter four argues that all methods to diagram argument 
and reasoning are necessarily selective and that of critical importance is finding 
a representation, or representations, appropriate to support of legal work. 
Chapter five revtews computer systems that have been built to support the 
construction of diagrams to aiel argument and reasoning. This chapter 
highlights the diversity of systems that have been constructed to support the 
diagramming of reasoning. The computer systems reviewed in this chapter 
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have been built to support a wide range of tasks, both inside and outside the 
law. Constructed to support a diverse range of tasks, the systems surveyed in 
chapter five are themselves based upon a diverse range of representations. In 
addition to highlighting the diverse uses to which systems can be put and 
thereby the scope of potential benefit of such systems, chapter five emphasises 
the need for a theoretical underpinning to the choice of representation 
underlying any particular representation. 
Chapter six exammes theories of representation. Throughout this work, the 
centrality of representations in problem solving is emphasised. All computer 
systems designed to augment legal knowledge work must be based on a 
representation of law and legal knowledge work. The choice of representation 
is centrally important to the use and operation of the system. However, the 
diversity is striking amongst representations used in problem solving and 
computer systems to support problem solving. This chapter examines theories 
of representation for clarification they might provide on how to create useful 
representations to support legal work. Chapter six concludes that theories of 
representation do not provide determinative criteria for the creation of 
representations in support of legal knowledge work or the choice amongst 
representations in support of legal knowledge work. Further, while providing 
visualisations is considered important, chapter six argues that theory does not 
currently indicate what visualisation should be chosen for a representation. 
Whilst theories of representation and visualisation provide guidelines which can 
inform the creation of and choice amongst representations, and the visual 
presentation of such representations, a large element of art remains. Despite 
this lack of determinacy however, chapter six argues that there exists a largely 
unexplored class of computer systems in law, a class of systems based on the use 
of visualisations of problem solving to support legal knowledge work. As 
examples of computer systems in this class that could be constructed this 
chapter discusses two potential computer applications to support legal 
knowledge work. 
11 
The final chapter in this work, chapter seven, summanses the conclusions 
reached during the course of this work and suggests avenues for future 
research. 
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2 Computer support for legal work 
If a little knowledge is dangerous, where is a man who has so much as to 
be out of danger? 
Thomas Henry Huxley 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter investigates legal knowledge work and the use of computers to 
support legal knowledge work. Much has been written about the use of 
computers in law and about 'knowledge-based' systems in law. Work on legal 
knowledge-based systems is currently dominated by attempts to apply 
techniques from artificial intelligence in law. Indeed, as currently conceived, 
legal knowledge-based systems have come to be synonymous with the 
application of methods from artificial intelligence. This has given rise to the 
specialised field of research unsurprisingly labelled 'artificial intelligence and 
law'. Research in artificial intelligence and law is simultaneously intriguing, 
tantalizing and frustrating. This research is intriguing because the ultimate aim 
- to create computer systems that can automatically reason with the law and 
solve legal problems - forces intimate examination of what law is and what it 
means to 'think like a lawyer'. Such examination displays in stark contrast the 
many gaps in our knowledge about what law is and what legal reasoning 
involves. This research is tantalizing because it promises a world in which access 
to legal knowledge and legal expertise is fundamentally changed and 
democratised. This research can display numerous constructed computer 
systems seemingly able to engage in surprisingly complex legal reasoning. 
However, this work is frustrating because the goal of creating a computer 
system that can truly 'reason like a lawyer' seems continually just out of reach. 
This chapter outlines an additional use of computers in law to that conceived in 
artificial intelligence and law - a use of computers to augment legal knowledge 
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work. This use of computers in law is also concerned with legal knowledge and 
legal knowledge work. However, unlike work in artificial intelligence and law, 
this use of computers does not seek to automate legal knowledge work. This 
requires reconception and a widening of what legal 'knowledge-based systems' 
are understood to encompass. 
Following this introduction, the next three subsections outline causes of the 
need for knowledge processing tools. This is followed by an examination of 
work in artificial intelligence and law in subsection five. After discussing the 
benefits and drawbacks of this work, subsection six outlines an alternative use of 
computers in law. This is a use of computers based on the augmentation, rather 
than the automation, of legal knowledge work. 
2.2 The information explosion 
For over 50 years Drucker has chronicled changes m the United States and 
world economies. According to Drucker while in 1900 the majority and largest 
single group of Americans earned their living from agriculture, by 1940 the 
largest single group was industrial workers. By 1960 the largest single group 
was professional, managerial, and technical - that is, knowledge workers. 
Drucker predicted that by 197 5-80 this group would embrace the majority of 
Americans.2 According to Drucker it is knowledge, not land, raw materials, or 
capital, that has become the central factor in production. This idea, that the 
very basis of economies worldwide is changing - moving from a base of physical 
production to a focus on knowledge - is echoed by numerous commentators. 3 It 
is widely accepted that knowledge and work with knowledge is a key to future 
success and competitive advantage. 4 In its 1998 competitiveness white paper, 
2 Dmcker, P.F., The Effective Executive (1967) Harper and Row. 
3 E.g. Tapscott, D., The Digital Economy: Promise and Peril In The Age of Networked 
Intelligence ( 1 997) McGraw-Hill. 
4 E.g. Stewart, T.A., Intellectual Capital: The New Wealth of Organizations (1997) Nicholas 
Brealey. 
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the government of the United Kingdom attempted to outline a regulatory 
framework in which the 'knowledge driven economy' could flourish. 5 
With the increased importance of knowledge has come a new type of worker. 
While the exact terms used to describe this change vary, the ideas are 
essentially similar. For example, while Drucker talks about the 'knowledge 
worker', Reich argues that the 'symbolic analyst' has emerged in society. 
According to Reich: 
Symbolic analysts solve, identify, and broker problems by manipulating 
symbols. They simplify reality into abstract images that can be 
rearranged, juggled, experimented with, communicated to other 
specialists, and then, eventually, transformed back into reality. The 
manipulations are done with analytic tools, sharpened by experience. 
The tools may be mathematical algorithms, legal arguments, fmancial 
gimmicks, scientific principles, psychological insights about how to 
persuade or amuse, systems of induction or deduction, or any other set 
of techniques for doing conceptual puzzles.6 
Whether we call such workers 'knowledge workers' or 'symbolic analysts', 
commentators argue that with this new worker has come a new type of 
organisation, the 'knowledge organisation'.7 In such organisations, cultivating 
the creation of knowledge and subsequent 'knowledge management' are central 
activities. 8 Not only does the nature and role of individual workers change, so 
5 Department of Trade and Industry, 'Competitiveness White Paper: Building the Knowledge 
Driven Economy' (1998). Available at: http://www.dti.gov.uk/comp/competitive/ (accessed 
18/2/2001). 
6 Reich, R.B., The work of nations: preparing ourselves for 21st-century capitalism (1991) 
Alfred A. Knopf, 178. 
7 Tapscott characterises this change as encompassing five aspects: the effective individual; the 
high performance team; the integrated enterprise; the extended enterprise; and the 
internetworked business: Tapscott, above n. 3, eh. 3. 
8 For a discussion of changes to education and their relation to work and organisations, see: 
ibid. eh 8. 
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do organisations themselves. Knowledge organisations must themselves 
cultivate an 'organisational memory' and promote 'organisational learning'. 
Whether or not all claims about the knowledge driven economy are correct and 
whether or not all predicted changes materialise, in any move towards 
knowledge-based work new tools are required by workers in this economy. 
Workers in the knowledge driven economy are subject to new pressures. For 
example, it appears that many workers are under pressure to deal with 
increasing amounts of information. Workers are encountering increasing levels 
of stress as they face the need to deal with increasing amounts of information in 
decreasing amounts of time. This has lead to a phenomenon that has been 
called 'information overload'.9 While it has been claimed that computers will 
eventually take over many of the jobs that people perform, even in knowledge-
based areas, 10 at present the explosion in information technology has actually 
increased the information processing load that workers are subject to. 
This is no less the case in legal work. Not only is the work place in general filled 
with more and more information, but legal workers are faced with more and 
more legal information. We are also subject to ever increasing legal regulation. 
We live in what Susskind has characterised as a 'hyper regulated society'. 
According to Susskind: 
9 As Rheingold states: 
The problem with the information age, especially for students and knowledge workers 
who spend their time immersed in the info flow, is that there is too much information 
available and few effective filters for sifting the key data that are useful and interesting 
to us as individuals. (Rheingold, H., The Virtual Community: Finding Connection in a 
Computerized World (1994) Seeker & Warburg, eh. 2.) 
10 E.g.: Kurzweil, R., The Age of Spiritual Machines : When Computers Exceed Human 
Intelligence (2000) Penguin; Moravec, H.P., Robot: Mere Machine to Transcendent Mind 
(2000) Oxford University Press. 
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We are all subject, in our social and working lives, to a body oflegal rules 
and principles that is so vast, diverse, and complicated that no one can 
understand their full applicability and impact. 11 
New tools are needed to help those who work with the law cope with the 
increasing amount and complexity of legal information. 12 
2.3 The knowledge processing /ag 
When examining computer applications in law it is customary to contrast 'back 
office' applications with 'front office applications' or with 'practice support 
systems.' 13 Back office systems are: 
generally the preserve of support staff. The pnmary purpose ts to 
enhance the productivity of secretarial and clerical employees; perhaps 
also of paralegals and legal executives. 14 
Time and billing software, and accounting packages are typical examples of 
such back office systems. 
In contrast, front office applications or practice support systems are said to be 
systems which: 
direcdy assist the substantive practice of law; which assist the lawyer in 
providing a better service, in a more efficient manner. 15 
Such systems might include applications such as word processing packages, 
legal research databases, case management systems and document 
management systems. 16 
11 Susskind, R.E., The Future of Law. Facing the Challenges oflnformation Technology (1996) 
Oxford University Press, 13, hereafterSusskind "The Future ofLaw". 
12 Ibid. 2.3; Susskind, R., Transforming the Law (2000) Oxford University Press, 21-6, 
hereafter Suss kind "Transforming the Law". 
13 Susskind "The Future of Law", above n. 11, 72; Mital, V., Johnson, L., Advanced 
Information Systems for Lawyers (1992) Chapman & Hall, 2. 
14 Mital andjohnson, above n. 13. 
15 Ibid., footnote omitted. 
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However, the distinction between back office systems and front office systems 
can be misleading. The image of a clear separation is difficult to maintain. The 
distinction between back office systems and front office systems suggests a 
separation based on the way a particular legal practice is structured rather than 
on a function of the applications themselves. 17 
It is nevertheless useful to focus on the substantive practice of law and on 
computer applications that support the substantive practice of law. According to 
Mital and J ohnson, this covers an extremely diverse range of applications -
from word processing systems to legal research databases to expert systems. To 
this could be added applications such as: automated document generation 
systems; real time transcription systems; evidence management systems; 
computerised training aids; and legislative drafting aids to name but a few. The 
notion of applications that support the substantive practice of law is thus very 
wide. However, it usefully focuses on the kind of work being performed- rather 
than who performs the work. It indicates a distinction between administrative 
work on the one hand and substantive work, or knowledge work, on the other. 
This distinction between legal knowledge work and other legal work is a 
distinction highlighted by Susskind. Susskind argues that computer applications 
in law are characterised by a 'knowledge processing lag' -while techniques exist 
to process legal information, techniques to process legal knowledge are highly 
16 Ibid. 
17 For example, it is not uncommon for lawyers to nm time-keeping packages on their own 
computers, at least partly taking this out of the preserve of support staff. Similarly, it is not 
uncommon, although perhaps decreasingly so, for lawyers to pass documents to support 
staff for typing, layout and printing, or to pass research requests to in-house librarians. In 
both situations, 'practice support applications' are being directly used by back office support 
staff. Further, other computer applications straddle both uses. For example, email and 
video mail could be used both as administrative tools and in the substantive practice of law. 
The distinction thus blurs depending on how a package is used in a particular situation. 
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underdeveloped. 18 Addressing this legal knowledge processing lag is crucial to 
tackling information overload and hyper regulation. However, knowledge work 
itself involves many aspects and to support the knowledge work that lawyers 
perform it is necessary to have a better idea of what knowledge work involves. 
2.4 Knowledge work 
Surprisingly for a term that has achieved such wide usage and that is applied to 
so many aspects of work, the precise content of knowledge work is difficult, if 
not impossible to pinpoint. Drucker outlines the wide-ranging effects that 
transition to a knowledge driven economy will have and the myriad diversity of 
knowledge workers in this economy - however, apart from the possession of 
specialised knowledge he does not indicate what characterises knowledge 
workers. 19 
According to the US Army Corps of Engineers, a knowledge worker IS 
someone: 
who gathers data/information from any source; adds value to the 
information; and distributes value-added products to others. 20 
Reich's conception of knowledge work is slightly narrower, it involves 
identifYing problems and solving problems through the abstraction of 
information, organizing information in new ways, making sense of information, 
seeing information as a whole, ordering information, and communicating it. 21 
Reich leaves out the finding of information. Tapscott provides a broad view of 
knowledge work, stating it is 'leveraged intellect'.22 While conceptions vary, at a 
very broad level knowledge work can be said to encompass 
• Finding knowledge 
18 Susskind "The Future of Law", above n. 11, 2.3. 
19 Dmcker, P.F., Post-Capitalist Society (1993) Harper Collins. 
20 http://www.cecer.army.mil/kws/kwp.htm (accessed 15/12/2000) 
21 Reich, above n. 6, 225-233. 
22 Tapscott, above n. 3, 44. 
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• Creating knowledge 
• Communicating knowledge23 
It is knowledge that is found, created and communicated, it is knowledge that is 
important - but this leaves unanalysed precisely what 'knowledge' actually is. As 
the background to the DTI Competitiveness White paper states: 
The information available in a book or on the Internet becomes 
knowledge only when it has been read and understood.24 
T errett emphasises this, stating: 
There are three fundamental information management concepts that 
require definition: data, information and knowledge. The firsts is simple 
- data is raw facts and figures. Information can be defmed as 'data 
process into meaningful patterns.' .... The concept of knowledge implies 
a body of information that is of higher value or calibre, that offers 
meaning or insight .. . 'knowledge is a personal subjective process 
emerging from previous experiences and current events, while 
information is objective data about the environment.'25 
Regardless of any epistemological considerations, for practical purposes central 
to all knowledge work is thus coming to an understanding of information. 
According to Terrett, five elements are central to knowledge work: 
contextualisation; categorisation; calculation; correction; and condensation.26 
Knowledge work involves placing information in a context such as to provide 
meaning. Before information can be regarded as knowledge, sense must be 
made of the information in order to gain some deeper understanding. 
23 Susskind expands on these in the legal context when examining legal knowledge 
management: Susskind "Transforming the Law", above n. 12, 22-4. 
24 Department of Trade and Industry, above n. 5, 1.6 Analytical Report. Note that this is 
different to the concept of 'knowledge' discussed in philosophy in epistemology. Such latter 
conceptions of knowledge will not be discussed here. 
25 Terrett, A., The Internet: Business Strategies for Law Firms (2000) Law Society Publishing, 
87 citations omitted. 
26 Ibid. 87. 
20 
A refinement can thus be provided on the need for knowledge processing tools 
symbolised by the technology lag. Addressing the technology lag requires 
providing support for making sense from information and legal knowledge 
workers require support in making sense from the mass of legal information. 
Supporting the making of sense in legal knowledge work remains somewhat 
vague. For example, providing the information out of which sense is made 
could itself be argued to support the making of sense. However, just as the 
making of sense must be distinguished from the tasks that surround it and 
interact with it, so must support for the making of sense be distinguished from 
support for those tasks that surround and interact with it. This distinction will 
be clarified in subsequent chapters. At present it is stressed that this discussion 
will not focus on the 'administrative applications' of computers in law - on those 
applications of computers in law that, though they support knowledge work, do 
not directly support the substantive aspects of legal knowledge work. Although 
such distinctions between knowledge work and other work and between 
elements of knowledge work are necessarily fuzzy, this distinction serves to 
focus the field of enquiry. 
2.5 Automated meaning making 
The uses of computers in law have been actively investigated for more than 50 
years and have focused on diverse applications. However, perhaps the most 
tantalising work occurs in the field of 'artificial intelligence and law.' Since the 
advent of computers the possibility of creating intelligent machines has 
enthralled countless researchers. This research is intimately concerned with 
using computers to manage legal knowledge, as opposed to legal information.27 
27 Oskamp discusses the crossover between the fields of artificial intelligence and law and 
knowledge management: Oskamp, A., Tragter, M. and Lodder, A.R., 'Mutual benefits for 
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Indeed the use of computers to manage legal knowledge, to make sense in law, 
has come to be dominated by applications of artificial intelligence. 
The field of artificial intelligence is enormous with a huge diversity of research 
and applications in numerous areas.28 Although researchers differ on the goal 
of the field, the essential idea is that with 'intelligent' computers the work of 
knowledge workers could be automated - the computer could itself identifY and 
solve problems through the abstraction and reorganization of information. The 
computer would make sense out of the mass of information. The possibility of 
automatically reasoning about legal problems and automating the application 
of law is a tantalising one and has motivated much work. Indeed, Berman and 
Hafner state that artificial intelligence, and the automatic solution of legal 
problems, has the capacity to solve a crisis in the legal system. 29 Since 1987 the 
field of 'artificial intelligence and law' has had its own biennial conference30 and 
since 1992 its own journal.31 Unfortunately, however, the present prospect of 
fully automating legal knowledge work appears limited. Essentially, artificial 
intelligence faces considerable difficulty in representing legal knowledge in a 
form appropriate for automated reasoning. 
It is obvious to observe that knowledge is a prerequisite for any kind of 
automated, knowledge-based, intelligent activity. However, this does emphasise 
that to build an intelligent computer some approach must be adopted to 
decompose the vast pool of human knowledge in such a way that it can be 
AI law and knowledge management' p. 126, in Proceedings of the Seventh International 
Conference on Artificial Intelligence and Law ( 1999) ACM Press. 
28 See the different opinions on what AI is trying to achieve in: Baumgartner, P., Payr, S., 
(eds.) Speaking minds: interviews with twenty eminent cognitive scientists (1995) Princeton 
University Press. 
29 Berman, D.H., Hafner, C.D., 'The potential of artificial intelligence to help solve the crisis 
in our legal system' (1989) 32(8) Communications of the ACM 928. 
30 The International Conference on Artificial Intelligence and Law. 
31 The International Journal of Artificial Intelligence and Law. 
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formalised and then manipulated by a computer. Knowledge must be 
represented in a form that a computer can manipulate. As Brachman and 
Levesque explain: 
The notion of representation of knowledge is at heart an easy one to 
understand. It simply has to do with writing down, in some language or 
communicative medium, descriptions of the world in such a way that an 
intelligent machine can come to a new conclusion about its environment" 
by formally manipulating these descriptions. 32 
Knowledge representation is central to artificial intelligence. Central to the 
application of artificial intelligence in law is writing down a description of the 
legal world in such a way that an intelligent machine can come to new 
conclusions about the law. 
Importantly, Brachman and Levesque's description of knowledge 
representation covers two distinct though subtly related issues. First is the 
description of the world being reasoned about. Second is the expression of that 
description m some language that a computer can manipulate. Artificial 
intelligence depends on developing both an appropriate description of the 
world being reasoned about and an appropriate computer manipulatable 
expression of that description. 
The concept of representations, their nature and use, is central to this thesis. 
Representations are discussed in more detail throughout this thesis and a more 
detailed discussion of representations is provided in subsequent chapters. To 
clarify discussion for the moment however, it is important to keep in mind the 
above distinction. To emphasise this distinction and clarify discussion, when 
representations in the sense of descriptions of the world are being discussed, 
the term 'representation of will be used. That is, if a representation of the 
world is being discussed, it will be called a representation of the world. If a 
representation of law is being discussed, it will be called a representation of law, 
32 Brachman, Levesque, Readings in Knowledge Representation (1985) Morgan Kaufman, xiii. 
23 
and so forth. When discussing a representation of something as implemented 
in a language that a computer can manipulate, the term 'formal representation' 
will be used. If discussing issues relevant to both representation of things in the 
world and formal representations, the general term 'representation' will be 
used. 
To better understand the prospects and limitations of research in artificial 
intelligence and law - and hence the prospect of automated knowledge 
processing - it is necessary to examine in more detail the uses of artificial 
intelligence in law. In artificial intelligence various major approaches to 
simulating legal intelligence are evident. Three important approaches involve: 
viewing law as composed of rules; viewing law as composed of cases; and 
v1ewmg law as composed of arguments. These approaches are founded on 
representations of law and representations of legal reasoning loosely adopted 
from legal theory. The formal representations used to describe these 
representations of the legal world are adopted from the wider field of artificial 
intelligence. Each of these approaches is discussed in turn. 
2.5.1 Logic and rules as knowledge and reasoning 
A highly influential representation of law and legal reasoning - a representation 
of law and legal reasoning discussed and criticised in more detail in the 
following chapter - views law as composed of rules and sees legal reasoning as 
the application of legal rules. The application of law is regarded as solely 
involving the application of legal rules. This representation of law and legal 
reasoning has been widely adopted in the domain of artificial intelligence and 
law33 - perhaps partly because it presents an apparently 'neat' representation of 
law and legal reasoning, partly because it builds on traditions in law itself, 34 and 
33 Though not without criticism, for example Peczenik is sceptical of the ability of logic to 
capture all of legal reasoning: Peczenik, A., Jumps and Logic in the Law' (1996) 4 Artificial 
Intelligence and Law 297. 
34 See discussion at 3.2.1. 
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also because it resonates with formal representations used m artificial 
intelligence. 
When law is represented as composed of rules and when legal reasonmg ts 
represented as the application of those rules, the formal representations 
typically applied are logic and production rules. Zeleznikow and Hunter 
illustrate this with an example from a hypothetical drink-driving law. Given the 
hypothetical rule: 
If you drive while drunk they you will lose your licence. 
this could be translated into a formal representation as: 
drink & drive ~ licence loss35 
Here that English language rule has been 'translated' into 'propositional 
calculus'. 36 Reasoning is then a matter of determining whether the conditions in 
the representation are met. 37 If these conditions are met then the specified 
consequences follow. 
Such formal representations of law can undoubtedly be useful. 38 However, as 
representations of legal knowledge and as representations of legal problem 
solving these representations are problematic. First, the representation of law 
and the representation of legal reasoning on which these approaches are based 
is itself limiting. This representation of law suggests that law is solely composed 
of rules. This representation of legal reasoning suggests that all legal reasoning 
is a matter of applying rules in solving problems. However, research indicates 
that rather than reasoning from rules whenever they solve problems, people 
35 Zeleznikow, J., Hunter, D., Building intelligent legal information systems: representation 
and reasoning in law (1994) Kluwer, 97-9. 
36 Ibid. I 02-4. 
37 Ibid. 
38 Such representations are used as the basis of automated checklists and legal document 
drafting systems. Such representations also have notable application in governmental 
administration, Softlaw (www.softlaw.com.au) is a successful company producing systems for 
public administration based on this approach. 
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rely on their experience. 39 People use knowledge of how they solved problems 
in previous similar situations to guide them in how they should approach a 
problem in a present situation. This is discussed in more detail in the following 
subsection and the following chapter. 
Secondly, as means to express legal knowledge the formal representations, the 
logics and rules, are themselves problematic. These formalisms have 
limitations.40 The very applicability of different logics for representing legal 
concepts is itself a lively area of debate and research. This will not be discussed 
further here. 41 For, apart from the theoretical possibility of using any particular 
formal representation to express a concept, it can nevertheless be difficult 
practically to express legal knowledge in these formalisms. It is perhaps most 
straightforward to formalise legislation and regulations in this way but it is less 
clear how precedents should be incorporated. When law is regarded as solely 
composed of rules, some means is necessary to 'transform' precedents into 
collections of rules. While approaches have been proposed for such 
transformation, these approaches are problematic. 42 
39 The role of precedents in legal problem solving is discussed in the following chapter. 
4
° For example, 'propositional calculus', in which the above example is written, has no 
existential qualifier or universal qualifier. Other logics, such as 'first order predicate 
calculus' for example address this, see: Zeleznikow and Hunter, above n. 35, 104-9. 
Notably, the representation of law as mles predates computer applications in law and 
indeed has been a motivator for computer applications. 
41 In pursuit of this goal ever more complex systems of logic have been developed e.g. modal 
logics, temporal logics and deontic logics. For a brief introduction to the different types of 
logic used in legally oriented computer applications, see: Zeleznikow and Hunter, above n. 
35. While each logic has its own characteristics, strengths and weaknesses, the observations 
'made here apply to each such logic. 
42 
'Deep stmcture' is one approach, for a discussion of deep stmcture see: Smith, J.C., 
Deedman, C., 'The Application of Expert Systems Technology to Case-Based Law' p. 84, in 
The First International Conference on Artificial Intelligence and Law: Proceedings of the 
Conference (1987) ACM Press N; Kowalski, A., 'Case-Based Reasoning and the Deep 
Stmcture Approach to Knowledge Representation' p. 21, in The Third International 
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The most problematic aspect of formal representations discussed here however, 
arises from an aspect inherent in such formal representations. Formal 
representations require all knowledge to be made explicit - and to be explicitly 
expressed within the formal representation. Although systems can draw 
inferences, this is restricted by the amount of knowledge available to the system. 
For example, with the above hypothetical drink-drive rule, prima facie, 
questions arise whether the rule applies both to someone driving a car after 
drinking a glass of water and to someone obviously drunk but riding a 
skateboard on a public road. In the first situation applicability of the rule 
depends on knowing more about what type of drinking the rule is intended to 
cover. In the second situation applicability of the rule depends on knowing 
whether riding a skateboard is regarded as 'driving' within the scope of the 
rule. In each situation it is necessary to know more about what kind of situations 
the rule is supposed to cover. Rules such as the above are obviously not meant 
to apply in every situation apparently covered by them. The difficulty is 
Conference on Artificial Intelligence and Law: Proceedings of the Conference (1991) ACM 
Press. Attempting to represent the ratio deddendj of cases as rules is another approach, see 
e.g.: Weiner, S.S., 'CACE: Computer-Assisted Case Evaluation in the Brooklyn District' p. 
215, in The Second International Conference on Artificial Intelligence and Law: 
Proceedings of the Conference (1989) ACM Press; Yoshino, H., Haraguchi, M., Sakurai, S. 
and Kagayama, S., 'Towards a Legal Analogical Reasoning System: Knowledge 
Representation and Reasoning Methods' p. 110, in The Fourth International Conference on 
Artificial Intelligence and Law: Proceedings of the Conference (1 993) ACM Press; Nitta, K., 
Shibasaki, M., Sakata, T., Yamaji, T., Xianchang, W., Ohsaki, H., Tojo, S., Kokubo, I. and 
Suzu~i, T., 'New HELIC-11: A Software Tool for Legal Reasoning' p. 287, in The Fifth 
International Conference on Artificial Intelligence and Law: Proceedings of the Conference 
(1995) ACM Press. For numerous decades however, jurists such as Stone have emphasised 
the difficulty in determining the ratio of precedents. Stone argues that precedents have 
multiple, perhaps conflicting ratJones, rendering impossible the identification and 
representation of a ratJo: Stone,]., Legal System and Lawyer's Reasonings (1964) Stevens 
& Sons Limited. 
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determining in which situations the rule should and should not apply. 43 
Theoretically, addressing such problems might 'simply' be a matter of 
providing an ever larger number of ever more explicit rules. Regardless of any 
practical considerations however, modelling legal knowledge and legal 
reasoning as collections of rules is beset by the problem of 'semantic flexibility', 
which the following subsection examines. 
2.5.2 Legal precedents 
Problems with logic and rule-based representations have motivated research 
into the role of legal precedents in legal problem solving. In response to 
perceived inabilities of logic and rule-based representations to capture all that 
is involved in human reasoning, researchers in artificial intelligence generally, 
and in artificial intelligence and law in particular, have investigated 'case-based 
reasoning' systems.44 In legal problem solving, problems are resolved by 
43 The difficulty in determining the extent of application of rules is of course not unique to 
artificial intelligence and has been discussed by numerous legal theorists, see the discussion 
in the following chapter. In artificial intelligence this general limitation is variously called 
the 'frame-problem' the 'background knowledge problem' and the 'common-sense 
knowledge' problem and is widely regarded as one of the major hurdles facing AI, see: 
Baumgartner, above n. 28. The CYC project is an interesting and ambitious attempt to 
address the common-sense knowledge problem. For perhaps the best source of information 
about the CYC project see: www.cyc.com. 
44 For a general discussion of case-based reasoning and the closely related field of 
computational analogy see: Riesbeck, C.K., Schank, R.C., Inside case-based reasoning 
( 1 989) Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc; and Kolodner, J., Case-Based Reasoning (I 993) 
Morgan Kaufmann. Note that in law the very term 'case-based reasoning' is laden with 
meaning. Legal cases are vital in the common law and lawyers use legal cases when 
reasoning about legal problems. However, when used in artificial intelligence the term 'case' 
has much wider meaning than that of a legal case. The term 'case' refers generally to any 
experience. As such, case-based reasoning is not generally concerned with reasoning with 
legal precedents but with the use of past experiences in reasoning. In addition to case based 
reasoning an influential approach to reasoning with legal precedents is based on the use of 
'neural networks', see 'Special Issue on Neural Networks' (1999) 7(2-3) Artificial Intelligence 
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reference to how similar problems have been solved m prev10us, similar 
circumstances. Precedents are used as guides. 
Numerous case-based reasoning systems have been built in law.45 Case-based 
reasoning systems can offer undoubted benefits compared to logic and rule-
based systems. For example, HYPO is one of the most famous case-based 
reasoning systems in law and compares and contrasts over 30 precedents when 
responding to problems in US taxation law. Nevertheless, systems such as 
HYPO have several shortcomings as a means to simulate legal reasoning. The 
problems experienced mirror those affecting logic and rule-based approaches 
to automating legal problem solving. First, the representation of law and the 
representation of legal reasoning underlying this approach is itself problematic. 
While legal reasoning unarguably makes use of precedents it is an open 
question as to what role precedents actually play in legal reasoning an in how 
precedents are used. The following chapter discusses in more depth legal 
theory examining the role precedents play in legal reasoning. 
Secondly, there are problems with the formal representations themselves. Many 
formal representations have been developed in case-based reasoning. As with 
logic and rule-based formalisms, the individual characteristics of these formal 
representations will not be discussed here. 46 Rather, a more general aspect of 
the formal representation of precedents and legal reasoning with precedents 
and Law. To avoid discu.ssing the technical similarities and differences between case-based 
reasoning systems and neural networks, which are not important for present purposes, this 
discussion will use the term 'case-based reasoning' as referring to both approaches. 
45 E.g.: Ashley, K.D., Modelling Legal Argument: reasoning with cases and hypotheticals 
(1990) MIT Press; Popple, J., A pragmatic legal expert system (1996) Dartmouth. For a 
detailed discussion of simulations of legal precedential reasoning and legal analogising, see: 
Aikenhead, M., 'Legal analogical reasoning - the interplay between legal theory and 
artificial intelligence' (1997) Master of Jurisprudence, Department of Law, University of 
Durham, England, eh. 6. 
46 See: Riesbeck and Schank, above n. 44; Kolodner, above n. 44. 
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will be examined. As with rule-based reasoning systems, case-based reasoning 
systems can only reason with knowledge that designers have explicitly provided, 
or more specifically, that has been explicitly provided using a formal 
representation. In an important way, logic and rule-based systems, and case-
based reasoning systems are very similar. Case-based reasoning systems rely on 
the same formalisms for representing legal knowledge as do logic and rule-
based systems.47 This sameness is the cause of common problems with 
knowledge representation that affect both approaches. As with logic and rule 
based systems, the legal knowledge represented in case-based reasoning 
systems is limited. Case-based reasoning systems have limited knowledge and 
the knowledge they do have is brittle. This results in problems with 'semantic 
flexibility'. 
It is easy, but fallacious, to assume that a computer has access to information 
that we would presume when reasoning about a problem. Whatever domain a 
system is operating within, knowledge about that domain must be converted 
into a formal representation. This is problematic however, as it is extremely 
difficult to represent the full complexity, richness and flexibility of human 
knowledge in a computer manipulatable form. 48 The practical problem is that 
making human knowledge amenable to computer manipulation is extremely 
time consuming. In a case-based reasoning system, for efficiency it is desirable 
to include only those cases and only those aspects of cases, which are useful to 
the system. However, it can be extremely difficult to separate knowledge that 
might be useful from knowledge that might not be useful. Designers must make 
fundamental choices about what cases to include in a system and what 
/ 
47 Case-based reasoning systems differ however, in the 'level' of knowledge represented. While 
rule-based systems represent general rules, case based reasoning systems represent 
individual experiences. These two types of system can thus have very different practical 
characteristics and practical application. However, as theoretical approaches to artificial 
intelligence, they are beset by very similar problems. 
48 For an attempt to achieve this, see: the CYC project, above n. 43. 
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knowledge to include in those cases.49 Systems necessarily involve a trade-off 
between the amount of knowledge represented . and between the amount of 
work needed to create and maintain the system. Even the most sophisticated 
systems operate with shallow representations ofknowledge.50 
The extent of this shallowness is best illustrated with an example. In the 
approach to simulating precedential argument pioneered in HYPO, a domain 
of law is first analysed to determine what 'dimensions' are important for 
predicting the outcome of disputes within the domain.51 It is for an expert in 
the field to decide what dimensions are important in determining the outcome 
of cases. Dimensions do not specifY the necessary and sufficient conditions for a 
classification but instead represent considerations that are relevant to 
constructing arguments for and against a classification. 52 According to Ashley, 
dimensions: 
are a conceptual link between various clusters of operative facts .. . and 
the legal conclusions that they support or undermine.53 
For example, United States trade secrets law can be broken down into various 
factors such as: 'common-employee-paid-to-change-employers'; 'exists-express-
non-competition-agreement' and 'security-measures-adopted' .54 Figure 1 
indicates a precedent analysed according to the dimensions it exemplifies. The 
49
.Kolodner, above n. 44, 14, 160. 
5° Case-based reasoning systems are sometimes referred to as 'deep' or 'shallow' in the case-
based reasoning literature. 'Deep' systems are systems that have some representation of 
general knowledge apart from the actual knowledge contained in cases. However, 'deep' 
and 'shallow' are relative terms and even in 'deep' case-based reasoning systems, the depth 
of knowledge is far less than typically available to a person. 
51 To be precise, Ashley's theory of ar~ment is based on the use of 'factors'. When factors are 
implemented in a computer program they are approximated using dimensions: Ashley, 
above n. 45, 37-8. However, for simplicity it is sufficient to here refer solely to dimensions. 
52 Ibid. 112-3. 
53 Ibid. 38. 
54 For a complete list of dimensions used by the HYPO program see: ibid. Appendix F. 
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dimensions that were thought important in the precedent are indicated in the 
'Dimensions List'. 
Case: USM Corp. V• Marson Fastener Corp. 
SHORT TITLE:. "USM v. Marson" 
CITATION: 379 Mass. ® 
· DATE: A-ugust 29, 1979 
PARTIES: 
Plaintiff Corporate-Party: USM 
Defendant Corporate-Party: Marson 
DECISION Foa: Plaintiff Corporate-Party: USM 
CLAIMS DECIDED: 'Ty:J>&-of-Claim: Trade-Secrets-Misappropria&iaa 
Won by: Plaintiff Corporate-Party: USM 
DIMENSIONS LIST: 
Competitive-Advantage-Gained 
Security-Mea.surescAdopted 
CASES CITED: 
Eastern Marble v. Roman Marble 
Healy V. Murphy 
Figure 1: A top-level HYPO precedent frame 55 
It is these dimensions around which matching revolves. Systems have no deeper 
representation of the concepts referred to in the dimensions list. There is no 
representation of the concept of what it means to gain a competitive advantage 
or to adopt security measures. The only information that systems have is that 
which is explicitly provided. 
The problem with such shallow representations of concepts is that, as Gentner 
notes, the representational decisions made when encoding knowledge: 
are crucial to the operation of the algorithm. Differences in the way 
things are construed can cause two situations to fail to match even if they 
are informationally equivalent.56 
Thus for example, although invoking the same meaning for readers, asserting 
• DIMENSIONS_ LIST(COMPETETIVE-ADV ANT AGE-GAINED, 
55 Ibid. 90. Note that this is only the top most frame which is actually used to represent this 
precedent. 
56 Gentner, D., 'The mechanisms of analogical learning' p. 199, in Ortony, A. and Vosniadou, 
S. (eds.) Similarity and Analogical Reasoning (1989) Cambridge University Press, 210. 
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SECURITY-MEASURES-ADOPTED) 
and 
• DIMENSIONS_ LIST( GAINED-COMPETETIVE-ADV ANT AGE, 
ADOPTED-SECURITY-MEASURES) 
would prevent a match in the system. Though the two assertions may convey 
the same information to a reader, their formal representations are completely 
different. Programs require uniform and unambiguous definitions of the 
concepts being reasoned about. As Hoffman notes: 
formal schemes ... will be limited by (at least) the depth, breadth, 
flexibility, and dynamics of the world knowledge that they can 
represent. 57 
Programs represent very minimal knowledge, which ts m turn shallow and 
inflexible. 
As Hofstadter cautions, when examining reasoning systems great care must be 
taken to avoid reading: 
far more understanding than is warranted into strings of symbols -
especially words- strung together by computers. 58 
For example, in the above example, it makes no difference to a computer if 
instead of referring to 'COMPETETIVE-ADVANTAGE-GAINED', some other 
reference is used. This could just as well have been referred to as 'X'. Similarly, 
'SECURITY-MEASURES-ADOPTED' could have been referred to as 'Y', 'GAINED-
COMPETETIVE-ADVANTAGE' referred to as 'M' and 'ADOPTED-SECURITY-
MEASURES' referred to as 'N'. This would give: 
• DIMENSIONS_LIST(X, Y) 
• DIMENSIONS_LIST(M, N) 
57 Hoffman, R.R., 'Monster analogies' (1995) 16(3) AI Magazine 11, 27. 
58 Hofstadter calls this the 'ELIZA' effect after the famous program, 'ELIZA', developed by 
J oseph Wizenbaum and to which many people spuriously attributed immense powers of 
perception an understanding: Hofstadter, D., The Fluid Analogies Research Group, Fluid 
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In the same vem, 'DIMENSIONS_LIST' has no particular importance to a 
computer and 'A' could be substituted instead. This would give: 
• A(X, Y) 
• A(M, N) 
It is interesting how this dramatically reduces the inherent feeling that 'X' and 
'M', and 'Y' and 'N' are similar. To state matters starkly, formal representations 
are based on the assignment of labels to objects and concepts, and reasoning 
depends on being able to match those labels. 
At first glance, addressing shallowness and inflexibility might appear simply a 
matter of adding more and more knowledge to a system. Apart from the 
previously mentioned practical difficulties though, there is a philosophical 
difficulty with this. Simply, it is not known how to exhaustively describe objects 
or concepts. Objects and concepts can be described in seemingly innumerable 
ways. Objects and concepts are 'semantically flexible'. 59 
A humorous illustration of this is provided by Hofstadter who poses the 
question - 'Who is the First Lady of England?'60 At first glance several answers 
might be proposed: Queen Elizabeth or Anitta Rodick for example. Each of 
these is a prominent lady. Out of these however, the Queen is perhaps the most 
eminent and so might be regarded as the First Lady. However, the term 'First 
Lady' is widely used in the United States of America to refer to the wife of the 
president. Who then is the First Lady of England? Tony Blair plays a role in the 
United Kingdom that is in many ways similar to the role played by the 
president of the United States of America. Should the First Lady of England 
thus be regarded as Cherie Blair? Choosing the most prominent woman in the 
country implies choosing Queen Elizabeth. Choosing the spouse of the national 
Concepts and Creative Analogies: Computer Models of the Fundamental Mechanisms of 
Thought (1995) Basic Books, 157. 
59 Hoffman, above n. 57, 19. 
60 Hofstadter, above n 58, 196. 
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political leader implies choosing Cherie Blair. However, in another sense 
Queen Elizabeth also plays a role in some ways reminiscent of the presidential 
role. Should her spouse be chosen? Could Prince Philip be regarded as the 
First Lady of England? While this has some nice similarities between the 
positions of the people involved, the term 'First Lady' strongly implies that a 
woman should be chosen. 61 Several competing pressures can be observed here: 
the pressure induced by the phrase 'First Lady' to find a woman to play this 
role; the pressure to choose the spouse of the most powerful political figure; the 
feeling that the 'First Lady' should be just that, the most powerful or popular 
lady in the country. According to Hofstadter, the person who is eventually 
chosen is determined by the result of the interplay between these pressures and 
what is felt to be involved in the concept of 'First Lady'. With foreseeable 
stretching, the concept could be allowed to slip and cover Prince Philip as being 
England's First Lady. Rather than being a well-defmed, static concept, the 
concept of 'First Lady' is fluid and semantically flexible. 62 
It is difficult to see how pre-defined static representations of knowledge can 
capture the fluidity, illustrated above, that characterises semantic flexibility. 
Notably, addressing this problem is not a matter of the mere addition of a 
greater amount of ever more detailed knowledge about the objects represented 
in the system.63 While this may appear to help, there is no way to stop semantic 
61 For a subtle twist on this example see Hofstadter: ibid. 
62 While Hoffman speaks of 'semantic flexibility', Hofstadter discussed the 'fluidity' evident in 
human thought. Hoffman and Hofstadter appear to have a similar concept in mind. As 
Hofstadter states: 
['fluidity'] exudes quite a clear image of flexibility, mutability, nonrigidity, 
adaptability, subtlety, pliancy, continuousness, smoothness, slipperiness, suppleness .. .' 
(Hofstadter ibid.) 
63 Hofstadter, D., French, R., 'Tabletop, BattleOp, Ob-Platte, Patelbat, Belpatto, Platobet' p. 
323, in Hofstadter, D. and Fluid Analogies Research Group (Eds) Fluid Concepts and 
Creative Analogies: Computer models of the Fundamental Mechanisms of Thought (1995) 
Basic Books. 
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flexibility recursively affecting the knowledge that is added. 64 For example, 
HYPO's ability to match precedents is limited to situations in which matching 
revolves around locating shared dimensions. HYPO can retrieve precedents 
that share the dimension 'competitive-advantage-gained'. However, HYPO's 
matching ability is restricted by limited knowledge of the concept 'competitive-
advantage-gained'. HYPO cannot reason about the presence or absence of 
dimensions themselves. While addressing this problem might appear to be a 
matter of analysing the dimensions used with 'sub-dimensions', there is 
seemingly no way to prevent the same difficulty recurring with the 'sub-
dimensions' themselves. A system relying on sub-dimensions would not be able 
to reason about the applicability, the presence or absence of those sub-
dimensions, without resorting to analysis using sub-sub-dimensions, apparently 
ad infinitum.65 Semantic flexibility arises whenever it is attempted to match 
real-world situations with the concepts used in a reasoning system. The model 
of precedential reasoning embodied in HYPO is thought-provoking and is 
more sophisticated than anything implemented in previous programs. 
Numerous subsequent systems adopt a dimension based approach. However, 
dimensional analysis is itself subject to severallimitations.66 
Semantic flexibility affects both rule based reasoning systems and systems that 
attempt to reason with precedents in essentially the same way. For rule based 
systems the problem is to determine whether the preconditions of a rule are 
met. Semantic flexibility complicates the determination of whether 
preconditions of the rule have been met. For systems that reason with 
precedents the problem is to determine whether two situations are similar. 
Semantic flexibility in the concepts being compared complicates this assessment 
64 Hoffman, above n 57, 21. 
65 Mendelson argues that dimensional analysis is only useful in some areas of law: Mendelson, 
S., 'An Attempted Dimensional Analysis of the Law Governing Government Appeals in 
Criminal Cases' p. 128, in The Second International Conference on Artificial Intelligence 
and Law: Proceedings of the Conference ( 1 989) ACM Press. 
66 See further discussion in: Aikenhead, above n. 45, eh 8. 
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of similarity. Systems lack access to all the real world, common sense and other 
knowledge that we use both in the flexible perception of concepts and m 
resolving tensions caused by this flexible perception. The difficulty m 
representing the richness and flexibility of human knowledge in computer 
manipulatable form, and hence the difficulty in addressing semantic flexibility, 
restricts the kind of reasoning that systems can perform. 67 
Researchers have attempted to address semantic flexibility in vanous ways. 
Indeed, focusing on the role played by legal precedents in legal problem 
solving is itself an attempt to address problems of semantic flexibility 
encountered m rule-based approaches to reasonmg. Researchers have 
attempted to address the semantic flexibility evident in reasoning, amongst 
other things, by utilising legal principles and policies and by trying to develop 
'strong' theories of law. Suffice to say that all of these approaches fail to 
eliminate semantic flexibility or the problems to which it gives rise.68 
2.5.3 Argumentation 
The third strand of work m artificial intelligence and law examined here 
focuses on legal reasoning as a process of argument. Law is clearly an 
argumentative endeavour and controversies surrounding the application of 
rules and the similarity or dissimilarity between precedents are addressed 
through argument. Whether or not the preconditions of a rule are actually met 
and whether or not two situations are actually similar, it would be useful to be 
able to simulate the processes of argument through which the controversies 
generated by semantic flexibility are addressed. Indeed it will subsequently be 
67 This affects all systems that seek to simulate legal analogical reasoning: ibid. ch.s 5,6. 
68 For an in depth discussion of attempts in artificial intelligence and law to incorporate 
reasoning with legal precedents see: ibid. eh 6. For a discussion of attempts by researchers 
in artificial intelligence and law to develop 'strong' theories of law, see the discussion of the 
Language for Legal Discourse: ibid. s.6.3.3. 
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asserted in this thesis that argument plays a central role in legal reasoning. 
Nevertheless, simulations of argument have numerous shortcomings. 
For the moment little will be said about the representation of legal reasoning as 
a process of argument - except to note that although argument appears 
inherent in legal reasoning, argument does not appear to comprise legal 
reasoning. The relation between argument and legal reasoning is explored in 
more depth in the following chapter. The examination here focuses on formal 
representations of argument. 
According to Bench-Capon, two distinct approaches are observable in 
computer-based models of legal argument. 59 The first of these approaches uses 
types of logic to model legal argument. The second of these approaches mode.ls 
argument as a process of comparing and contrasting precedents. These are 
examined in turn. Prakken has provided a useful structure through which to 
view logic based representations of argument. Prakken asserts that logic _based 
models of argument are concerned with three main things: (a) the logic to be 
used; (b) an argument framework; and (c) dialectical protocols. 70 Within this 
perspective, the logic is concerned with 'defining a relation of necessary 
consequence between sets of premises and conclusions'. 71 For example, this 
could be syllogistic logic. The argument framework itself has four concerns:(i) 
defining what amounts to an argument; (ii) defining when arguments are in 
conflict and types of conflict; (iii) defining an ordering for conflicting 
arguments; and (iv) definitions for the ultimate status of arguments. Dialectical 
protocols are concerned with the way in which argument occurs as an 
69 Bench-Capon, T., 'Argument in Artificial Intelligence and Law' (1997) 5(4) Artificial 
Intelligence and Law 249. 
70 Prakken, H., 'From Logic to Dialectics in Legal Argument' p. 165, in The Fifth International 
Conference on Artificial Intelligence and Law: Proceedings of the Conference (1 995) ACM 
Press. 
71 Ibid. 166 
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interaction between two parties and define the rules through which the parties 
can interact. 72 
However, while Prakken's framework is useful, it should not mask the 
difficulties underlying the application of logics, argument frameworks and 
dialectical protocols. Regardless of the strengths, weaknesses and idiosyncrasies 
of any particular logic, argumentation framework or protocol, these all depend 
on matching formal descriptions of objects and concepts as discussed in the 
previous subsection. In a logic for example, as Bench-Capon indicates, work is 
concerned with modelling sow1dness of arguments. 73 An example formula in 
predicate calculus is: 
(::Jx)fr 
This can be read as 'There exists at least one x, such that it is f. 74 Similarly: 
(Vx)!X) 
is read as 'For all x, xis f. 75 The difficulty however is in determining whether 
the actual situation under consideration is an 'x, as opposed to a 'y' or 'z', or 
something else. Similarly, for example, in the ordering of arguments specified 
in the argument framework, with a hypothetical ordering that 'A takes 
precedence over B' in every situation it is necessary to unequivocally determine 
whether arguments 'A' and 'B' are present - as opposed to other arguments. In 
essence, this aspect of work on legal argument is very similar to work examined 
above that seeks to represent law as composed of legal rules and represents 
72 Similarly, Feteris classifies research on legal argumentation according to whether it 
investigates logical, rhetorical, or dialogical aspects of argument: Feteris, E.T., 'A survey of 
25 years of research on legal argumentation' (1997) 11(3) Argumentation 355. 
73 Bench-Capon, above n. 69. 
74 The '3' symbol is read as meaning 'there exists', in predicate calculus this is called the 
'existential qualifier': Mitchell, D., An Introduction to Logic (2nd edition) (1964) 
Hutchinson & Co, 95. 
75 The 'V' symbol is read as meaning 'for all', in predicate calculus this is called the 'universal 
qualifier': ibid. Note that although Mitchell uses a different symbol for the universal 
qualifier, '\:/' is widely used and has the same meaning. 
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legal reasoning as the application of those rules. Although the objects of focus 
are different - rules in one case and arguments in the other - the underlying 
approach is analogous. It is certainly not that this work is without value, only 
that it does not escape problems of semantic flexibility. 
The second distinct approach m computer-based models of legal argument 
mentioned by Bench-Capon is based on comparing and contrasting 
precedents. Ashley's work with HYPO is a paradigmatic example of this work. 
The central aim of this work is to simulate how precedents can be used to 
construct and support arguments about how a problem should be resolved. 
This mirrors the way that legal practitioners use precedents to construct and 
support arguments for particular propositions and the way in which alternative 
precedents are cited in order to undermine these arguments. As discussed in 
the previous subsection, HYPO revolves around 'dimensional analysis'. HYPO 
bases the arguments it constructs around these dimensions. In a dispute, the 
presence of certain dimensions and the absence of others will strengthen the 
plaintiffs case while the presence and absence of other dimensions will 
strengthen the defendant's case. A dispute will involve competing dimensions 
and since there is no 'deductive or mathematical process' by which to resolve 
the conflicts between dimensions, precedents are used to support arguments 
about how to resolve conflicting dimensions in a problem. 76 By focusing on 
dimensions, arguments can be constructed and precedents that have shared 
dimensions can be cited in these arguments as support. 
This is a distinctly different approach to argumentation than that adopted in 
logical approaches. While these differences are interesting, for present 
purposes it is sufficient to observe that this approach is restricted by an inability 
to address semantic flexibility. HYPO's limitations in this respect have been 
discussed in the previous subsection. 
76 Ashley, above n. 45, 28. 
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Regardless of the approach adopted to modelling legal argwnent, in reviewing 
this work on argument in artificial intelligence and law, two goals seem 
apparent. The first seeks to develop systems that in some way conduct an 
automated argument with an opponent. That is, systems which seek to refute 
statements made by an opponent and which propose their own counter 
arguments. For present purposes it suffices to observe that, apart from other 
obstacles, such systems are limited by the amount of knowledge formally 
represented in them. Without detailed formalised knowledge about the subject 
being argued about, an automated argwnent system can only make limited 
refutations and counter arguments. 
The second goal of this work does not seek to automatically generate 
arguments or to perform inferences over argwnents in a system. This work 
does not seek to determine what arguments support or refute each other. This 
is not to say that these things aren't useful - they would certainly be useful if 
possible. In contrast to systems that seek to conduct automated argument, the 
second goal of work on computer-based legal argwnent seeks to provide 
systems that impose a formal framework which regulates an argument 
occurring between opponents. For example, if argwnent 'A' is labelled as 
'supporting' argument 'B' and argument 'B' is labelled as 'supporting' 
argument 'C' then the system can indicate that argument 'A' also 'supports' 
argument 'C'. By tracing which arguments are unchallenged and which 
unchallenged arguments have the most support, some indication can be 
provided of which argument is 'winning'. Nothing will be said about the 
representations of argument embodied in these systems - each system 
embodies a potentially different representation of argument. Nor will the 
characteristics of the formal representations be discussed - these too vary from 
system to system. However, it is important to note that in this approach to 
argument, semantic flexibility is less of a problem as the system is merely 
'tracing' relationships which the user determines to be existent or non-existent·. 
The user inherently resolves issues of semantic flexibility in labelling argwnents 
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as 'supporting' or 'attacking' or any of the other relationships supported by a 
particular system. 
It is important to note how different this second approach to computer-based 
argument is to attempts to have a computer automatically propose or refute 
arguments or itself determine which arguments are complimentary or 
contradictory. The latter . is severely limited by our inability to formally 
represent knowledge. The former merely relies on a computer's ability to keep 
track of the many relationships that can exist between arguments. This 
approach to computer-based argument is unproblematic to the extent that it 
relies on the user to label arguments - and not on the system to automatically 
propose arguments or to determine argument relationships. 
2.5.4 Artificial intelligence? 
Disappointingly, research in the field of AI and law has resulted in notably few 
applications. 77 One reason for this is perhaps the aim underlying the 
endeavour. According to Minsky, artificial intelligence is the science of making 
machines do things that would require intelligence if done by people. 78 
Artificial intelligence and law would thereby seek to build systems to perform 
tasks that would require intelligence if performed by a lawyer. Even if the focus 
of artificial intelligence and law is not regarded as the creation of machines that 
could 'truly' be regarded as intelligent, the simulation of intelligence remains a 
central concern. The fteld is intimately concerned with investigating how legal 
knowledge can be expressed in computer manipulatable formalisms and how 
the processes of legal reasoning can be simulated on computer. Within this 
approach it is argued, once the precise operation of legal reasoning is 
understood and once it is understood how to formally represent legal 
knowledge, it will then be possible to automatically perform legal reasoning 
77 A notable exception being SoftLaw: above n. 38. 
78 Minsky, M.L., (ed.) Semantic information processing (1968) MIT Press, v. 
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and automatically solve legal problems. As discussed above though, formalising 
legal knowledge is extremely difficult. As we will see in the following chapter, a 
precise description of legal reasoning remains elusive. So far this difficulty has 
made simulations of legal reasoning of any degree of complexity impossible. 
None of the above means that the goal of artificial intelligence and law is 
fundamentally impossible, only that so far it has proved elusive. 
The construction of computer systems that could independently reason with the 
law and automatically solve legal problems would be of undoubted beneftt for 
the legal knowledge worker. Such systems could independently process some of 
the masses of information that workers are presented with, reducing it, refming 
it and distilling it into a more valuable and manageable essence. However, if 
this goal is currently largely out of reach then the practical benefit of artificial 
intelligence as a path to legal knowledge processing is limited. 
2.6 Augmenting knowledge work- computer support for sensemaking 
The concept of knowledge-based systems in law, systems that help manipulate 
knowledge rather than just information, has come to be synonymous with the 
application of artificial intelligence. If this goal is currently unattainable then 
this apparently limits the possibility of legal knowledge processing. If the 
prospects for artificial intelligence in law are currently limited, the hope of 
addressing the knowledge processing lag appear remote. 
The application of artificial intelligence in law is based on a specific vision of 
the relationship between computers and people. It is based on a vision of 
computers that replace many of the intelligent tasks people perform. In 
contrast to this automation paradigm, more than 25 years ago the idea of tools 
to aid the knowledge worker - and not to replace her - was prominent in the 
thinking of researchers such as Engelbart: 
But the very great importance of aspects other than the new tools 
makes us prefer the "augmentation" term that hopefully can remain 
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"whole-scope." We want to keep tools in proper perspective within the 
total system that augments native human capacities toward effective 
action.79 
The notion of augmenting knowledge work, rather than automating it, ts a 
powerful one. If we cannot build tools to automate legal knowledge work can 
we nevertheless augment that work? 
The concept of augmentation is suggestive and has been adopted by various 
researchers in computing. For example, Brown examines the idea of 'cognitive 
ergonomics'. 80 Suthers refers to mental 'scaffolding'81 when discussing human-
computer systems. Although Brown and Suthers refer to uses in different 
contexts, the commonality is the use of computers to improve the knowledge 
work people perform. 
The concept of augmentation has informed numerous strands of research in 
computing. For example, 'computer supported cooperative work', which 
investigates means of using computers to promote teamwork and the 
communication and transfer of knowledge within teams, is predicated on the 
use of technology to augment the sharing of information and improvement of 
group interaction. The concept of augmentation has also informed work in 
fields such as 'decision support systems,' 'group decision support systems', 
79 Engelbart, D. C., Watson, R.W. and Norton, J.C., 'The Augmented Knowledge Workshop' p. 
9, in AFIPS Conference Proceedings, National Computer Conference (1973). See also: 
Engelbart, D.C., 'Augmenting Human Intellect: A Conceptual Framework' (1962) Report 
AFOSR-3223, SRI Project 3578, Stanford Research Institute, Menlo Park, Ca. 
80 Brown, J.S., 'From cognitive ergonomics to social ergonomics and beyond' p. 457, in 
Norman, D.A. and Draper, S.W. (eds.) User centred system design (1986) Lawrence 
Erlbaum Associates. 
81 Suthers, D., 'Representations for Scaffolding Collaborative Inquiry on Ill-Structured 
Problems' ( 1 998) Presented at the 1998 conference of the American Educational Research 
Association, April 1998, San Diego. Available at: 
http://lilt.ics.hawaii.edu/lilt/papers/aera98. pdf ( accessed 15/12/2001 ). 
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'negotiation support systems' and hybrid versions of such systems. Negotiation 
and decision-making are vital in legal problem solving. Such systems might 
thus provide a valuable means with which to augment legal knowledge work. 
However, work on decision-support systems and related systems has 
predominantly focused on 'quantitative' decision support. For example, 
Bayesian belief networks and decision trees (both of which allow the 
diagramming of decisions) focus on facilitating the performance of calculations 
in a form of inference. Quantitative decision analysis is based on the existence 
of consensus as to what the possible options and choices are in any problem 
and where the only uncertainty is how to best choose between the enumerated 
options. In contrast, this thesis investigates the possibility of 'qualitative' 
decision support. 82 Decision-support systems encounter difficulty where it is 
unclear what the available options are and where it is difficult to quantify the 
available options. In this respect work in 'decision support systems' is not 
designed to support the 'ill-structured'83 nature characteristic of many 
problems. 84 Qualitative decision support has a wider remit, also exploring how 
82 This is a distinction drawn by Lee: Lee, J., 'SIBYL: A qualitative decision management 
system' p. 105, in Winston, P. and Shellard, S. (eds.) Artificial intelligence at MIT: 
Expanding frontiers (1990) MIT Press hereafter 'Lee 1990a'. Similarly, Sutherland 
distinguishes on the one hand between Group Decision Support Systems and Group 
Decision and Negotiation Support Systems, and on the other hand, support for judgment 
based decision making': Sutherland, J.W., 'Extending the reach of collective decision 
support systems: Provisions for disciplining judgment-driven exercises' (2000) 48 Theory 
and Decision 1. Sutherland argues the existence of: 
a family of collective decision support facilities not as yet well represented in either 
GDSS or GDNSS designs, i.e., facilities to assist a collectivity is [sic] arriving at a 
rational resolution to decision exercises that are too technically intractable to allow an 
algorithm-driven decision choice, but not so ill-structured as to rule out anything but a 
subjectively-engined outcome. (Sutherland, 6.) 
Notably though, Sutherland does not examine any of the Toulmin, IBIS, QOC, and other 
systems which are discussed below. 
83 The nature of such problems is discussed in more detail in the following chapter. 
84 Sutherland, above n. 82, 3. 
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options are generated, how options evolve and how choices and decisions can 
be made in situations where quantification is impractical. To this end, a new 
class of 'argumentation decision support systems' has been proposed. 85 
2. 7 Discussion 
Lawyers would appear to be paradigmatic knowledge workers. It is typical to 
regard lawyers as the paradigm of professions and the practice of law as 
requiring much education, understanding, skill and intelligence. The 
application of artificial intelligence in law has promised legal workers radical 
new tools to enhance their work and promised to reduce the legal knowledge 
processing lag. However, applications of artificial intelligence in law founder on 
various troublesome aspects of law - legal concepts are fluid, they are 
semantically flexible and their content is determined not only during their 
application, but changes over time. This flexibility confounds logic based 
approaches to simulating legal reasoning, automated determinations of 
similarity and automated argumentation on which legal problem solving seems 
to depend. 
An alternative approach to creating legal knowledge-based systems and to 
addressing the knowledge processing lag is to use computers to augment legal 
knowledge work. In contrast to the automation of legal knowledge work, 
augmentation investigates how computers, jointly regarded with their users as 
knowledge processing systems, can best be built to support knowledge work. 
While the apparent cost of such an approach is loss of the power to perform 
automated reasoning, given the currently limited practical scope for this, this is 
not be a big loss compared with the potential gains from focusing on 
augmentation. Certainly, augmentation does not exclude automation m 
85 Hua, G.H., Kimbrough, S.O., 'On hypermedia-based argumentation decision support 
systems' (1998) 22 Decision support systems. 259. 
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support of reasonmg, only acceptance that practical applications must 
acknowledge the limitations of automated reasoning. 
There are potentially many ways to augment legal knowledge work. Knowledge 
workers perform a variety of tasks and each could potentially be provided with 
computer support. To a degree, supporting each task augments knowledge 
work. The focus here is narrower. As discussed above, making sense of 
information is central to knowledge work. Support for making sense would thus 
be beneficial. In this respect, augmenting legal knowledge work requires more 
understanding of what making sense in law involves. The following chapter 
examines theories of law, legal reasoning and legal problem solving. This 
chapter proposes a representation of law and a representation of legal 
reasoning on which systems to augment legal knowledge work could be based. 
This examination forms the basis for subsequent chapters which examine 
systems to augment legal work. 
3 Wicked legal problems 
3.1 Introduction 
While I am writing, I'm far away; 
and when I come back, I've gone. 
I would like to know if others 
go through the same things that I do, 
have as many selves as I have, 
and see themselves similarly; 
and when I've exhausted this problem, 
I'm going to study so hard 
that when I explain myself, 
I'll be talking geography. 
Pablo N eruda 
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The previous chapter examined the use of computers, and particularly 
knowledge-based systems, to support legal work. It was argued that work on 
knowledge-based systems has focused on the use of artiftcial intelligence. 
Artificial intelligence seeks to automate legal knowledge work. In contrast to 
automating legal work, it was argued that augmentation of legal knowledge 
work would be beneficial. 
Computer applications necessarily embody a theory of law and a theory of legal 
reasoning. 86 Computer applications in law necessarily embody a representation 
86 For work explicitly discussing the role of legal theory in the creation of computer tools for 
use in law, see e.g.: Susskind, R.E., Expert systems in law (1987) Clarendon; Zeleznikow and 
Hunter, above n. 35; Valente, A., Legal Knowledge Engineering: A modelling approach 
(1995) IOS Press, Ohmsha; Visser, P.R.S., Knowledge Specifi~ation for Multiple Legal 
Tasks: A Case Study of the Interaction Problem in the Legal Domain (1995) Kluwer Law 
International. 
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of law and a representation of legal reasoning. Program designers consciously 
or unconsciously create the representation of law embodied in a computer 
program. 87 This is whether the computer application seeks to itself automate 
legal reasoning or to support lawyers in their work. However, whether 
consciously or unconsciously embodied, these representations must reflect the 
way lawyers work within the law. Work in artificial intelligence and law is based 
on particular representations of law and representations of legal reasoning -
representations that this chapter argues are potentially misleading. This 
chapter examines theories of law and theories of legal reasoning in order to 
better understand the limitations of automation and to clarifY how 
augmentation might occur. 
The law and legal reasonmg can be examined from numerous perspectives. 
The development of law through history can be examined. The social and 
political influences on and effects of the law and legal structures can be 
scrutinized. According to Kelly, one tension running through theories of law is 
a conception of the relationship between the individual and the law - the 
relation between individual identity and freedom and the constraints imposed 
by the legal order. 88 The relationship between the individual decision maker 
and the law is of central importance for the creation of computer systems that 
augment legal knowledge work. This chapter examines the descriptive 
elements of various theories of law and legal reasoning in light of this 
relationship. 89 This chapter concludes with the presentation of a perspective on 
law and legal reasoning - a representation of legal reasoning as a process of 
'sensemaking' - that is of particular importance for work on computer tools to 
augment legal knowledge work. 
87 This observation is what motivates the work on ontologies of law in artificial intelligence and 
law, e.g.: Valente, above n. 86 and Visser, above n. 86. 
88 Kelly, J.M., A Short History of Western Legal Theory (1992) Clarendon Press. 
89 Normative aspects are not examined as this thesis is concerned with supporting the 
processes of legal reasoning, not specifYing how they should operate. 
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Following this introduction, the next subsection examines several descriptive 
theories of law that underpin work in artificial intelligence and law. This 
subsection argues that these theories of law present an unbalanced 
representation of legal reasoning. The third subsection briefly exammes a 
theory of law, which while not having been adopted in artificial intelligence in 
law, is a useful complement to the preceding examination. Subsection four 
presents a representation of law as a process of 'sensemaking'. This subsection 
explores what sensemaking in law involves and how it relates to the previously 
examined theories of legal reasoning. The fifth and final subsection in this 
chapter examines aspects of sensemaking that are particularly relevant for the 
creation of computer tools to augment legal knowledge work. It is argued that 
central to sensemaking are processes of argumentation. Moreover, this 
subsection argues that visualisation is a process that can be extremely beneficial 
in sensemaking. Hence, it is proposed that visualisations of processes of 
sensemaking and in particular, visualisation of processes of argumentation, can 
be highly beneficial for legal sensemaking. 
The examination of law and legal reasoning undertaken in this chapter, and 
the perspective on legal reasoning as a process of sensemaking proposed here, 
form the basis for subsequent chapters which examine computer tools that 
might augment legal sensemaking. 
3.2 Law as an object 
It is a commonplace to talk about 'the law' and to discuss 'legal reasoning' 
acting on that law.90 It is common to speak of 'the law'- as something separate 
from other things - and of 'legal reasoning' - as a specialised tool that is used 
90 In many ways talking about 'legal reasoning' is inherently vague. As discussed in subsection 
3.5, it is highly doubtfi.Il that there is only one type of reasoning that is used when thinking 
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to examme the law in order to solve problems. 91 Viewing law in this way is 
linked to deep-rooted views about the purpose of law in society. Central to 
these is the view that the law is an objective, rational means to order society and 
regulate human relationships. Law is perceived as the means of restraining 
excesses of official use of power, of regulating the behaviour of individuals, and 
hence balancing the needs and desires of the population in a just way. 
3.2.1 Law as rules 
This conception of law and of the 'rule of law' is embedded in Western legal 
thought. According to Kelly, although the notion of the rule of law is not 
abstractly expressed in classical Greek writings, the general feeling of a 
sovereignty oflaw was a source of Greek pride.92 Thus Plato states that: 
For wherever in a state the law is subservient and impotent, over that 
state I see ruin impending; but wherever . the law is lord over the 
magistrates, and the magistrates are servants to the law, there I descry 
salvation ... 93 
Similarly, Aristotle says that 'we do not permit a man to rule, but the law.'94 
Corresponding sentiments are evident m Roman legal theory. Cicero wrote 
that: 
about the law and legal problems. Nevertheless, unless circumstances require it, this 
discussion will continue to examine 'legal reasoning' as a generic whole. 
91 A further difficulty when discussing legal reasoning is simply the overwhelming number of 
theories of legal reasoning that exist. In a non minimal sense any discussion about the law 
inherently implicates a theory of what the law is and is not, as MacCormick has said, every 
'theory of legal reasoning requires and is required by a theory of law': MacCormick, N., 
Legal Reasoning and Legal Theory (1978) Oxford University Press, 229. There are thus 
differences in the conception of legal reasoning proposed by different legal theorists, such 
differences being inherently tied to the nature of law proposed by the theorist. 
92 Kelly, above n. 88, 25. 
93 Plato cited in Kelly, above n. 88, 25. 
94 Aristotle cited in Kelly, above n. 88, 25 
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True law is right reason in agreement with nature, diffused among all 
men; constant and unchanging, it should call men to their duties by its 
precepts, and deter them from wrongdoing by its prohibitions ... To 
curtail this law is unholy, to amend it illicit, to repeal it impossible; nor 
can we be dispensed from it by the order either of senate or of popular 
assembly; nor need we look for anyone to clarifY or interpret it; nor will 
it be one law at Rome and a different one at Athens, nor otherwise 
tomorrow than it is today; but one and the same Law, eternal and 
unchangeable, will bind all peoples and all ages; and God, its designer, 
expounder and enacte.r, will be as it were the sole and universal ruler 
95 
As expressed by Cicero, this conception of law is one of a higher, divinely 
inspired, natural order.96 As divinely inspired, law is not merely a means to 
order the common good for society as a whole, it also commands and prohibits, 
it controls the actions of individuals. As St Thomas Aquinas wrote in the middle 
ages, law is a: 
rule or measure of action in virtue of which one is led to perform certain 
actions and restrained from the performance of others'97 
Though rejecting the natural and divine as the source of law - instead placing 
man himself at the centre of a legal order for regulating his own affairs - early 
positivists maintained a conception of law as a defined framework itself 
controlling behaviour and ordering society. Thus, Bentham expounded the 
notion of 'complete law': 
To have the effect of a complete law it should be made to appear such in 
the eyes of those who are concerned in it: to the citizen who is to take it, 
... for the measure of his conduct; to the judge who is to take it for the 
measure of his decision: and to the legislator, who ... should be able to 
95 Cicero cited in Kelly, above n. 88, 58-9 
96 Kelly, above n. 88, 19-21 
97 St Thomas Aquinas cited in Kelly, above n. 88, 135. 
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see at a moment's glance what it is he hath done. It ought accordingly to 
be consigned to paper, and that in such a form that anyone who opens a 
volume of the code may lay his finger upon it and say this is one law: and 
this is another: here the first begins, and there ends: here are all the 
parts, and these together are what makes the whole of it.98 
As Austin, a student of Bentham, made clear, the law commands obedience -
indeed the law is a set of commands from superiors to inferiors: 
The matter of jurisprudence is positive law: law, simply and strictly so 
called: or law set by political superiors to political inferiors.99 
Again, these commands prescribe the behaviour of individuals: 
A law, ... may be said to be a rule laid clown for the guidance of an 
intelligent being by an intelligent being having power over him. 100 
Just as early theorists expounded an all encompassmg unchanging law, 
Benthem and Austin promoted the notion of the complete, well defined and 
comprehensive law. The conception remains of a legal order in which solving 
problems is simply a matter of referring to the law itself and hence from which 
human caprice is removed. 
This conception of law has continued to be highly influential in nineteenth and 
twentieth century legal theory. Indeed, from being defined and complete, 
Langdell went so far as to call law a 'science'. According to Langdell it is: 
indispensable to establish at least two things; first that law is a science; 
secondly, that all the available materials of that science are contained in 
printed books . . . . the library is the proper workshop of professors and 
students alike; that it is to us all that the laboratories of the university are 
98 Quoted in Lloyd, above n. l, 207. 
99 Quoted in Lloyd, ibid. 
100 Ibid. 208. 
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to the chemists and physicists, all that the museum of natural history is to 
the zoologist, all that the botanical garden is to the botanist. 101 
As Twining argues, the central idea conjured up by this analogy is the idea of 
order. 102 In this vein, law consists solely of doctrines and principles to order 
behaviour. 103 
Given the importance of rules in what have been labelled 'formalist' theories of 
law, it is tempting to follow Frank's lead and criticise formalists for an 
adherence to 'mechanical justice'. 104 A mechanical justice that operates with 
hierarchies of ever more abstract rules; rules which apply without regard to the 
merits or demerits of the situation and which apply to every instant case to 
determine a legal result. However, it is more difficult to find conceptions of law 
that conform to this extreme. While the writings of Benthem, Austin and 
Langdell might border on this, other jurists who emphasise the importance of 
rules nevertheless acknowledge an element of human agency in rule 
application. 
For example, while in Kelsen's 'pure theory of law' all laws can trace their 
validity back to an overarching 'basic norm', Kelsen also viewed law making as a 
dynamic even 'political' process. 105 Kelsen did not regard the basic norm as 
prescribing particular norms and thus particular results in every situation - he 
acknowledged that the content of norms is simply developed based on higher 
norms, and that this development was a dynamic process. 106 Kelsen states that 
if: 
101 Quoted in Twining, W., Karl Llewellyn and the Realist Movement (1973) Weidenfeld and 
Nicholson, 11-12. 
102 Ibid. 12. 
103 Ibid. 13. 
104 Frank, J., Law and the Modem Mind (1949) Stevens & Sons Limited, eh XIII. 
105 Kelsen, H., Pure theory of law (1967) University ofCalifomia Press, 198. 
106 Ibid. 
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law is to be applied by a legal organ, he must determine the meaning of 
the norms to be applied: he must "interpret" these norms. 
Interpretation, therefore, is an intellectual activity, which accompanies 
the process of law application in its advance from a higher to a lower 
level. 107 
Interpretation: 
need not necessarily lead to a single decision as the only correct one, but 
possibly to several, which are all of equal value .... 108 
Similarly, Hart did not regard either pnmary or secondary rules as 
determinate. Hart discussed the 'open texture' of rules arguing that rules have 
a 'core' of settled meaning and that only the 'penumbra' suffers from vagueness 
or ambiguity. Hart thought that there is inherent indeterminacy in legal rules 
and precedents, stating it: 
is impossible in framing general rules to anticipate and provide for every 
possible combination of circumstances which the future may bring. 109 
In cases of indeterminacy, Hart talks of the opposing values and reasons and of 
courts: 
forced to balance or weigh them and to determine priorities among 
them. no 
Hart clearly acknowledges the role of the individual in judgment. 
Nevertheless, Kelsen's goal was a 'pure theory of law' which sought to 'eliminate 
from the object of description everything that is not strictly 'law' 111 - such as 
moral judgments and political biases. Although Kelsen acknowledged that such 
factors might influence the interpretation of norms, 112 he regarded this as 
107 Ibid. 348. 
108 Ibid. 351. 
109 Quoted in Lloyd, above n. 1, 794. 
110 Ibid. 797. 
111 Kelsen, above n. 105, 1. 
112 Ibid. 353. 
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outside the field of positive law. Similarly, while Hart acknowledged the need to 
'weigh' the results of the application of legal rules, he was not concerned with 
the actual operation of the process that this mechanistic metaphor conjures up. 
Certainly, by arguing that only the rules of law need be examined, Kelsen and 
Hart endorse a rule oriented view of law. 
This notion of an authoritative law, controlling and ordering society IS a 
hallmark of Western legal thought. 113 The conception of law as composed of 
rules governing human interaction, evident in both natural law and positivistic 
theories of law, is striking not so much for arguments about where the power of 
law derives but rather the nature of law as a collection of controlling rules that 
is thus conceived. This is a conception of law that has been highly influential in 
artificial intelligence and law - it has underpinned work on rule-based 
systems. 114 This is also a conception of law that has come under sustained 
criticism. Such criticisms are numerous and varied. For present purposes it is 
sufficient to highlight the semantic flexibility to which the terms of legal rules 
are subject. 115 
3.2.2 Experience and legal precedents 
This overwhelming concern with the rules of law, and the difficulty in 
determining the scope of rules, was criticised by Justice Holmes who in an often 
quoted passage stated: 
The life of the law has not been logic: it has been experience. The felt 
necessities of the time, the prevalent moral and political theories, 
intuitions of public policy, avowed or unconscious, even the prejudices 
which judges share with their fellow-men, have had a good deal more to 
do than the syllogism in determining the rules. 116 
113 Kelly, above n. 88, 183. 
114 See 2.5.1 for an examination of this work. 
115 See: 2.5.1. 
116 Holmes, O.W., The common law (c1881) Little, Brown, 1. 
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The inadequacy of rules for determining legal problems was a theme adopted 
by the American Realists. 117 This scepticism about rules as determinants of 
decisions and this concern with the law's 'experience' prompted Levi to 
emphasise the importance of precedent in Anglo-American law. Thus 
according to Levi, it: 
is important that the mechanism of legal reasonmg should not be 
concealed by its pretense. The pretense is that the law is a system of 
known rules applied by a judge; the pretense has long been under 
attack. 118 
In contrast according to Levi: 
The basic pattern of legal reasonmg ts reasonmg by example. It LS 
reasoning from case to case. 119 
This occurs in a three step process: 
1. similarity is seen between cases, 
2. the rule of law inherent in the first case is announced; and 
3. the rule oflaw is made applicable to the second case. 120 
117 However, as Frank points out, this label masks a multitude of views and in that respect is 
problematic: Frank, above n. 104, preface to the 6th printing vi-viii. According to Frank, 
sceptics could be divided into two groups: 'rule sceptics'; and 'fact sceptics'. Rule sceptics 
argue that the rules - the 'paper rules' - expressed in court are unreliable guides to the 
prediction of decisions and that instead 'real rules' can be found based on regularities in 
actual judicial behaviour; Frank viii. Fact sceptics, amongst whom Frank places himself, 
agree that paper rules do not predict decisions but further argue that the elusiveness of the 
facts on which decisions turn make it impossible to predict decisions in most disputes; 
Frank, ix. 
118 Levi, E. H., An Introduction to Legal Reasoning (1 949) University of Chicago Press, 1 
footnote omitted. Notably in this footnote, Levi states 'The controlling book is Frank, Law 
and the Modern Mind (1936)'. 
119 Ibid. 2. 
120 Ibid. 1. Burton, S.J., An introduction to law and legal reasoning (1985) Little, Brown & Co, 
26-39 gives a similar taxonomy. Levi's view has been criticised by Murray, J.R., 'The Role of 
Analogy in Legal Reasoning' (1982) 29(4) UCLA Law Review 833, 848-50 and also by 
Sunstein, C.R., 'On Analogical Reasoning' (1993) 106 Harvard Law Review 741, footnote 
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Reflecting its premier position m the process, Levi states that the 'finding of 
similarity or difference is the key step in the legal reasoning process.' 121 Far 
from being deterministic however, this finding of similarity is for the individual 
judge.I22 
Levi's emphasis on the role of cases in shaping law and legal decisions forms 
the basis for much jurisprudence examining and emphasising the role of case 
law and analogical reasoning in Anglo-American jurisprudence. 123 Indeed Cross 
has stated that analogising is central to legal reasoning since there is a formal 
principle of justice that requires 'treating like cases alike' .124 Similarly, 
MacCormick and Summer argue that the use of precedents in decision making 
is a critical element of rationality.125 
63 and Cross, R., Precedent in English Law (3rd edition) (1977) Clarendon Press, 182 
footnote 2. The substance of these criticisms differ. This discussion is in accord with these 
criticisms in arguing that Levi's examination of analogy leaves many questions 
unaddressed. Levi's examination is nevertheless commendable for its clarity. 
121 Levi, above n. 118, 2. 
122 Ibid. When discussing the doctrine of stare decisjs, Cross states that the discovery of the 
ratjo decidendi" of the previous case is 'primarily a psychological problem': Cross, above n. 
120, 187. Justice Keeton says interpretation should be consistent with 'common sense': 
Keeton, R.E., 'Statutory analogy, purpose and policy in legal reasoning: live lobsters and a 
tiger cub in the park' (1993) 52 Maryland Law Review 1192, 1204. This of course leaves 
open however, the thorny question of what amounts to common sense and how is it made. 
MacCormick is content to state that acts 'are not determined by logic, they are determined 
by the choices of agents, and by whatever, if anything, that determined those choices.': 
MacCormick, above n. 91, 33. 
123 E.g.: Burton, above n. 120; Brewer, S., 'Exemplary reasoning- semantics, pragmatics, and 
the rational force of legal argument by analogy' (1996) 109(5) Harvard Law Review 923; 
Golding, M.P., Legal reasoning (1984) Alfred Knopf; Sunstein, above n. 120. 
124 Cross, above n 120. 
125 MacCormick, D.N., Summers, R.S., (eds.) Interpreting Precedents: a comparative study 
(1997) Dartmouth, 5-6. 
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However, while accepting that cases play an important role in legal problem 
solving, maintaining laws determinacy is nevertheless of paramow1t concern. 
The fear, as voiced by U nger, is that if cases - which can be similar and 
dissimilar in innumerable ways - are used to justifY decisions then they can 
consequently be used to justifY innumerable decisions. 126 The docu·ine of stare 
decisis and the troublesome search for the ratio decidendP7 within a case are 
expressions of this desire to restrict capricious analogising. Indeed Brewer has 
gone so far as to argue that judges should be interpreted as structuring 
analogies with deductive 'analogy warranting rules'. According to Brewer this is 
necessary to satisfY 'rule of law' ideals which in turn explain why analogies are 
justified. 128 With such analogy warranting rules, the 'rational force' of 
analogising is preserved. 129 
Thus, under this conception of precedent, even if the rules by themselves do 
not determine decisions, rules used with reference to cases do determine 
decisions. 130 The irony is that reasoning with cases comes to be conceived within 
a deductive mould and the problem of determining the scope of any rules then 
re-emerges - the very problem Levi originally sought to address. 
If a deductive model of precedents is rejected, the difficulty re-anses of 
determining when cases are alike. Any set of circumstances will resemble each 
other in some ways and differ in others. As Levi wrote: 
The problem for the law is: When will it be just to treat different cases as 
though they were the same? A working legal system must therefore be 
126 Unger, R.M., The Critical Legal Studies Movement' (1983) 96 Harvard Law Review 561, 
571. 
127 Stone, above n. 42. 
128 Brewer, above n. 123, 992. See also: Golding, above n. 123, eh 3. 
129 Brewer, above n 123, 928. 
13° For example the work of Brewer, ibid. and Golding, above n. 123 provide near mechanical 
models of the operation of analogising in law. 
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willing to pick out key similarities and to reason from them to the justice 
of applying a common classification. 131 
3.2.3 Legal principles 
According to Levi, the perception of cases as similar or different is a process of 
classification within ever moving legal categories. 132 However, Levi only hints at 
what drives this classification, when at the end of his examination he mentions 
the role of 'legal theory.' 133 Levi does not discuss in depth what such legal 
theory involves. However, the idea that 'higher' evaluative standards control 
analogising is an influential one in legal theory. For example, MacCormick 
argues at length that it is legal principles that determine situations being 
regarded as similar. 134 According to MacCormick, the finding of similarity is 
dependent on the overall purposes that the legal system is trying to achieve, 
which are in turn expressed in the principles that the law recognises and in the 
balance that is achieved amongst those principles. 135 Sunstein reaches similar 
conclusions. 136 
For present purposes, the comparative details of these theories are not 
important. The interesting aspect of this work emphasising legal principles is 
the concern to relocate a constraint for legal decision-making. Rather than 
decision-making driven on an ad hoc case-by-case basis, the use of legal 
principles provides a general, principled, strategy for decision-making. Indeed, 
131 Levi, above n. 118, 3. 
132 Ibid. 8. 
133 Ibid. 103. 
134 MacCormick states: 'Analogies only make sense if there are reasons of principle underlying 
them.': MacCormick, above n. 91, 186. Similar positions are expressed by Golding, above 
n. 123 and Sunstein, above n. 120. 
135 MacCormick, above n 91, eh. 5 et seq. 
136 Sunstein, above n. 120. It is ironic how in some of this work, analogising is cast in a 
deductive mould e.g.: Brewer, above n. 123 and Golding, above n. 123 
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legal principles come to be seen as not only constraining the use of precedents 
but as ultimately driving and constraining the application of legal rules. Thus 
according to MacCormick: 
The decision whether to interpret a statute restrictively or extensively, or 
the decision whether to explain and distinguish or follow by extending a 
case-law rule is ... in part at least based on arguments from legal 
principles ... 137 
Legal principles come to be seen as the ultimate constraint in legal reasoning. 
This picture of an empire of rules and principles is perhaps most sweepingly 
expressed in Dworkin's work. According to Dworkin, principles not only guide 
decision-making but also control to the extent that the vast majority of disputes 
in law have right answers. 138 Dworkin argues that solving legal disputes involves 
construction of: 
a scheme of abstract and concrete principles that provides a coherent 
justification for all common law precedents and, so far as these are to be 
justified on principle, constitutional and statutory provision as well. 139 
Within this framework, the ultimate constraint is achieved. Dworkin states that: 
It remains the judge's duty, even in hard cases, to discover what the 
rights of the parties are, not to invent new rights retrospectively .140 
Through the application and interaction of rules of law, precedents and legal 
principles, the law achieves its aim of restraining individual discretion. By 
focusing on the law, and solely on the law, disputes can be resolved. 
Despite the desire to constrain reasonmg through the application of legal 
principles, highlighting the importance of legal principles does not fully 
illuminate how legal reasoning occurs. A reasoner may adhere to particular 
137 MacCormick, above n. 91, 231, see generally ch.s VII and VIII. 
138 Dworkin, R., Taking Rights Seriously (1977) Gerald Duckworth & Co. 
139 Ibid. 116-7. 
140 Ibid. 81. 
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legal principles and given adherence to these legal principles, particular cases 
might be regarded as similar and a particular rule as applicable. In this sense, 
focusing on principles, cases and rules tells us a lot about what legal reasoning 
involves. However, why a reasoner adheres to particular principles rather than 
others, and how these principles are given content and related to other 
principles is itself left unclear. As Sunstein observes when discussing the use of 
precedents, although we may adhere to a principle or set of principles, the 
consequences of this may be unclear - for the application of the principles we 
adhere to: 
1s an important part of the development of those principles ..... We 
cannot know what it is that we think until we explore a range of cases. 
Principles are thus both generated and tested through confrontation 
with particular cases. 141 
The application of principles itself changes the conception of those principles. 
However, if principles themselves change during use then it is questionable how 
principles can fully constrain legal reasoning. 
Regardless of the precise kind and degree of constraint that legal rules, legal 
precedents and legal principles have on decision-making, it is notable that in 
focusing solely on these, legal reasoning is largely divorced from the individual 
who is purportedly engaged in that reasoning. In the drive to constrain 
individual decision-making, reasoning comes to be regarded as disembodied. 
All that is important here are the legal objects which direct problem solving. 
This is a an 'Objectivist' conception of law. 
However, reasoning is always performed by someone. 142 It is individuals who 
think about and apply the law. Legal objects may be regarded as relevant to a 
given dispute but if they are not self-applying, who is it that does this 
141 Sunstein, above n. 120, 775. Levi noted this early on stating that the 'rules change as the 
rules are applied': Levi, above n. 1183-4. See also MacConnick, above n. 91. 
142 At least perhaps until the field of artificial intelligence and law fulfils it promises. 
62 
regarding? It cannot be anyone other than the individual considering the 
resolution of the dispute. It is up to this individual to conclude how the dispute 
should be resolved. Unsurprisingly, this representation of law and legal 
reasoning - as a process involving the objective application of determinative, 
formal laws that control decision-making and determine legal outcomes - has 
come under sustained criticism. 
3.3 The radically free thinker 
The vision of law as objectively and impassively controlling decisions has been 
called one of the central ideas of modern legal thought. 143 It is also an image of 
law that has been subject to sustained criticism by the American Realists, and 
more recently by the Critical Legal Studies (CLS) movement. 144 In this light, 
CLS scholars criticise the invocation of rules, cases: 
impersonal purposes, policies, and principles as an indispensable 
component of legal reasoning. 145 
In contrast to the control imposed by these, according to U nger: 
legal reasoning seems condemned to a game of easy analogies. It will 
always be possible to find, retrospectively, more or less convincing ways 
to make a set of distinctions, or failures to distinguish, look credible .... 
Because everything can be defended, nothing can. 146 
In stark contrast to the constraint cortiured up by Dworkin, U nger sees an 
'incorrigible indeterminacy.' 147 
Focusing on the rules, cases and principles oflaw directs problem solving into a 
search for means to satisfY the requirements of those legal objects - a search for 
the components of the legal rule or a search for the elements which will make a 
143 Unger, above n. 126, 563. 
144 For a characterisation of this movement by a participant see: Unger, above n. 126. 
145 Ibid. 564. 
146 Ibid. 570. 
147 Ibid. 579. 
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precedent similar. A search for the constituents of the legal principle. Problem 
solving takes place within the boundaries of the categories specified by the 
rules, precedents and principles. In contrast, adherents of CLS argue that: 
"Reality" is not carved up into categories that representational systems 
happen to match. Rather, "reality" is constructed in the very process of 
description or representation. 
Representation depends on prior categories within which events 
are taken as similar or dissimilar. When the categories are taken to 
reflect a reality that exists prior to the representational system, the 
analogical reasoning with the categories appears natural and necessary 
rather than artificial and contingent. 148 
In contrast to demonstrating a system of control by legal rules, cases and 
principles, CLS seeks to show: 
how power-ridden and manipulable materials gam a semblance of 
authority, necessity, and determinacy and thus how formalism and 
objectivism seem plausible. 149 
Roots of this view can be traced to the American Realists and statements such as 
Frank's that legal rules are 'indeterminate' .150 However CLS pushes one step 
further this criticism of a reliance on legal rules and argues that legal rules and 
principles merely serve to protect the existing social order from criticism and 
change. 151 Accordingly, in critiquing the reliance on rules, cases and principles 
comes the freedom to reconceive social relations. 152 While American Realists 
stopped at highlighting indeterminacies in legal reasoning, CLS seeks to 
advance 'leftist' aims. 153 According to Unger: 
148 Peller, G., 'The Metaphysics of American Law' (1 985) 73 California Law Review 1151, 1177. 
149 Unger, above n. 126, 579. 
15° Frank, above n. 104. 
151 Unger, above n. 126, 563-7. 
152 Ibid. 579. 
153 Ibid. 566-7. 
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The constructive outcome of our critique of objectivism is to turn us 
toward the search for alternative institutional forms of the available 
institutional ideals, most especially the market and democracy. 154 
This rejection of formalism thus views the resolution of legal disputes as subject 
to the 'normal modes of moral and political controversy.'155 
This is a representation of law as manipulatable and a representation of legal 
reasoning as personal choice. At the extreme, it is a representation where law 
provides no guidance m decision-making and where reasonmg ts 
unconstrained. If legal materials are indeed indeterminate, or incorrigibly 
indeterminate, then potentially any, and all, results are justifiable. 
Objectivist and CLS representations of law thus appear in stark opposition. 
Indeed, where objectivism seeks to remove the legal reasoner through focusing 
on the constraining power of the legal materials themselves, CLS embodies a 
conception of the legal actor as a 'radically free subject.' 156 Rather than being 
controlled by the legal materials, this radically free subject is free to reconceive 
social and legal structures, to choose amongst these alternatives and to 
implement the choice made. Rather than being controlled by objects of the 
legal order, the individual in CLS is able to perceive the elements of that order 
and to reconnect them to achieve any particular desired end. 
However, Schlag argues that this seemingly stark contrast, this apparent 
divergence, actually masks a fundamental sameness. According to Schlag: 
The recurrent picture informing critical legal thought is that legal 
thinkers are already politically and morally competent subjects who are 
154 Ibid. 583. 
155 Ibid. 579. 
156 Schlag, P., The Problem of the Subject' (1991) 69 Texas Law Review 1627. 
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systematically mystified and constrained by an oppressive object-order of 
legal structures ... 157 
This 'object-order of legal relations' is of course the same order used by 
formalists to constrain discretion. Whereas the formalist uses this order to 
constrain, CLS sees the individual as perceptive of this order and free to move 
outside it. The sameness then is the acceptance of the existence of this object-
order of legal structures. 
For Schlag acceptance of the existence of this object-order of legal relations 
raises two problems: 
One problem is that we are missing any convincing accounts of who or 
what it is that thinks or produces law. Another problem is that 
apparently we and our legal rhetoric have been constituted to avoid 
inquiry into this question of who or what produces law. 158 
Schlag calls this desire by formalist theory on the one hand to eviscerate the 
legal thinker, and CLS on the other hand to free the thinker, the 'problem of 
the subject.' 159 In both cases the important focus is regarded as the rules, cases 
and principles that constitute the law. Where formalism sees these legal objects 
as providing control, CLS sees manipulatable materials. In both cases though 
the focus is on the objects of law rather than the subject oflaw who is controlled 
or who engages in manipulation. In neither case is there a real investigation of 
what it means to think about legal problems. 
3.4 Legal reasoning as justification 
The desire to uphold the ideal of the rule of law underlies legal theory's 
overwhelming disinterest in the legal subject. Like Holmes, Frank was highly 
critical of what he called 'mechanistic' law of which he said: 
157 Ibid. 1685-6. 
158 Ibid. 1629. 
159 Ibid. 
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there is the insistent effort to achieve predictability by the attempt to 
mechanise law, to reduce it to formulas in which human beings are 
treated like identical mathematical entities. Under such influences, there 
is proclaimed the ideal of "a government of law and not of men." The 
law is dealt with as if it were settled once and for all; its rules are 
supposed to operate impartially, inflexibly: justice must be uniform and 
unswerving. 160 
As part of his criticism of this view Frank argued that legal results were merely 
the result of personal hunches. 161 The implication being that there is a 
government of men and not laws, where rules of law are not impartial, and 
where justice is not uniform. The final implication being that justice is arbitrary. 
Wasserstrom responded to Frank's criticisms, proposing that legal reasoning 
operated as a two-step process. 162 According to Wasserstrom, it is necessary to 
distinguish between the processes by which solutions to legal problems are 
created and the processes by which solutions to those problems are justified. 163 
Wasserstrom argued that in law processes of creation are irrelevant and that 
only processes of justification need be investigated and explained - providing 
an account of how results are created is unimportant if it is possible to give an 
account of why those results are justified. Accordingly, any of the personal input 
in legal reasoning, the influence of personal views and values, can validly be 
ignored because legal propositions are only acceptable and accepted to the 
extent they can be justified. In which case the fact that they are legally justified 
makes it irrelevant that they may also be personally felt. As MacCormick states: 
The process which is worth studying is the process of argumentation as a 
process of justification. 164 
16
° Frank, above n. 104, 118, eh. XVII. 
161 Ibid. 103, see eh XII for a discussion of the process. 
162 Wasserstrom, RA., The Judicial Decision (1961) Stanford University Press, 25-31. 
163 Ibid. 26-7, eh. 2. 
164 MacCormick, above n. 91, 15. 
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Interestingly, CLS is also largely uninterested in processes of creation. 
Although Frank lucidly highlighted how the way in which facts are interpreted, 
how the facts are classified in a dispute, can have just as significant 
consequences as the classification of the law itself, 165 CLS tends to focus on how 
any position that might by whatever means be created, can also be justified. 
Showing the multitude of justifiable positions is enough to undermine the rule 
of law project. So again, processes of creation are regarded as peripheral. 
The objectification of law and the associated fascination with justification 
maintain that resolving problems is simply a matter of referring to legal objects 
and connecting them in the 'right' way (for supporters of the rule of law), or the 
'desired' way (for the critical legal theorist). However, problems with this 
exclusive focus on justification are hinted at by supporters of the rule of law 
themselves. 
MacCormick and Dworkin both argue the need for coherence in legal 
justification. 166 It is striking then that MacCormick criticises Dworkin's theory: 
as an untenable form of ultra rationalism. Reason alone cannot wholly 
determine what we ought to do. 167 
However, if justification is the sole process of interest as MacCormick states, 168 
then Dworkin's approach seems wholly sensible. The suggestion then is that 
despite arguing for coherence, MacCormick regards as unachievable the kind 
165 See Frank, above n. 104. Justice Wald candidly makes the same point, stating: 
The facts can - and indeed must - be retold to cast a party as an innocent victim or an 
undeserving malefactor, to tow the story line into the safe harbour of whatever 
principle of law the author thinks should control the case. Wald, P.M., 'The Rhetoric 
of Results and the Results of Rhetoric: Judicial Writings' (1 995) 62 University of 
Chicago Law Review 1371, 1386. 
166 MacCormick, above n. 91, ch.s V, VI, VII and VIII; Dworkin, above n. 138. 
167 MacCormick, above n. 91, ·265. 
168 Ibid. 15. 
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of coherence for which Dworkin argues. A clue to MacCormick's concern may 
be the idea that things must cohere: 
in the sense that the multitudinous rules of a developed legal system 
should 'make sense' when taken together. 169 
Coherence relies on: 
'what makes sense m the world' ... [and is] therefore m some degree 
suf?jective. 170 
3.5 Reasoning as sensemaking 
An alternative to, on the one hand viewing law as composed of authoritative 
materials and to viewing legal reasoning as a process controlled by the legal 
materials, and on the other hand as involving a radically free thinker, is to view 
legal reasoning as a process of 'sensemaking'. Simply, the felt experience of 
legal work is neither of being controlled by a set of materials nor of being able 
to achieve anything whatsoever with those materials. While a feeling may persist 
that during reasoning there are multiple sources to choose from, this is far 
from the feeling that anything at all can be done with these sources. Accepting 
that law does not strictly bind is far from accepting that the possible moves with 
the law are completely free. 
169 Ibid. 152. 
170 Ibid. 106. C.f. Balkin who argues that coherence must be seen as an individual function of 
the person constructing the coherence: Balkin, J.M., 'Understanding legal understanding: 
the legal subject and the problem of coherence' (1993) 103 Yale Law Journal 105. 
Similarly, Simon argues that in judicial decision making there is: 
a transformation of the way the dispute is represented in the judge's mind. During the 
course of deciding a hard case, the judge's mental representation of the dispute 
evolves naturally towards a state of coherence. (Simon, D., 'A Psychological Model of 
Judicial Decision Making' (1998) 31 Rutgers Law Journal1, 19.) 
Any coherence that may be achieved however, depends on how the individual mental 
representation evolves. 
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Kennedy provides an evocative and insightful description of this. 171 Kennedy 
describes the work of a judge faced with the need to rule on a (hypothetical) 
labour dispute involving workers picketing their employer's premises. 
Kennedy's judge is broadly sympathetic to the striking workers and is broadly 
in favour of transforming modes of economic life in the direction of greater 
worker control and worker management. 172 The judge is thus aware of the 
object order of legal relations and has an initial sense of 'how-l-want-to-come-
out' (HIWTCO). However, the judge feels a quick intuition that the law is 
against his preferred position. According to Kennedy: 
from my point of view the application of the rule to this case feels like a 
nondiscretionary, necessary, compulsory procedure. I can no more deny 
that, if there is such a rule, the workers have violated it, than I can deny 
that I am at this minute in Cambridge, Massachusetts, sitting on a chair, 
using a machine called a typewriter. The rule just applies itself. 173 
Despite this feeling of the law's compulsion however, Kennedy's judge soon 
manages to review the rule from a more comfortable perspective: 
I stopped imagining the rule of "no interference" as the only thing out 
there - as dominating an empty fteld and therefore grabbing up and 
incorporating any new fact-situation that had anything at all "sort of like 
interference" in it. I tried to find other rules that set the limits on this 
one, so I could tuck my case under their wing. Once I identified those 
affirmative rules ... I restated the facts of the lie-in to emphasize those 
aspects of that fit ... 174 
Kennedy goes on to describe how the hypothetical judge might think about the 
dispute and how during this a process of change occurs. As the judge explores 
the law in more detail and reflects on how the facts might interact with the law, 
171 Kennedy, D., 'Freedom and Constraint in Adjudication: A Critical Phenomonology' (1986) 
36 I ournal of Legal Education 518. 
172 Ibid. 520. 
173 Ibid. 520. 
174 Ibid. 525. 
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the judge begins to see both the law and the facts in a different light. The judge 
begins to re-characterise the scope of th.e rules of law that he has 'found' and to 
re-characterise the facts of the dispute. This re-characterisation of the rules and 
facts results in a changed perspective on the dispute. Kennedy describes how 
this re-experiencing of the problem results in change: 
my initial impression of conflict between the law and HIWfCO may 
disappear because HIWTCO changes, as well as because I manage to 
change the law. Further, the very resistance of the law to change in the 
direction of HIWTCO may impel HIWfCO to change in the direction of 
the law. I may find myself persuaded by my study of the materials that 
my initial apprehension of HIWTCO was wrong. I may find that I now 
want to come out the way I initially perceived the law coming out.175 
In contrast to control by the legal materials or complete freedom to reconceive 
social relations, the experience of law is neither one of captivity nor freedom: 
One of the ways in which we experience law ... is as a medium in which 
one pursues a project, rather than as something that tells us what we 
have to do. When we approach it this way, law constrains as a physical 
medium constrains - you can't do absolutely anything you want with a 
pile of bricks, and what you can do depends on how many you have, as 
well as on your other circumstances. 176 
As Kennedy states, this suggests: 
that we should understand both freedom and constraint as aspects of the 
experience of work-chosen project constrained by material properties of 
175 Ibid. 549. 
176 Ibid. 526. Notably, under this conception the notion of freedom within the law takes a 
different perspective. 
What then can be said of the body of legal materials "itself', considered in isolation 
from the particular contexts within which particular judges experience it? Not much. 
We have no reason to believe that the field is ever unbudgeable otherwise than as a 
consequence of the failure of particular judges to find a way to budge it. But we cannot 
assert the contrary either: it may be true that a given field was experienced as 
immovable because it was immovable, and that's all there was to it. (Ibid. 548). 
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the medium - rather than thinking in the back of our mind of a 
transcendentally free subject who "could do anything," contrasted with a 
robot programmed by the law. 177 
Such descriptions of legal reasoning and legal problem solving suggest a very 
different conception of legal reasoning, one hinted at by MacCormick, of legal 
reasoning as a process of 'sensemaking'. The legal thinker can be said neither 
to be completely controlled by the legal materials nor to be completely free to 
reconceive those materials - feelings of control and freedom depend on the 
sense that is made from the materials. Control and freedom are not properties 
of the materials themselves but rather a result of the way those materials are 
perceived. 
Central to sensemaking is the idea that reasoning is a matter of coming to 
understand the materials that are being reasoned about. When faced with an 
uncertain situation, with a problem to be solved, we must try to make sense of 
it. If it already fully made sense then it would not be a problem. We try to make 
sense of the problem and how the materials available might be used to resolve 
the problem. In order to make sense we try to fit our knowledge of the problem 
with our existing knowledge of the world. We try to integrate our beliefs about 
the world and wishe~ about how the world should be with the dictates of the 
problem. As Kennedy suggests, sensemaking is a matter of making these 
psychologically consistent. 178 Attempting to achieve consistency could involve 
revision in our beliefs and wishes, revision of our interpretation of the scope 
and requirements of the problem; or in a revision of both. Amongst other 
things, we interpret how physical things in the world work, we reason from and 
reason to causes and effects. We reason about other people in the world. We 
177 Ibid. 527. 
178 C.f. 'dissonance theory' in psychology and its influence in legal reasoning: Jackson, B.S., 
Making Sense in Law: Linguistic, Psychological and Semiotic Perspectives ( 1 995) Deborah 
Charles Publications. 
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reason about their intentions and motivations their beliefs and desires. We 
reason about morality, about what we regard as good and right, acceptable and 
unacceptable, and we reason about the law, whether things are legal or illegal, 
and whether they should be legal or illegal. We try to determine not only what 
we regard as acceptable and unacceptable but also what others would regard as 
acceptable or unacceptable. In a broad but important respect, in all these 
situations we are constructing theories about the things about which we are 
reasoning. We construct theories in order to try to determine why things are as 
they are, how things might be in the future and how we would like them to be 
in the future. 
Rather than a process governed by the material - an impersonal process in 
which the individual is irrelevant - sensemaking is thus a highly individual 
process. It is a process in which personal beliefs and wishes are constantly 
subject to potential revision. Our beliefs about how we act, about how others act, 
and about the way the world works generally, are all open to question. Our 
beliefs about how we should act, about how others should act and about how we 
would like the world to be in general are all open to revision. The beliefs and 
wishes by which we define who we are and our relations to others are subject to 
continual potential revision. Weick highlights the very personal nature of this, 
stating that sensemaking is 'grounded in identity construction'. 179 According to 
Weick: 
the sensemaker is himself or herself an ongomg puzzle undergoing 
continual redefinition, coincident with presenting some self to others 
and trying to decide which self is appropriate. Depending on who I am, 
my definition of what is "out there" will also change. Whenever I define 
self, I define "it," but to define it is also to define self. Once I know who I 
am then I know what is out there. 180 
179 Weick, K.E., Sensemaking in Organizations ( 1995) Sage, 18. 
180 Ibid. 20. 
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White reaches the same conclusion, writing that the lawyer rs engaged m a 
process of meaning making in which: 
"We" and our "wants" are constantly remade in the rhetorical process. 181 
In contrast to formalist views where the reasoner is irrelevant, sensemaking sees 
the meaning of materials as changeable - meaning depends on constructions 
provided by readers. However, in contrast to conceptions of a radically free 
subject where the materials are to be manipulated by a fully self-aware reasoner, 
sensemaking sees the subject as highly influenced by the materials. In Simon's 
terms, reasoning is 'bi-directional'- decisions: 
are determined by legal materials that are restructured in turn by the 
process of making the decision. 182 
While formalistic theory sees the problem environment as containing rules, 
cases and principles, and critical theory sees the environment as containing a . 
free decision maker making choices driven by personal beliefs, sensemaking 
sees problems as involving an interaction between the decision maker and her 
beliefs, and the environment which she influences and is influenced by. 
Sensemaking might thus be seen as a perspective lying between objectivism and 
relativism. In saying that we make sense of the world is not necessarily to adopt 
a cynical stance towards the law or society. It is not to argue that we can make 
whatever sense of the world we want. According to Dervin, adopting a 
sensemaking perspective means that: 
information is not a thing that exists independent of and external to 
human beings but rather is a product of human observing. 183 
181 White, J.B., 'Law as Rhetoric, Rhetoric as Law: The Arts of Cultural and Communal Life' 
(1985) 52 University of Chicago Law Review 684,691. 
182 Simon, above n. 170, 21. 
183 Dervin, B., 'An overview of sense-making research: Concepts, methods and results' (1983) 
Paper presented at the annual meeting of the International Communication Association, 
Dallas, TX, May 1983. Available at http://communication.sbs.ohio-state.edu/sense-
making!art/artdervin83.html (accessed 15/2/2001), 4. 
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She concludes that all 'information is subjective.' 184 However, this view is not a 
necessary consequence of the perspective that reasoning is, at least partly, a 
process of sensemaking and that people both construct and are constructed by 
knowledge. 185 
To emphasise that legal reasoning is about sense making is not to ignore or to 
detract from the important role of principles, rules and cases in legal 
reasoning, nor to ignore the role of logic, deduction, induction and analogical 
reasoning in legal reasoning. In examining reasoning in law we could say that 
the individual applies the legal rules, the legal cases and the legal principles 
and any other materials to the problem at hand. However, in this context 
debates about the roles of rules and cases, and about the role of logic, 
deduction, induction and analogical reasoning can be understood in terms of 
the part they play in sense making. 
In making sense of situations and problems, we may use deductive reasoning in 
some circumstances. When we are confident that our interpretation of a 
situation is correct then we may rely on this confidence as the basis to draw 
deductions. When we are sure that our interpretation of a rule or case is correct 
the application of that rule or case to the particular situation may appear 
deductive. Accepting that personal views, beliefs and wishes are always subject 
to potential revision does not mean that they are constantly revised. Only when 
an am_biguity is felt in the application of the legal materials must we look for 
something to bridge gaps in deduction. It is in such situations- where we are 
unsure as to what situation actually adheres or what situation should adhere -
that solid ground on which to base a deductive inference is felt lacking. In this 
situation, as Kennedy discusses, sensemaking will more consciously precede 
184 Ibid. 5. 
185 See Berger and Luckmann who discuss processes of "sedimentation" and "internalisation" 
of social knowledge: Berger, P., Luckmann, T., The Social Construction of Reality: A 
Treatise in the Sociology of Knowledge ( 1971) Doubleday. 
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deduction. Nevertheless, despite any felt certainty, all the sensemaking that has 
occurred prior to the application of a rule or case cannot be ignored. Or more 
accurately, we can only ignore all this prior reasoning if we deem it 
unimportant for the particular perspective we want to adopt on law and legal 
reasonmg. 
Similar observations apply to the various forms of inductive inference often said 
to operate in legal reasoning. For example, in induction by enumeration186 if 
we are confident that the situations under comparison are all of the same type, 
then we can draw a general inference from them. However, focusing on 
reasoning in this way must not obscure important aspects of reasoning inherent 
in problem solving. For a central element in inductive reasoning ts the 
perception of two, or more events as similar. If a group of events ts not 
perceived as similar then it is not possible to form an inductive generalisation 
from them. This construction of similarity is important. In an important sense, 
the construction of similarity is a process of sensemaking. Coming to regard 
situations as similar is a matter of building a personal understanding of each 
situation. When considering a problem, a reasoner is necessarily faced not only 
with a particular conception of the situation itself but also with a conception of 
the materials relevant to that problem. It is the task of the reasoner to 
determine what materials are relevant to the problem and how they influence 
the problem. This is a matter of conceiving of the problem in a particular way; 
it is a matter of conceiving of the material in a particular way, of rejecting some 
material while emphasising other material. Even when a similarity seems 
obvious, focusing on induction simply as the generation of general rules masks 
all the sense making that has previously occurred in the perception of situations 
as indeed similar enough on which to base the induction. Moreover, it masks all 
the sense making that occurs in reaching the particular induction arrived at, 
186 Induction by enumeration occurs when several similar situations are observed and a general 
rule is proposed to explain those situations: Golding, above n. 123, 43-4. 
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rather than other possible inductive conclusions. 187 When we are not so 
confident that the situations under consideration are indeed similar, or that a 
particular result should follow, then making sense of the situations will need to 
more explicitly precede enumerative induction. 
Just as in deductive reasonmg and inductive reasonmg, sense making is 
apparent in various forms of analogical reasoning. If we regard two things as 
sufficiently similar then we can import our understanding about one of them in 
order to inform about the other. However, as in enumerative induction this 
depends on confidence that the two situations are initially similar. Sometimes, 
perhaps indeed often, we may be confident in this sense of similarity without 
conscious reflection. At other times however, despite an initial feeling of 
difference, through conscious reflection we come to regard two situations as 
similar. In this process of reflection, situations can come to be perceived in new 
ways and situations that are otherwise seen as dissimilar can come to be seen as 
similar. 
Legal reasoning is sometimes examined in terms of 'reflective equilibrium' and 
'reasoning to the best explanation'. According to Brewer, reflective equilibrium, 
involves a 'process of reflective adjustment between specific examples . . . and 
general normative principles'. 188 Central to this is uncertainty about the precise 
consequences of a finding of similarity amongst the precedents and uncertainty 
about the precise scope and requirements of the normative principles. Each is 
evaluated in light of the other. This inherently involves reasoning about what 
the precedents and the principles mean - it involves making sense of the 
187 This is the 'problem of induction': Routledge, (ed.) Concise Routledge Encycolpedia of 
Philosophy (2000) Routledge. 
188 Brewer, above n. 123, 938-9 citations omitted. Compare Sunstein who also regards 
reflective equilibrium as an important part oflegal reasoning: Sunstein, above n. 120, 781-
3. However, while Brewer discussed reflective equilibrium as a 'vitally important instance of 
example-based reasoning', Sunstein regards the two as closely related though irreducible. 
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precedents and principles in light of each other. The attainment of equilibrium 
is in this respect the attainment of a new sense of the precedents and principles. 
According to Lipton 'inference to the best explanation': 
has become extremely popular ... It is widely supposed to provide an 
accurate description of a central mechanism governing our inferential 
practices. 189 
In 'inference to the best explanation', a reasoner does not typically know why 
something has occurred, why something will occur or why something should 
occur, and reasons to such an understanding by attempting to provide 
explanations. The explanation that provides the best explanation for what has 
occurred, what will occur, or what should occur is said to provide reasons why 
something has occurred, why it will occur or why it should occur. Here 
understandings are modified according to how they fit with explanations that 
can be provided for an anomaly or for a desired result. Inherent in this is that 
judgments about what explains what, and what counts as a good explanation, 
are all made in light of prior knowledge. Within this model reasoning involves 
a backwards and forwards movement of hypothesising what is possible and then 
testing that against the actual or accepted. Inherent here is the tterauve 
building of world pictures. The precise operation of inference to the best 
explanation and its role in legal reasoning is beyond the scope of this 
discussion, it is interesting simply because it highlights that inference iteratively 
involves proposition, exploration, testing, acceptance, rejection and refmement 
of sense as reasoning progresses. Through reorientation of our views about the 
law and our understanding of situations we can come to make sense of them in 
new ways. 190 In this respect, the sense we make and the sense we remake of 
situations drives the semantic flexibility observed in reasoning. 
189 Lipton, P., Inference to the Best Explanation (1991) Routledge, 2. 
190 Pennington and Hastie's model of 'explanation-based decision making' has strong overlaps 
with the idea of reasoning to the best explanation, see section 3.5.2 for a discussion of 
Pennington and Hastie's work. 
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Judicial decision-making provides ample examples of sensemaking - such as 
Donoghue v Stevenson. 191 
Their lordships in Donoghue referred to numerous cases, these cases having 
differing results. Commenting on these cases Lord Macmillan said: 
It humbly appears to me that the diversity of view [sic] which is exhibited 
.. . is explained by the fact that in the discussion of the topic which now 
engages your Lordship's attention two rival principles of the law fmd a 
meeting place where each has contended for supremacy. On the one 
hand, there is the well established principle that no one other than a 
party to a contract can complain of a breach of that contract. On the 
other hand, there is the equally well established doctrine that negligence 
apart from contract gives a right of action to the party injured by that 
1. 192 neg tgence .... 
Lord Buckmaster dissented in the case and would have denied the appeal. 
According to Lord Buckmaster, the general considerations relevant to the case 
were that: 
The breach of the defendant's contract with A. to use care and skill in 
and about the manufacture or repair of an article does not itself give any 
cause of action to B. when he is injured by reason of the article proving 
to be defective. 193 
Two exceptions were contemplated: 
( 1 )In the case of an article dangerous in itself; and (2)where the article 
not in itself dangerous is in fact dangerous by reason of some defect or 
for any other reason. 194 
191 [1932] A.C. 562, 566. 
192Ibid, 609. 
193Ibid, 569. Quoting Lord Summer in Blacker v Lake & EJ}jot Ltd 106 LT. 533, 536. 
194[1932] A.C. 532, 569. 
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Within the sense made of the law by Lord Buckmaster, the sense made of the 
two rival principles, and the sense made of all the previous precedents, the 
situation in Donoghue was governed by the principles in conflict. 
According to Lord Buckmaster no one could 'suggest that ginger-beer was an 
article dangerous in itself.' 195 Further, the second exception rests on the 
'obligation to warn' the concealment of which is in the 'nature of fraud'. 196 Lord 
Buckmaster considered there to be no indication of fraud in the present case. 
Thus, regarding the general situation as governed by contract and admitting 
only strict exceptions, Lord Buckmaster refused the appeal. Given the sense 
made of the law, the facts could not be analogised to any of the precedents 
cited by counsel in argument because the bottle of ginger-beer was not an 
inherently dangerous item and nor was there any evidence on which to 
establish fraud. 
In contrast, the majority opinion of Lord Atkin rested on a very different sense 
of the law. According to Lord Atkin, you: 
must take reasonable care to avoid acts or omtsstons which you can 
reasonably foresee would be likely to injure your neighbour ..... persons 
who are so closely and directly affected by my act that I ought reasonably 
to have them in contemplation as being affected when I am directing my 
mind to the acts or omissions which are called in question. 197 
With this conception, the examination thus focused on considerations such as 
whether the product was 'used immediately' and whether there was a 
'reasonable opportunity of inspection' - whether there was a 'proximate 
relationship'. 198 The sense made of the law by Lord Atkin required a search for 
195lbid. 
196lbid. 
197Ibid, 580. 
1981bid, 582. 
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a different type of characteristic, which required different facts to prove and 
disprove, than the search for a product that is 'inherently dangerous' or for 
'fraud'. Applying this conception, Lord Atkin regarded the case as analogous to 
several precedents and found for the appellant. 
Consequently, while Lord Buckmaster's vtew that principles of contract 
governed resulted in a series of rejected analogies to cases involving 'inherently 
dangerous' items or involving fraud, Lord Atkin's view that 'sufficient attention' 
must be given 'to the general principle which governs the whole law of 
negligence' 199 resulted in the problem being regarded as analogous to several 
precedents. The analogies drawn between precedents, the construction of the 
facts upon which those analogies rested, and ultimately the outcome of the case 
depended on the framework through which the case was viewed. 
It is not simply the 'facts' of a problem which are classified in terms of static 
laws. Potentially, the law is reconceived each time it is applied. While the 
objectification of law suggests that legal rules, legal cases and legal principles 
statically control problem solving, Donoghue also illustrates how principles 
interact and are moulded during reasoning. Commenting on the whole law of 
negligence, Lord Salmon noted: 
Here is an age long conflict of theories which is to be found in every 
system of law. "A man acts at his peril" says one theory "A man is not 
liable unless he is to blame" answers the other. It will not surprise ... to 
find that between these theories a middle way, a compromise has been 
found. 200 
The opposing judgments of Lord Buckmaster and Lord Atkin each express a 
different compromise between these principles. Neither judgment applied 
either principle in full. Lord Buckmaster's requirement that a contract is 
199Ibid, 594. 
200Readvj. Lyons& Go. Ltd. [1947] A.C. 156, 180. 
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generally necessary to found liability can be seen as strongly influenced by the 
principle that 'a man is not liable unless he is to blame'. However, the 
acknowledgement of exceptions in cases involving 'inherently dangerous' 
objects or fraud is a small concession to the principle that 'a man acts at his 
peril.'201 In contrast, Lord Atkin reached a different compromise between these 
principles - this compromise itself having come to be called the 'neighbour 
principle'. Lord Atkin can be thought to have been more influenced by the 
principle that 'a man acts at his own peril.' However, Lord Atkin did not fully 
apply this principle and the neighbour principle is a succinct expression of the 
balance to be drawn between the principle that 'a man acts at his peril' and the 
principle that 'a mans is not liable unless he is to blame.' Thus, both principles 
influenced each judge. Neither applied either principle in totality. It was the 
dynamic interaction between and influence of these principles that resulted in 
two different compromises which ultimately founded the different conceptions 
of the case. 
As discussed thus far, sensemaking is a representation of legal reasoning as it 
occurs on an individual level. Interestingly, as J ackson discusses, the Anglo-
Saxon adversarial legal system itself illustrates processes of sensemaking at an 
institutionalleveF02 Inherent in this system is the opposition of two parties, and 
the opposition of two different interpretations of a situation. Each party is 
engaged in the legal process in order to present a particular version, their 
particular version, of a situation. Amongst other things the parties may differ 
on whether particular circumstances exist or have existed. They may differ on 
whether circumstances can be imputed from other circumstances. They may 
differ on the consequences of a set of circumstances. They may differ on what 
201 It could be argued that all Lord Buckmaster was actually doing was re-affirming a line of old 
cases, he was not thinking about principles at all. Apart from the question of why Lord 
Buckmaster focused on the particular cases that he did, even if this is accepted, it is argued 
that this line of old cases expresses the compromise between principles discussed above. 
202 Jackson, above n. 178, 163-84. See also: White, above n. 181, 688. 
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the law is or how the law should be. Whatever the particular disagreement is 
about, there is a disagreement, a difference of view as to a past state of affairs, 
their present implications and or their future effects. Each party attempts to 
present a version of events that presents a convincing story as well as a 
conception of the law that favours, indeed requires, resolution in their favour. 
If a dispute reaches an impasse that has to be officially adjudicated, the judge, 
or the judge and jury must review both perspectives and then decide based on 
which they find most convincing. Choice will depend on which account makes 
the most sense. Although juries do not detail their reasoning, in this respect 
judgments can be viewed as accounts of the sense made of the dispute -
accounts that report how facts were viewed, how the law was construed and the 
consequences of each of these. 203 In a process highlighted by Levi, precedents 
are thus an institutional means of remembering what sense has been made of 
disputes and themselves become a resource for making sense in latter 
situations. 
Sensemaking emphasises that central to problem solving is the perspective 
from which problems are understood, the way in which problems are perceived. 
This is a distinctly individual process. However, when perceived at an 
institutional level, sensemaking both highlights the operation of the 
institutional processes themselves but also indicates how those processes affect 
the sense that individuals make. Just as sensemaking is a perspective that can 
be applied to the operation of the legal process, theories of the operation of the 
legal process are themselves accounts of legal sense construction.204 The 
theories we offer of the law and legal reasoning affect how we view those 
processes. As J ackson states: 
sense is created both of the language and psychological processes of the 
law, and through those very processes.205 
203 See generally Simon, above n. 170. 
204 J ackson, B.S., Making Sense in I urisprudence ( 1 996) Deborah Charles Publications, 4. 
205 Ibid. 8. 
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Thus, when law is perceived as a process of rule application, problem solving 
becomes a search for rules and means to fulfil the requirements of those roles. 
When law is perceived as a process of analogising, problem solving becomes a 
search for precedents and a search for similarities and differences between 
precedents. When the problem solver is regarded as radically free, problem 
solving becomes an opportunity to advance personal values. This reaffirms the 
importance of legal theory in the construction of computer systems in law. 
When computer systems in law necessarily embody a theory of law and a theory 
of legal reasoning, it is important to adopt an appropriate representation of law 
and legal problem solving. Adopting a representation of legal reasoning as a 
process of sensemaking indicates that systems must be built to support the 
solution to a different kind of problem. Rather than automatically solve 
problems through deduction or automatically perform analogical reasoning, 
systems must support the resolution of 'wicked problems'. 
3.5.1 'Wicked' problems 
Sensemaking involves a reconceptualisation of problems as they are examined. 
The requirements of a problem and the materials relevant to the problem can 
both evolve during problem solving. However, an environment where the very 
shape of the problem under consideration changes during problem solving 
indicates a very different type of problem to the clear, structured problems 
posited in the objectification of law. Problems are ill-defined. An environment 
where problems are ill-defined and where problems must be identified before 
they can be approached not only suggests a very different type of reasoning, 
but also a very different type of problem to the structured, mechanistic 
problems implied in the objectification of law. Rittel and Weber perceptively 
contrast 'tame' problems with 'wicked' problems. Tame problems are fow1d in 
science and aspects of engineering and are 'definable and separable and may 
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have solutions that are findable' .206 This is not to say such problems are easy 
though. In contrast, 'wicked problems' have several characteristics: 
• There is no definitive formulation of a wicked problem - understanding 
the problem depends upon one's ideas for solving it; 
• Problems can be explained in numerous ways and the choice of 
explanation determines the nature of the problem's resolution; 
• In wicked problems, work is terminated not for 'logical' reasons but for 
considerations of time, or money, or patience; 
• Solutions to wicked problems are not true or false, but good or bad; 
• There is no immediate and no ultimate test of a solution to a wicked 
problem; 
• Wicked problems do not have an enumerable, exhaustively describable, 
set of potential solutions; 
• Every wicked problem is essentially unique. Despite seeming similarities 
one can never be certain that the particulars of a problem do not 
override its commonalities with other problems; 
• Every wicked problem can be considered a symptom of another 
problem.207 
Legal problems display each of these characteristics. 
Understanding processes through which sense is made of wicked problems 
requires more than a focus on deduction, induction and analogy can provide. 
Psychological examinations of reasonmg and decision-making have 
traditionally focused on the use of logic and models such as expected utility 
theory and multi-attribute utility analysis.208 However, it has been consistently 
206 Rittel, H.W.J., Webber, M.M., 'Dilemmas in a General Theory of Planning' (1973) 4 Policy 
Sciences 155, 160. 
207 Ibid. 161- 167. 
208 Johnson-Laird, P.N., Shafir, E., (eds.) Reasoning and Decision Making (1993) Elsevier 
Science Publishers, 3-5. Expected utility theory proposes that when making decisions, 
people assign a value to each possible outcome, with the highest value going to the most 
desired outcome. The theory proposes that the probability of each outcome is then 
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shown that people do not conform to logical requirements or the requirements 
of expected utility theory when they make decisions.209 Indeed, according to 
J ohnson-Laird and Shafer: 
the major psychological discovery about both reasonmg and decision 
making is that normative theory and psychological facts pass each other 
by.2IO 
The field of 'naturalistic decision-making' is one response that has developed to 
investigate this divergence. Unfortunately, apart from a rejection of classical 
decision-theory, there is almost no unifted theory uniting naturalistic decision-
making research. 211 However, two foundations that unite research are first an 
emphasis on 'mental imagery' and secondly, and emphasis on the importance 
for reasoning of the way that information is 'framed'. 212 
3.5.2 Mental imagery- sensemaking as argument 
Mental tmagery, which researchers argue involves categorisation and 
storytelling, aims at identifYing and defining the very problem to be solved.213 
Naturalistic decision-making theory thus emphasises that in real world 
decision-making people dynamically construct mental images of their situation, 
which they use as the basis of reasoning.214 In contrast to the well-defined 
multiplied by this value. Finally, the choice with the highest resulting score is chosen- since 
this is the choice giving the highest probable return: Baron, J., Thinking and Deciding 
(2nd edition) (1994) Cambridge University Press. 
209 J ohnson-Laird and Shafir, ibid. 
210 Ibid. 6. 
211 Lipshitz, R., 'Converging Themes in the Study of Decision Making in Realistic Settings' p. 
103, in Klein, G.A., Orasanu, J., Calderwood, R., and Zsambok, C.E. (eds.) Decision 
Making in Action: models and methods (1993) Ablex. 
212 Ibid. 132-3. 
213 Ibid. 
214 See generally: Klein, G.A., Orasanu, J., Calderwood, R. and Zsambok, C.E., (eds.) Decision 
Making in Action: Models and Methods (1993) Ablex Publishing. Also Billig, M. Arguing 
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problems traditionally investigated in decision-making research, 'natural' 
decisions occur in an environment characterised amongst other things by ill 
structured problems, uncertain dynamic environments, shifting, ill-defined, or 
competing goals, and time stress.215 
The notion that people actively construct meanmgs has been influential in 
various fields including. psychology, 216 communication theory, 217 organisational 
theory/18 education theory219 and law.220 This wide heritage reflects not only the 
utility of the perspective but also the numerous influences on how people make 
sense. Amongst other things, J ackson discusses the importance of linguistics, 
philosophy and psychology for understanding how people make sense in law. 
J ackson traces the ways in which the words and phrases that make up 
communication, and the meanings we make from them, are socially 
constructed.221 He examines theories of cognitive competence and language 
development, and personality and emotion for consequences they have on 
senses that are made. J ackson traces how these manifest in the law and the 
implications they have for law and legal institutions. For J ackson however, 
and thinking: a rhetorical approach to social psychology (1989) Cambridge University 
Press, 152. 
215 Orasanu, J., Connolly, T., 'The Reinvention of Decision Making' p. 3, in Klein, G.A., 
Orasanu, J., Caldetwood, R., and Zsambok, C.E. (eds.) Decision Making in Action: models 
and methods (1993) Ablex, 7. 
216 Klein et al, above n. 214; Billig, above n. 214, 152; Jackson, above n. 178, 188-93. 
Although the ideas of narrative, storytelling and mental imagery are slightly different and 
indeed used in different ways in different contexts, there is a close connection between 
them, as J ackson makes clear: J ackson, above n. 178, 153. 
217 Dervin, above n. 183. 
218 Weick, above n. 179. 
219 This perspective is embodied in 'constructivism' and 'constructivist' learning theory: 
Jonassen, D., Computers in the Classroom: Mind tools for Critical Thinking (1996) 
Prentice-Hall. 
220 Jackson, above n. 178. 
221 Ibid. ch.s 1 and 2. 
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central to sensemaking is the concept of 'narrative', which proposes that people 
make sense of the situations they are in and the way they should and shouldn't 
act through the adaptation and construction of stories. Essentially, sense is 
made of situations by trying to fit them within 'meaningful sequences of 
action'. 222 
Influential work on the psychology of juror decision-making emphasises the 
role that narratives play in making sense in law.223 Pennington and Hastie 
propose a model of juror decision-making that they call 'explanation-based' 
decision-making.224 The central hypothesis of explanation-based decision-
making is that: 
decision makers construct an intermediate summary representation of 
the evidence, and that this representation, rather than the original "raw" 
evidence, is the basis of the final decision. 225 
Essentially this representation of the evidence is constructed as a story 'in which 
causal and intentional relations among events are prominent.'226 The story is 
constructed from the evidence presented as well as prior knowledge: 227 
General knowledge about the structure of human purposive acuon 
sequences, characterized as an episode schema, serves to organize events 
according to the causal and intentional relations among them as 
perceived by the juror. An episode schema specifies that a story should 
222 Ibid. 142. 
223 E.g.: Pennington, N., Hastie, R., 'Explanation-based decision making: Effects of memory 
structure on judgment' p. 454, in Goldstein, W.M. and Hogarth, R.M. (Eds) Research on 
Judgment and Decision Making: Currents, Connections, and Controversies (1997) 
Cambridge University Press; Pennington, N., Hastie, R., 'A theory of explanation-based 
decision making' p. 188, in Klein, G.A. and Orasanu, J. (Eds) Decision making in action: 
Models and methods (1993) Ablex Publishing; hereafter 'Pennington and Hastie 1993'. 
224 This has interesting overlaps with theories of reasoning to the best explanation discussed in 
section 3.5. 
225 Pennington and Hastie 1993, above n. 223, 188. 
226 Ibid. 191. 
227 Ibid. 192. 
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contain initiating events, goals, actions, consequences, and 
accompanying states, in a particular causal configuration228 
The central emphasis is on making sense through placing information within a 
set of relationships that is compatible with experience and prior knowledge. 229 
While mental imagery, storytelling and categorisation may partly explain how 
wicked problems are approached, they cannot be a full answer. For images, 
stories and categories must themselves be constructed, assessed and chosen. 
The elements of images and stories and the definitions of categories must be 
determined, as must the applicability of images, stories and categories in 
particular situations. As Billig states, psychologists: 
have tended to assume that categorization is a basic unit of thinking. At 
its simplest level, categorization involves the placing of a particular 
object, or entity within a general category.230 
However: 
The problem with the categorization approach to cognition is that, from 
one-sided assumptions, a one-sided tmage of the person has 
developed. 231 
Billig notes a countervailing tendency to categorisation, categorisation is: 
the process by which a particular stimulus is placed in a general 
category: as a result of this process, the particular stimulus is robbed of 
its particularity, to become merely an instance of the general category. 
On the other hand, one might hypothesize that there is a reverse 
process: a stimulus need not be treated as being equivalent to other 
stimuli, but might be considered in its particularity.232 
228 Ibid. 188 references omitted. 
229 That Pennington and Hastie provide evidence that people do seek consistency in their 
personal beliefs and their understanding of the law provides evidence for coherence 
theories of law. 
230 Billig, above n. 214, 151. 
231 Ibid. 160. 
232 lbid. 161. 
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'Categorisation' thus does not exist as a thing in itself, rather it is part of a 
tension between the cognitive drive to generalise and the cognitive drive to 
specialise.233 Whether researchers prefer to speak of mental images, stories or 
categories, there is an inherent element of assessment in their use. 234• 
According to Lipshitz, in this context the 'root metaphor' for decision-making 
should be argument.235 The content and structure of stories, narratives and 
images, and their appropriateness in a given context is argumentatively 
assessed in light of the available alternatives. As Billig concludes: 
If we then wished to offer a location for the essence of thinking itself, we 
might propose the following to be considered. Categorization does not 
provide the basis of thinking in a simple sense. The automatic 
application of categories is the negation of thinking, m that it is 
essentially a thoughtless process. Thinking starts when we argue or 
deliberate about which categorization to particularize, or how to 
categorize a particularization. 236 
233 Ibid. 163 citation omitted. More subtly, it is not merely a matter of choosing whether to 
classifY an experience within an existing category or to treat it as sui generis, things can 
resemble and differ from each other in infinite ways. Categories can always be the subject 
of dispute. Thus according to Billig if one: 
set of categories is thrust at us, we might then make the implication explicit, and find 
ourselves arguing about the location of the heart of the issue. In consequence, it is not 
a matter of essences as such, but of arguments about the essence of the matter. (Ibid. 
168). 
234 1 ackson briefly discusses the relationship between argument and narrative: 1 ackson, above 
n. 178, 178-81. 
235 Lipshitz, R., 'Decision Making as Argument-Driven Action' p. 172, in Klein, G.A., Orasanu, 
]., Calderwood, R., and Zsambok, C.E. (eds.) Decision Making in Action: models and 
methods (1993) Ablex, 180. See also: Shafir, E., Simonson, I. and Tversky, A., 'Reason-
based choice' p. 69, in Goldstein, W.M. and Hogarth, R.M. (Eds) Research on Judgment 
and Decision Making: Currents, Connections, and Controversies (1997) Cambridge 
University Press. 
236 Billig, above n. 214, 170. 
90 
Numerous psychological experiments highlight the role that argument plays in 
reasoning, decision-making and decision rationalisation. People rely on simple 
arguments to justifY the choices they make and the absence of good argument 
for a choice, or the introduction of further arguments for alternatives can 
influence the choices that are made or indeed whether any choice is made. 237 As 
Shafir, Simonson and Tversky conclude: 
In contrast to the classical theory that assumes stable values and 
preferences, it appears that people often do not have well-established 
values, and that preferences are actually construCted - not merely 
revealed - during their elicitation. 238 
The centrality of argument for sensemaking should come as small surprise to 
legal theorists habituated to the systematised study of argument - although the 
powerful drive to objectification of the law requires its occasional reemphasis. 
As Balkin states: 
the dialectical structure of legal argument is not a distortion of our 
thought by an imperfect medium, but reflects the structure of legal and 
moral thought itsel£.239 
Importantly, argument is central to reasoning, to sensemaking, not solely as a 
public pursuit. Argument is a key process that individuals engage in when 
making sense. As Billig emphasises: 
237 Shafir, Simon and Tversky, above n. 235; Hogarth, R.M., Kunreuther, H., 'Decision making 
under ignorance: Arguing with yourself p. 482, in Goldstein, W.M. and Hogarth, R.M. 
(Eds) Research on Judgment and Decision Making: Currents, Connections, and 
Controversies ( 1 997) Cambridge University Press. 
238 Shafir, Simon and Tversky, above n. 235, 91 citation omitted. Shafir, Simon and Tversky 
say that while reliance on reasons has been a hallmark of social psychological analyses the 
analysis of reasons has been less influential in the analysis of individual decision making: 
ibid. 
239 Balkin, J.M., 'The Crystalline Structure of Legal Thought' (1986) 39 Rutgers Law Review 1, 
76. 
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"the same arguments which we use in persuading others when we speak 
in public, we employ also when we deliberate in our thoughts" .... "we 
use the same processes in argumentation, where we are disputing with 
another" as "in meditations, when we are considering and resolving 
anything with ourselves"240 
In consequence, thought 'should possess a dialogic, rather than monologic, 
character', it should: 
not be seen as a process which is inevitably locked within the recesses of 
the brain and which is only dimly reflected in our words. Instead, the 
structure of the way we argue reveals the structure of our thoughts.241 
Weick too, emphasises the centrality of argument m sensemaking. 
Psychological experiments confirm that people do indeed argue with 
themselves when thinking and making decisions. 242 
In this context, where argument is a central aspect of sensemaking, 
MacCormick's view that the process worth studying is the 'process of argument 
as a process of justification' must again be reassessed. Just as worthy of study is 
the process of argument as a process of sensemaking. 
3.5.3 Visualisation 
The way a problem ts represented greatly effects how the problem is 
approached. For example, representing the law as composed of legal objects 
directs thinking around those objects and away from the thinker. Conversely, 
representing reasoning as a process of sensemaking focuses more directly on 
the thinker. The importance of problem representation has long been 
recognised in psychology. In the nineteenth century, Gestalt psychologists 
240 Billig, above n. 214, 140 citations omitted. 
241 Ibid. 141. 
242 E.g. Hogarth and Kunreuther, above n. 237. The notion that argument is central to 
decision-making has become increasingly influential in psychology and has been called the 
'argumentative turn' in psychology; Billig's work has been influential in this. 
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emphasised the importance of appropriate problem representation, argumg 
that improvements in thinking are dependent upon improvements in 
representation, and arguing that what separates the expert from the novice is 
the expert's ability to see things the novice cannot.243 Although in a completely 
different paradigm, in their highly influential work on an 'information-
processing' theory of mind N ewell and Simon argue the importance of the 
correct representation of the problem. 244 As Best explains, a good 
representation of the problem will include a representation of the problem and 
an adequate specification of the goal - all searching for a solution is based on 
this representation - and without the 'right' elements the representation may 
be inadequate to attain the solution.245 However, the focus of such examinations 
has been on internal representations - the way problems are represented in the 
mind of the reasoner. The way that problems are externally represented has 
largely been ignored on the assumption that they will be converted into an 
internal representation appropriate for processing. 
Intuitively, the general v1ew that the external form in which information is 
presented is unimportant for the way that information is used in the mind 
seems problematic. It is difficult to imagine how the feel of a piece of music or 
the sense of a painting could be conveyed in a work of sculpture or a passage of 
text. Psychology and cognitive science have recently begun to investigate the 
importance of 'external representations' in reasoning.246 Commenting on this 
interest Zhang argues that: 
243 Best,J.B., Cognitive psychology (4th edition) (1995) West Publishing, 420-1. 
244 Newell, A.C., Simon, H.A., Human problem solving (1972) Prentice-Hall, 90. The focus of 
external representations, and visual representations in particular, is not the focus of Newell 
and Simon's work however. 
245 Best, above n. 243, 443. 
246 Larkin, J.H., Simon, H.A., 'Why a Diagram is (Sometimes) worth Ten Thousand Words' 
(1987) 11 Cognitive Science 65; Stenning, K., Oberlander, J., 'A Cognitive Theory of 
Graphical and Linguistic Reasoning: Logic and Implementation' (1994) 19 Cognitive 
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external representations are not simply inputs and stimuli to the internal 
mind; rather, they are so intrinsic to many cognitive tasks that they 
guide, constrain and even determine cognitive behaviour.247 
Far from being irrelevant then, external representations can determine 
cognitive behaviour. As Larkin and Simon emphasise, one way to solve a 
problem in a poor representation is to translate it into a better one.248 More 
than being simply beneficial in problem solving however, translating the form 
of presentation could possibly determine what solution is reached or if a 
solution is reached at all. According to Zhang: 
representational effect is not just a matter of different efficiencies and 
different behaviours . . . . the format of the representation can determine 
what information can be perceived, what processes can be activated, and 
what structures can be discovered from the specific representation. This 
is called representational determinism. 249 
In parallel with work on external representations, researchers emphasise the 
importance of diagrams for reasoning in many situations. This work on 
'diagrammatic reasoning' investigates benefits that diagrams, as opposed for 
example to textual representations, have for reasoning. Researchers examining 
diagrammatic reasoning argue that diagrammatic presentations of information 
have various differences from pure textual representations of information, 
including: 
Science 97; Zhang, J., 'The Nature of External Representations in Problem Solving' (1997) 
21(2) Cognitive Science 179. 
247 Zhang, ibid. 
248 Larkin and Simon, above n. 246, 66. This may not be intuitive however: 
a problem solver often also needs the knowledge of how to construct a "good" diagram 
that lets him take advantage of the virtues we have discussed. (Ibid. 99). 
249 Zhang, above n. 246, 213. 
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• Diagrams can group together all information that is used together, thus 
avoiding large amounts of search for the elements needed to make a 
problem -solving inference ;250 
• Diagrams typically use location to group information about a single 
element, avoiding the need to match symbolic labels;251 
• Diagrams automatically support a large number of perceptual 
inferences, which are extremely easy for humans. 252 
• Diagrams provide 'free rides'. 253 
A comparative examination of the operation and intricacies of the vanous 
cognitive models that have been proposed for reasoning with diagrams is 
beyond the scope of this work. 254 Notable however, is the consensus that 
diagrams can be more efficient for reasoning and that the way in which 
information ts presented is extremely important for the way it is used. With 
appropriate diagrams, patterns and relationships emerge from the 
information. A graphical presentation of information can present a powerful 
visual picture which allows the mind to 'see' patterns and relationships. Hence 
the exclamation 'Ah, I see!' meaning 'I understand'. 
The importance of visual information appears evident on a daily basis. It is 
difficult to imagine how a textual representation of Monet's 'Water lilies' could 
convey the same sense as does seeing the original. Similarly, navigating the 
London underground with a map of the 'tube' seems infinitely easier than with 
a textual representation of the position of stations, the lines they run on, the 
250 Larkin and Simon, above n. 246, 98 
251 Ibid. 
252 Ibid. 98. 
253 Gurr, C.A., 'Effective Diagrammatic Communication: Syntactic, Semantic and Pragmatic 
Issues' (1999) 10 Journal ofVisual Languages and Computing 317,323. 
254 See: Zhang, above n. 246; Larkin and Simon, above n. 246; Stenning and Oberlander, 
above n. 246; Shimojima, A., 'The Graphic-Linguistic Distinction' (1 999) 13 Artificial 
Intelligence Review 313. 
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location of interchanges etc.255 Diagrams are widely used day to day. 
Geographical, political and weather maps are common. We encounter graphs, 
for example of the stock market, almost everyday. Calendars and project 
planners are widely used. Even in more analytical fields, the use of visual 
representations is widespread e.g.: Venn diagrams; truth tables; visual logic; 
and Feynman diagrams to name but a few. De Bono advocates diagrams to 
improve management thinking.256 The maxim 'A picture is worth ten thousand 
words' remains intuitively true. 
Numerous researchers, from diverse domains, have argued the educational 
benefit of diagrammatic presentations of information. For example, Barwise 
and Etchmedy strongly argue the benefit of visual presentations of information 
in teaching first order logic.257 Cheng argues the benefit of teaching physics 
with 'law encoding diagrams.'258 In educational psychology, N ovak has 
championed the benefit of visual presentations.259 
The claimed benefits of diagrams for reasonmg strongly suggest the use of 
diagrams to support sensemaking in law.260 Regarding argument as an 
255 For a brief but interesting history of the development of the tube maps, see: London 
Transport Museum, 'Mapping the way' (1994) Information Sheet, 14, 1 1994; London 
Transport Museum, 'Decorative maps' (1997) Information Sheet, 20, 1997. 
256 de Bono, E., Atlas of Management Thinking (1983) Penguin Books. 
257 They have developed 'HyperProof to demonstrate this: Barwise, J., Etchemendy, J., 
Hyperproof ( 1995) CSLI Publications. 
258 Cheng, P.C.-H., 'Problem solving and learning with diagrammatic representations m 
physics' p. 47, in Peterson, D. (Ed) Forms of Representation (1996) Intellect Books. 
259 Novak, J.D., 'Concept Mapping: A Useful Tool for Science Education' (1990) 27 Journal of 
Research in Science Teaching 937. Methods for visualisation in teaching and learning are 
generally explored in the educational literature under the title of 'Graphic Organizers.' 
260 Note visualisation plays an increasingly important role in the presentation of evidence 
during trials. This trend is interesting for the general emphasis it places on the importance 
of the visual presentation of information. This trend is however, only peripherally related 
to the work undertaken here and so will not be examined further. 
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important component of the process of legal sensemaking it would accordingly 
be easy to conclude that people are good at argument- that people are good at 
constructing arguments and at assessing arguments. After all, people appear to 
coherently manage day by day. However, research by Kuhn strongly suggests 
that this is not the case; Kuhn's research indicates that argument is a specific 
skill that must be learned. 
In her research, Kuhn asked subjects about the causes of three social problems: 
what causes prisoners to return to crime after release; what causes children to 
fail at school; and what causes unemployment. She surveyed a cross-section of 
people in different age groups, with different educational levels and who were 
either expert or non-expert in the problems being examined. Kuhn concluded 
that across all age groups and education levels, and for both genders, people 
were not good at constructing arguments. People often did not manage to 
present evidence for their own arguments, did not contemplate alternative 
arguments and did not manage to rebut alternative arguments, neither if 
autonomously thought of nor if provided by the researchers. Notably, this was 
the same for subjects with expertise in a given area. Indeed, Kuhn concluded 
that: 
The performance of experts indicates that expertise with respect to a 
content area may expand the amount of knowledge that is available, but 
it does not necessarily enhance the forms of reasoning that are used .... 
if anything, experience with respect to a topic may make it more difficult 
to recognize opposing views ... 261 
Notably, the only group that performed well in Kuhn's assessment of 
argumentative ability was the group of doctoral students that she tested. Kuhn · 
hypothesised that this is because this group had much formal training in the 
construction and assessment of arguments. Kuhn's research thus supports the 
idea that the skills of argument are specific, learnt, skills - they are not 
necessarily absorbed from the general cultural background or other 
261 Kuhn, D., The skills of argument ( 1991) Cambridge University Press, 262-3. 
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educational experience. That people can manage day by day without thorough 
skills of argument suggests, amongst other possibilities, either that argument is 
not that important an aspect of daily sensemaking or that only shallow skills are 
needed on a day to day basis. In law however, which is much more consciously 
argument oriented, it also suggests the possibility of improving argumentative 
skills. 
In a senes of experiments, Robinson and colleagues have investigated the 
influence on learning of the graphical presentation of arguments. They 
conclude that using matrix presentations of information, students learned more 
hierarchical and coordinate relations, and were more successful in applying 
that knowledge and in writing integrated essays, than students studying outlines 
or text alone.262 In related experiments results have shown that readers who 
searched either graphical presentations or outlines found answers to fact 
questions more quickly than those who searched text, and students who 
searched graphic presentations found answers to comparison questions and 
pattern questions more quickly than those who searched either outlines or 
text. 263 The results of these studies demonstrate that the purely textual 
presentation of arguments was the least effective means for students to learn 
the structure of argumentative texts. Network presentations as well as matrix 
presentations were all more effective as means to present arguments than 
purely textual presentations. Research by Veerman reports similar results. Her 
262 Robinson, D.H., Kiewra, K.A., 'Visual Argument - Graphic Organizers are superior to 
outlines in improving learning from text' (1995) 87(3) Journal of Educational Psychology 
455; Robinson, D.H., Skinner, C.H., 'Why graphic organizers facilitate search processes: 
Fewer words or computationally efficient indexing?' (1996) 21 Contemporary Educational 
Psychology 166; Robinson, D.H., 'Graphic organizers as aids to text learning' (1998) 37(2) 
Reading Research and Instruction 85; Kiewra, K.A., Kauffman, D.F., Robinson, D.H., 
Dubois, N.F. and Staley, R.K., 'Supplementing floundering text with adjunct displays' 
( 1 999) 27 Instructional Science 3 73. 
263 Robinson and Skinner, ibid. 
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research indicates that graphical presentation encouraged argumentative 
exchange amongst students.264 
Work by Carr and Hair conflicts however, on whether diagrams are beneficial 
in improving argument skills in law. Carr studied the effect of using computer-
based diagramming tools on argumentation by second year law students.265 
Carr reports that the test group did not have better test scores than the control 
group. 266 In contrast however, Hair reports a similar experiment in which the 
test group did outperform the control group.267 Without further data it would 
appear that benefits of diagramming legal arguments is inconclusive. 
However, the experiments performed by Carr and Hair must be interpreted 
with caution. First, the experiments aimed to test whether diagramming 
arguments was useful for teaching argument skills. Moreover, the aim was to 
teach the abstract structure of argument, rather than argument about a 
particular area of law. This is very difficult where, as Carr observes of his test 
group, the students 'were already very good at legal argument.'268 It is difficult 
to think of any method that would be good for teaching an abstract skill that is 
already well understood. These experiments thus leave largely uninvestigated 
the benefit of diagramming as part of a process of sensemaking. The 
experiments focus on teaching the process of argun1ent rather than supporting 
264 Veerman, A., 'Computer-supported Collaborative Learning Through Argumentation.' 
(2000) Ph.D. Dissertation, Universiteit Utrecht, The Netherlands. 
265 Carr, C.S., 'CSCA in Legal Education' (1999). Paper presented at workshop on Computer-
Supported Collaborative Argumentation for Learning Communities, 1999, Stanford 
University. Available at http://d3e.open.ac.uk/cscl99/Carr/Carr-paper.html (accessed 
6/3/2001). 
266 Ibid. section 5. 
267 Hair, D.C., 'Using the Interface to Improve Performance of Complex Cognitive Tasks' 
(1990) Technical Report CU-CS-490-90, Department of Computer Science, University of 
Colorado at Boulder, Discussion. 
268 Carr, above n. 265, Effectiveness. 
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the construction of pieces of argument as part of a process of sensemaking. 
Indeed, Carr reports that while diagramming did not improve the quality of 
argument produced, diagramming did improve the efficiency of argument 
production. 269 This suggests that argument diagramming may be useful in 
supporting sensemaking. 
The second reason that these experiments exammmg legal argument 
diagramming must be interpreted with caution is that they used different 
representations of argument. As cognitive theories of diagrammatic reasoning 
indicate, the representation that is used guides, constrains and may even 
determine· problem solving. Different representations would thus be expected 
to have different effects on reasoning. 
It thus remains that much theory and evidence indicates that diagramming is 
beneficial for reasoning. How the diagramming of legal argument in support of 
legal sensemaking might be supported however, remains to be examined. 
3.6 Discussion 
The representations of law and the representations of legal reasonmg 
embodied in computer systems that support legal knowledge work are 
extremely important. This chapter has reviewed several representations of law 
and legal reasoning that have been influential not only in legal theory, but also 
in attempts to create legal knowledge-based systems. These representations of 
law and legal reasoning were argued to gloss important aspects of legal 
problem solving. In contrast, this chapter presented a representation of law 
and a representation of legal reasoning as a process of sensemaking. 
Sensemaking involves building a picture of a problem and materials relevant to 
a problem. It involves the construction of a picture of the world as it was, as it 
currently is and as we would like it to be. It is about interpreting, applying, and 
269 Ibid. 
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perhaps manipulating the law in order to achieve results. It is in this vein that 
reasoning with the law, and reasoning about the law, is a process of 
sensemaking. It is about using the law as a tool to make sense of the world but 
also using the world as a reference point from which to makes sense of the law. 
It thus involves an interaction between 'the law' and 'the world'. Viewing law as 
a process of sensemaking provides a useful basis from which to approach the 
construction of knowledge-based systems that augment legal work. 270 
. Two processes were argued to be highly significant for sensemaking. First, 
argumentation is central to the construction of sense. We argue with ourselves 
when exploring our beliefs and views and when constructing explanations. 
Secondly, the visualisation of information can be highly beneficial for 
sensemaking. More specifically, visualisations of argument have been shown to 
be beneficial to reasoning. Together, these suggest that augmenting legal 
knowledge work could usefully be achieved by supporting the visualisation of 
argumentative processes of sensemaking. As Lipshitz calls for, this is an attempt 
to develop decision support systems compatible with human information 
processing and knowledge representation methods.271 
In order to construct computer systems that support visual representations of 
argument however, it is necessary to know more about the structure of 
270 In this respect it has not been argued that sensemaking is the right way of viewing law and 
legal reasoning - only that sensemaking is a useful perspective and a useful perspective 
from which to approach the construction of legal knowledge-based systems. Sensemaking is 
presented as a description of processes of legal reasoning. This says nothing about the 
usefulness of other representations of legal reasoning for other purposes. For example, if 
normative theory is felt appropriate, it is perfectly possible to accept that people engage in 
sensemaking and concurrently argue that 'such and such' a method is how they should 
proceed. Such considerations are however, beyond the scope of this work. 
271 Lipshitz, above n. 211, 131-4. In a similar vein, Weick raises the need for sense making 
support systems: Weick, above n. 179, 179. 
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argument. The following chapter examines theories of argument and examines 
methods developed to diagram the structure of argument. 
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4 Diagramming sensemaking 
How can I know what I think until I see what I say? 
E. M. Forster 
4.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter examined sensemaking as a perspective on legal 
reasoning. Theories of sensemaking were examined and the importance of 
argument as a component of sensemaking was emphasised. In particular, it was 
claimed that visualising the structure of argument would be beneficial for legal 
sensemaking. This chapter examines theories of argument and theories of 
argument diagramming. These theories are examined for the assistance they 
may provide in the support of legal sensemaking. This chapter attempts to 
apply argument diagramming in the analysis of a legal judgment. It concludes 
that while well-established methods of argument diagramming exist, unaided, 
these methods can only provide limited support for legal sensemaking. This is 
both because there is no consensus on how argument should be represented 
and more importantly, because legal sensemaking involves processes other than 
bare argument. In order to support sensemaking, supporting processes wider 
than argument will often be necessary. This chapter attempts to apply 
techniques for diagramming wider aspects of sensemaking in the analysis of a 
legal judgment. It is concluded that such diagramming methods are 
problematic. Methods for diagramming argument and other aspects of 
sensemaking are subject to representational effect which influences their 
usefulness. 
Following this introduction, the next subsection examines logical approaches to 
argument analysis. This subsection reviews research examining logic-based 
approaches to argument analysis and which argue that such approaches to 
argument analysis are an inappropriate basis for a method to diagram 
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arguments. Subsection three of this chapter exammes theories of 'everyday' 
argument, which have been proposed as alternatives to logical approaches to 
argument analysis. Theories of everyday argument are particularly interesting 
because argument diagramming is an established analytical tool and relatively 
conventional diagramming methods exist. Subsection four of this chapter 
examines the influential Toulmin method of argument analysis and highlights 
several problems with this method. Subsection five examines the 'standard' 
method of argument diagramming. It is asserted that while theories of 
everyday argument can be useful for the analysis of argument and hence for the 
diagramming of sensemaking, they are limited as means to support 
sensemaking. It is claimed that although argument is an important aspect of 
sensemaking, argument is only one aspect of sensemaking and wider processes 
of sensemaking require diagramming support. Subsection seven of this chapter 
examines approaches to supporting such wider aspects of sensemaking and 
discusses the limitations of these approaches. 
4.2 The logic of argument 
Just as logic has heavily influenced both the study of legal reasoning in legal 
theory, and the study of reasoning and decision making in psychology, the 
study of argument has also been hugely influenced - indeed dominated - by 
what many current argumentation theorists call 'formal logic.' Just as deeply 
held views about the role of law in society can be traced back to Greek 
philosophy, so too can the study of argument - in particular to the work of 
Aristotle. 272 
272 According to van Eemeren et al., the backgrounds of argumentation theory lie in Greek 
antiquity from where they evolved during beginning in the 6th and 5th centuries BC. van 
Eemeren et al. argue that at this time, the prevalent mythological picture of the world, 
under which nature and the social order of the city-state were regarded as a divinely 
ordained immutable order, began to change. 1l1inkers began to try to explain the existence 
of their environment - from the natural to the social order. Disagreements over the origin 
and state of the world and of people's place in the world all clamoured for acceptance - this 
104 
According to Aristotle, all new knowledge, insights and opinions, to the extent 
that they arise from rational thought, are based on existing knowledge, insights 
and opinions.273 For Aristotle argument was the means of using what was 
already known to establish such new knowledge, insight and opinion. Aristotle 
regarded thinking and argument as amenable to systematic, scientific study, 
stating: 
As a start, we must say what this inquiry is about and to what subject it 
belongs; namely, that it is concerned with apodeixis [i.e. the way in which 
conclusions are to be established] and belongs to the science ( episteme) 
of their establishment. 274 
For Aristotle, logic was the tool for this systematic and scientific study and 
consequently logical arguments led to certain and reliable knowledge.275 
For Aristotle, the deductive syllogism provided the model for reliable 
arguments. A deductive syllogism consists of a major premise, a minor premise 
and a conclusion. The major premise is a general statement. The minor 
premise is a specific state of affairs. The conclusion is the result of combining 
the major premise and the minor premise. A standard example is: 
All men are mortal (major premise) 
Socrates is a man 
Socrates is mortal 
(minor premise) 
(conclusion) 
lead to questions of what actually amounts to a good opinion and under what circumstances 
something could be said to be true: van Eemeren, F.H., Grootendorst, R., Henkemans, 
F.S., Blair, J.A., Johnson, R.H., Krabbe, E.C.W., Plantin, C., Walton, D.N., Willard, C.A., 
Woods, ]. and Zarefsky, D., Fundamentals of Argumentation Theory: A Handbook of 
Historical Backgrounds and Contemporary Developments (1996) Lawrence Erlbaum 
Associates, 29-31. 
273 Ibid. 31. 
274 Quoted in: Toulmin, above n. 113, 2. 
275 Although in his work Aristotle referred to this study as 'analytic' the term 'logic' has 
subsequently become widely used in replacement. 
105 
The movement is from the general to the specific and it is impossible for each 
premise to be true and the conclusion to be false. 276 As Walton states, an 
argument in this sense is a: 
group of propositions of which one, the conclusion, is claimed to be true 
on the basis of other propositions, the premises, that are asserted as 
providing grounds or reasons for accepting the conclusion.277 
In this conception, argument is centrally concerned with ideas of truth and 
falsity, and validity and invalidity.278 
The ability to sort arguments that are certain and reliable from those that are 
not certain and reliable has fascinated philosophers ever since. With such a 
powerful system, it would be possible to determine what are good and bad 
arguments, what are valid and invalid inferences, what amounts to a true or 
false conclusion and more broadly, perhaps, what it means to be rational. 
However, while Aristotle viewed logic as merely one aspect of a study of 
argument, both the normative and descriptive study of argument have come to 
be dominated by this tradition with its conception of argument as a deductive 
system and the associated concern with validity and invalidity, truth and 
falsity. 279 
276 van Eemeren et al., above n. 272, 31. C.f.: Carroll, L., What the Tortoise said to Achilles' 
( 1995) 104 Mind 691. 
277 Walton, D.N., Argument structure: a pragmatic theory (1 996) University of Toronto Press, 
5. 
278 As van Eemeren et a] state: 
if an argument is valid in' propositionallogic it is impossible that its conclusion be false 
whereas its premises are true .... this does not mean that the premises are required to 
be true. A valid argument may very well have false premises. Valid arguments that do 
have true premises are usually called "sound" .. (van Eemeren et al., above n. 272, 10) 
279 E.g.: van Eemeren et al., above n. 272, 51; Walton, ibid.; Govier, T., Problems in Argument 
Analysis and Evaluation (1987) Foris. Johnson states that while formal logic is concerned 
with truth, informal logic is concerned with argumentation: Johnson, R.H., 'The Relation 
between Formal and Informal Logic' (1999) 13 Argumentation 265. However, while 
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The deductive syllogism is a compact and powerful tool for analysis. It 
apparently provides a concise method for analysing arguments and a 
straightforward method for visualising the structure of arguments. 
Unfortunately, the deductive syllogism proves difficult to apply. 
4.2.1 Enthymemes 
Perhaps the major difficulty with the deductive syllogism ts that the vast 
majority of commonly encountered arguments often do not 'fit' the required 
'shape'. 280 The deductive syllogism relies on the existence of explicit statements 
to which the syllogistic template can be applied. However, in most commonly 
encountered arguments, the argument contains unexpressed premises. As an 
informal logic may be less concerned with establishing the truth of propositions and 
arguments, it is inaccurate to imply that formal logic is unconcerned with argumentation -
much work has been conducted attempting to use formal logic to model argument, see e.g.: 
Pollock, J.L., 'How to reason defeasibly' ( 1 992) 57 Artificial Intelligence 1 and works 
examined at 2.5.3. 
28° Four main problems are commonly cited in the application of formal logic to every-day 
argument: ( 1 )arguments contain unexpressed elements; (2)arguments display 
argumentation structures; (3)arguments utilise argumentation schemes; and (4)some 
arguments are fallacies, e.g. van Eemeren et al., above n. 272, 12; Walton above n. 277. 
The study of argument structures investigates the various ways in which premises can 
combine to support a conclusion. Premises can mutually or independently support a 
conclusion. The syllogistic analysis of argument has not traditionally investigated such 
structures and this requires non-logical, pragmatic criteria: ibid. The study of 
argumentation schemes investigates the common principles which arguments often use to 
transfer acceptance from premise to conclusion: van Eemeren et al., above n. 272, 19. The 
study of fallacies is a traditional concern in logical approaches to the study of argument, 
however, many argumentation theorists argue that a full treatment of arguments that have 
traditionally been regarded as fallacious cannot be based solely on formal methods and 
require pragmatic assessment criteria. Problems with syllogistic logic will only be examined 
from the existence of unexpressed premises as this is sufficient to highlight the need for a 
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example van Eemeren et al. cite the argument 'Amos is a teacher, so Amos is 
pig-headed' which might be analysed as: 
Amos is a teacher 
Amos is pig-headed281 
This dearly lacks one of the premtses that constitute deductive syllogisms. 
According to Van Eemeren et al., the argument can be read as missing the 
premise 'Teachers are pig-headed'. This would give the deductive syllogism: 
Teachers are pig-headed 
Amos is a teacher 
Amos is pig-headed282 
Just as arguments may leave either the major or minor premise implicit, the 
conclusions may also be implicit. 283 
All such mtssmg statements are called 'enthymemes'.284 Prima facie, the 
existence of an enthymeme in an argument means that a deductive syllogism is 
not present and that the rules for manipulating deductive syllogisms are not 
applicable. In order to apply the rules governing deductive syllogisms, some 
method is necessary to 'find' enthymemes. Identification of enthymemes may 
be straightforward in some circumstances. However, in other situations, the 
identification of enthymemes can be problematic - often there are multiple 
possibilities. For example, in the argument: 
Fred is a lawyer 
wider scope of examination. The remaining three issues will not be explicitly discussed 
here, though issues relevant to these topics arise throughout this work. 
281 van Eemeren et al., above n. 272, 14. 
282 Ibid. 
283 Ibid. 16. Although van Eemeren et al. argue that such implicit conclusions are easier to 
identity. 
284 Note that as conceived by, Aristotle an 'enthymeme' was simply a premise in an argument 
which was not completely reliable. However, the term has come instead to refer to any 
unstated, implicit, statements that might be read into an argument. It is in this latter sense 
that the term is used here. 
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Fred makes lots of money 
What is the missing premise? Is it that anyone who is a lawyer makes lots of 
money? Is it that professionals make lots of money? Or might it be that Fred is 
a conscientious worker? Without further information each of these possibilities, 
and others, are possible candidates.285 IdentifYing enthymemes thus requires 
non -logical pragmatic-criteria. 286 
However, the need to clarifY arguments by inserting statements reduces the 
benefit of the deductive syllogism. The claimed benefit of the deductive 
syllogism is that it can sort valid argument from non-valid arguments, truth 
285 This is a particular concern in the law, in particular for the interpretation of precedents. 
Precedents are often said to contain an authoritative ratio that expresses the mle in the 
case. However, as jurists question, how do you determine exactly what the ratio decidendi 
of a case contains? Indeed jurists such as Stone have argued that the ratio can be regarded 
as standing for as many different things as there are combinations of distinct propositions 
in a case: Stone, above n. 42. 
286 Argumentation theorists have adopted vanous approaches. At one extreme, theorists 
suggest that enthymemes should be read with the statement which makes the argument the 
strongest it could possibly be. This would suggest a mle linking premise and conclusion. 
Against this it is often argued that making the argument as strong as is possible is 
ungenerous in that it too greatly ignores the original argument. Rather, arguments should 
be left as they are and left to stand or fall with their enthymematic gaps. This certainly does 
justice to the original argument, although in some circumstances it can be harsh to assess 
an argument based on obvious and easily filled omissions. There is no solid solution to this 
interpretive problem and as such, the principle of 'moderate charity adopted by Govier 
seems reasonable: 
Moderate charity directs us not to interpret others as having made implausible claims 
or faulty inferences unless there is good empirical reason to do so. Empirical reason is 
provided in the first instance by the wording of the discourse and also by the context 
in which the discourse appears and background knowledge pertaining to the arguer. 
(Govier, above n. 279, 152) 
She continues: 
When relevant empirical evidence does not determine one or other interpretation and 
when moderate charity is indicated, we adopt that interpretation according to which 
the claims made are most plausible and the inferences most reasonable. (Ibid.) 
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from falsity. However, it is possible to insert a premise to make any argument 
deductively valid.287 When every argument can be made deductively valid 
though, the ability is necessarily lost to sort good arguments from bad 
arguments, valid arguments from invalid arguments. Moreover, even when 
each premise is explicit, as will be discussed in more detail shortly, the link 
between the major premise, minor premise and conclusion itself needs 
support. 288 This further undermines the ability to sort valid arguments from 
invalid arguments. 
Aristotle was aware of difficulties in applying the deductive syllogism, stating 
that precision should not be sought from where it is not available. 289 In addition 
to the deductive syllogism, Aristotle also studied dialectic and rhetoric - where 
arguments did not lead to valid conclusions.290 However, it is the deductive 
syllogism that has dominated theories of argument. 291 
287 Govier, above n. 279, 25. 
288 Carroll has provided an amusing, though serious, example of this: Carroll, above n. 276. 
289 Aristotle, Rhetoric, translated by]. H. Freese (1926) Heinemann. 
290 According to Aristotle, while deductive arguments prove their conclusions, the premises of 
dialectical arguments are only generally accepted (or accepted by the 'wise') and because 
the premises are only generally accepted, the conclusions are also only generally accepted: 
van Eemeren et al., above n. 272, 32. In contrast to logic and dialectic, as conceived by 
Aristotle rhetoric was concerned with how to best convince an audience. The sole concern of 
rhetoric was methods by which an orator could move the audience to accept the orator's 
conclusion. Hence, the premises would have to be chosen to best convince the audience. 
According to v~m Eemeren, the audience must accept the move from premises to 
conclusion and whether th'e reasoning is valid by demonstrative or dialectical criteria was 
not relevant: ibid. For Aristotle, the notion of 'rhetoric' and 'rhetorical argument' did not 
have the pejorative overtones .that the terms have come to be burdened with. 
291 van Eemeren et al. trace the study of argumentation subsequent to Aristotle, in its Roman 
and Renaissance forms, and argue that it has largely involved ever more detailed 
cataloguing within Aristotle's framework: van Eemeren et al., above n. 272, 45-50. 
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4.3 Everyday arguments 
Concerns over the utility of the syllogism for analysing arguments has led to the 
rise of 'informal logic.' Informal logic has been characterised as a practical 
subject: 
whose task is to develop non-formal standards, criteria, procedures for 
the analysis, interpretation, evaluation, criticism and construction of 
argumentation in everyday discourse. 292 
This conception has proved attractive and as well as research into the academic 
uses of informal logic, has been embraced in instructional courses on 'critical 
thinking'. 293 
There is some controversy over the applicability of the term 'informal logic' 
itsel£.294 Critics argue that by definition, a 'logic' is a well-defmed system for 
drawing inferences and as such the label 'informal logic' is nonsensical. To 
avoid entering into this debate, the term 'informal logic' will be avoided here 
and instead the assessment of' everyday' argument will be discussed. 295 
In deductive arguments a true conclusion is the goal. It is the truth of the 
premises that is transferred to the conclusion. However, if it cannot be shown 
that an argument is deductive - either because the argument is enthymematic 
or because the premises do not conform to the required form - then the 
premises must exist in some relation to the conclusion other than that of 
292 J ohnson, above n. 279, 270. 
293 The appeal of the study of informal logic is indicated by two primary journals devoted to 
the subject, Informal Logjc and Argumentaa·on, and two societies, the Assodaa·on for 
Informal Logjc and Crjtical Thjnkjng and the International Sodety for the Study of 
Arugmentaa·on, 
294 J ohnson notes several authors sceptical that informal logic exists: J ohnson, above n. 279, 
265. 
295 Reclaiming the term 'logic' for wider use is of peripheral concern. If the assessment of 
everyday arguments is informative then it is worthwhile regardless of whether it is strictly 
logical in the sense of confirming to defined and specified mles. 
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transferring truth. Once it is accepted that everyday arguments do not conform 
to the deductive model, the question arises as to what relationship exists 
between an argument's conclusion and its premises. In investigating this 
question, argumentation theorists have revived Aristotle's concern with dialectic 
and rhetoric. Following Aristotle, and more recently Perelman and Olbrechts-
Tyteca/96 argumentation theorists argue that it is the audience's acceptance 
that is transferred from the premises to the conclusion. According to van 
Eemeren: 
It should not be taken for granted that anyone who puts forward an 
argument is automatically involved in an attempt to logically derive the 
conclusion from the premises. Yet, in some way or other, a transfer of 
acceptance from the explicit premise to the standpoint must be aimed 
at. 297 
Through the presentation of acceptable premises, an arguer seeks to move an 
audience to accept what would otherwise be a controversial conclusion. The 
investigation of everyday argument is thus concerned with ways in which 
conviction is transferred from premises to conclusion during argument. 
Reconceiving the goal of argument requires reconceiving what constitutes an 
argument. In contrast to the view of argument as a series of premises that prove 
a conclusion, van Eemeren et al. define argument as: 
a verbal and social activity of reason aimed at increasing (or decreasing) 
the acceptability of a controversial standpoint of the listener or reader, 
by putting forward a constellation of propositions intended to justifY (or 
refute) the standpoint before a rationaljudge. 298 
This is a much wider conception of argument than the deductive syllogism 
allows. This conception of argument is not directly concerned with truth and 
296 Perelman, C., Olbrechts-Tyteca, L., The New Rhetoric: A Treatise on Argumentation 
(1969) University ofNotre Dame Press. 
297 van Eemeren et al., above n 272, 19. 
298 Ibid. 5. 
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falsity and it is inherently social, involving at least two parties and a rational 
judge. The terms 'argument' and 'argumentation' mask an ambiguity that has 
previously been glossed over - both terms are commonly used to refer both to 
the process of arguing and also to the product resulting from that process. 299 
Formal logic is solely concerned with the product, i.e. whether a conclusion can 
be validly derived from a given set of premises. 300 In contrast, the study of 
everyday argument is also concerned with the process of argument. Instead of 
viewing argument from the standpoint of formal logic, van Eemeren et al.'s 
explicitly dialectical view of argument inevitably involves consideration of the 
audience, and the manner of convincing that audience. 
Numerous studies of everyday argument exist.301 It is not the aim here to review 
or critically discuss these. The focus of this discussion is the diagramming of 
arguments; as such this examination concentrates on techniques for 
diagramming arguments developed in argumentation theory. 
4.4 Tou/min 's analysis of arguments 
Toulmin was amongst the first and one of the most influential theorists to 
question the possibility of having a science of syllogistic logic that is also 
applicable to everyday arguments. Toulmin asserted that, except for very 
limited types of argument, the syllogism disguises important steps of reasoning. 
Most importantly according to Toulmin, the syllogism conceals that the 
application and relevance of the major premise to the minor premise is a 
reasoning step that itself needs justification. According to Toulmin, recognising 
this leads to the ability to freshly and more realistically, reassess notions such as 
299 Ibid. 
300 Ibid. 6. 
301 E.g.: Govier, above n. 279; van Eemeren et al., above n. 272; Walton, above n. 277; 
Freeman, J.B., Dialectics and the macrostructure of arguments: a theory of argument 
structure (1991) Foris Publications; Snoeck Henkemans, F., Analysing Complex 
Argumentation (2nd edition) (1997) SICSAT. 
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'reasonableness', 'logically', 'probability', 'improbability', and 'necessity'. More 
importantly for present purposes, Toulmin argued that recognising this would 
lead to the better understanding and communication of arguments. 
Toulmin argued that syllogistic logic is wholly inapplicable to 'practical' 
reasoning, of which legal reasoning is a type, and was concerned to both make 
arguments more comprehensible and to provide a new logic for arguments.302 
Toulmin proposed an alternative structure to the syllogism for examining the 
arguments that constitute everyday reasoning. The claim that syllogistic and 
formal logics are wholly inapplicable to everyday reasoning might be regarded 
with some scepticism and Toulmin's proposal for a new logic, to which all 
arguments must conform, has not received wide support. However, Toulmin's 
rejection of the syllogism and his use of diagrams to illustrate his own 
arguments, have proved highly influential. 303 
302 Toulmin, S., The Uses of Argument (1964) Cambridge University Press, 149-169. 
303 Citation analysis indicates a wealth of citation to Toulmin's work. The model has been 
widely adopted in argument oriented computer applications, e.g.: Dick, J.P., 
'Representation of legal text for conceptual retrieval' p. 244, in The Third International 
Conference on Artificial Intelligence and Law: Proceedings of the Conference (1991) ACM 
Press; Stranieri, A., Zeleznikow, J., Gawler, M. and Lewis, B., 'A hybrid rule - neural 
approach for the automation of legal reasoning in the discretionary domain of family law in 
Australia' (1 999) 7 Artificial Intelligence and Law 153; Bench-Capon, T.J.M., Staniford, G., 
'PLAID-Proactive Legal Assistance' p. 81, in The Fifth International Conference on 
Artificial Intelligence and Law: Proceedings of the Conference (1995) ACM Press; Marshall, 
C. C., Halasz, F.G., Rogers, RA. and J anssen, W.C., 'Aquanet: A hypertext tool to hold your 
knowledge in place' in Proceedings of Hypertext '91 Conference (1991) ACM Press, Loui, 
RP., Norman, J., Altepeter, J., Pinkard, D., Craven, D., Lindsay, J. and Foltz, M., 'Progress 
on Room 5: A Testbed For Public Interactive Semi-Formal Legal Argumentation' p. 207, in 
The Sixth International Conference on Artificial Intelligence and Law: Proceedings of the 
Conference (1997) ACM Press; Freeman, K., Farley, A.M., 'A Model of Argumentation and 
Its Application to Legal Reasoning' (I 996) 4 Artificial Intelligence and Law 163; further 
systems are mentioned in the remainder of this work. 
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According to Toulmin, in every argument there is 'Data' which acts as the 
foundation for the 'Claim' that it is sought to establish. 304 
jnata -------+",Claim I 
Figure 2: Toulmin's Data and Claim 
One of Toulmin's criticisms of the syllogism was that even accepting a major 
premise and a minor premise, it is unclear how the two are connected and how 
the two premises necessarily lead to the conclusion. Toulmin argued that it is 
easy to skip a step in inference. Thus, Toulmin argued that the movement from 
the Data to the Claim is itself always a step that must be supported. According 
to Toulmin, a 'Warrant' provides the support for this move. The Warrant acts 
as a general hypothetical statement 'bridging' the move from Data to Claim 
and supporting movement from one to the other. 305 
DataTiaim 
Since Warrant 
Figure 3: Toulmin's Warrant 
However, according to Toulmin, Warrants themselves need support. Toulmin 
argued that the Warrant, supporting the move from the Data to the Claim, can 
itself be controversial, i.e. not universally accepted. Consequently, Toulmin 
argued that the Warrant required 'Backing', such Backing providing the 
authoritative status of the Warrant. 306 
304 Toulmin, above n. 302, 97. 
305 Ibid. 98. 
306 Ibid. 103. 
Data~laim 
Since Warrant 
i 
On account of 
Backing 
Figure 4: Backing in arguments 
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Finally, according to Toulmin the Data only supports a Claim to some limited 
degree. Hence the claim must be 'Qualified'. Similarly, Toulmin argued that 
the Data will not support a Claim in all circumstances - there are circumstances 
in which the Claim can be 'Rebutted'. 307 
Data Ts. Qualifif Claim 
S. W Unless Rebuttal mce arrant 
i 
On account of 
Backing 
Figure 5: The complete Toulmin model 
According to Toulmin, all arguments (including syllogisms) follow this basic 
structure, regardless of whether or not such structure is made fully explicit. 308 
Toulmin was heavily influenced by jurisprudential models of argument (as still 
are many argumentation theorists). Toulmin's model thus apparently provides 
a good basis for diagramming legal argument and indeed Toulmin provided a 
legal example to support his theory of argument structure. Thus, the argument 
'Harry was born in Bermuda so Harry is a British subject' has the following 
underlying structure: 
307 Ibid. 101. 
308 Ibid. 109-111. 
Harry was bornm~-----.,,------.. So presumably, Harry 
in Bermuda is a British subject 
t 
Since a man 
born in 
Bermuda will 
generally be a 
British subject 
i 
On account of the 
following statutes 
and other . legal 
proVISIOns 
Unless both his 
parents were 
aliens/he has 
become a 
naturalised 
American 
Figure 6: An example argument in Toulmin's modeP09 
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To reiterate, according to Toulmin the importance of using this structure for 
examining everyday arguments stems from it facilitating a quicker and clearer 
understanding of arguments. 310 This structure highlights that informal logic is 
concerned with the 'appraisal' of arguments on their 'merits' and that telling 
sound arguments from untrustworthy ones requires experience, insight and 
judgment. 311 T oulmin argued that trying to cast everyday arguments within a 
syllogistic form hinders their appraisal and hinders acceptance of the need to 
assess arguments on their merits. 
4.4.1 Problems with Toulmin 
Given Toulmin's radical proposals concerning the structure of argument, it is 
unsurprising that they have been subject to much criticism. 
One of the striking aspects of Toulmin's model is the requirement that the 
move from Data to Claim be warranted. Toulmin provided forceful arguments 
supporting the need for a Warrant and indeed justification of the move from 
claim to conclusion has become a central concern of argument theory. 
309 Ibid. 105 
310 Ibid. 149-169. 
311 Ibid. 187-8. 
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However, Toulmin's treatment of Warrants is inconsistent - for just as the 
assertion that Data supports a Claim may need support, so the assertion that a 
Warrant justifies such a move may itself need support. While Data may give 
support to a Claim, as van Eemeren et al. note: 
There is absolutely no reason, however, why the same should not apply 
to the warrant. If a warrant is not immediately accepted as authoritative, 
then an attempt must be made to remove the objections by means of a 
new argumentation in which the warrant from the first argumentation 
serves as the claim. 312 
If a warrant is the subject of argument, this must be viewed in the Toulmin 
model as a separate preliminary argument. 313 Moreover, the particular Warrant 
provided may not be accepted and so itself need support. There is no reason to 
assume that a Warrant will immediately be accepted as authoritative. While 
Toulmin would supply support with Backing, why the move from Backing to 
Warrant should be accepted, or why the particular Backing supplied should be 
accepted, may in turn need support. 
Similarly, why a Rebuttal should be regarded as detracting from a Claim or why 
a particular Rebuttal should be regarded as authoritative may itself need 
clariftcation. There seems little reason to attach an unsupported statement of 
rebuttal directly to the claim and not allow the reasoning behind the rebuttal to 
itself be a fully expressed argument. Nor does the model allow rebuttal of 
Claims, Warrants or Backing. In a modification of the original model 
researchers who have attempted to analyse everyday arguments with the model 
often allow Warrants to be the subject of argument, and sometimes allow 
argument about Rebuttals. If modified, Toulmin's model can be used to 
diagram arguments about Warrants, Backing and Rebuttals. However, as 
originally presented, Toulmin's model is restrictively asymmetrical. 
312 van Eemeren, above n. 272, 158. 
313 Ibid. 158. 
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Argumentation theorists and several authors who attempt to apply it have 
noted these inconsistencies in Toulmin's model.314 However, once the need for 
such modification is accepted, there appears much less reason to separate 
Warrants, Backing and Rebuttals as privileged aspects of argument. According 
to Toulmin, Warrants are general hypothetical statements authorising the 
movement from Data to Claim. However, theorists argue that what authorises 
such moves is often not such a bare, individual general statement. Rather, 
authorisation of the move from premise to conclusion may itself result from a 
chain of preliminary argument. Similarly, Toulmin envisages the Backing for 
Warrants as a bald authoritative source supporting the Warrant; however there 
seems little reason to limit Backing in this way. Warrants might themselves be 
backed by preliminary arguments. Thus, rather than being able to distinctly 
separate Data, Claims, Warrants and Backing, what amounts to these things will 
depend on the role they play in the overall argument. The conclusion of one 
argument might thus be called a Warrant if it is subsequently used to authorise 
the movement from Data to a Claim. Data might be called Backing if it is used 
to support a Claim that is then used as a Warrant. 
Researchers' claims that it is extremely difficult to distinguish between Warrant 
and Backing when applying the model reflect these problems with Toulmin's 
model.315 In part this stems from Toulmin's restrictive notions of Backing and 
314 E.g.: Govier, above n. 279, 18; Gasper, D.R., George, R.V., 'Analyzing argumentation in 
planning and public policy: assessing, improving, and transcending the Toulmin model' 
(1998) 25(3) Environment and Planning B -Planning and Design 367, 381; Newman, S., 
Marshall, C., 'Pushing Toulmin too far: Learning from an argument representation 
scheme' (1991) Technical Report SSL-92-45: Xerox Palo Alto Research Centre, Palo Alto, 
California. 
315 E.g.: Newman and Marshall ibid.; Gasper and George ibid. 381; Fulkerson, R., 'The 
Toulmin Model of Argument and the Teaching of Composition' p. 45, in Emmel, B., 
Resch, P., and Tenney, D. (eds.) Argument Revisited; Argument Redefined: Negotiating 
Meaning in the Composition Classroom (1996) Sage Publications. 
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Warrant. 316 In addition to limiting Warrants to general hypothetical statements 
and Backing to authoritative sources for such statements, Toulmin argued that 
Backings and Warrants must come from the same 'field.' A fundamental 
problem is determining what counts as a field in the first place. 317 Toulmin was 
extremely vague about this. 318 Although it has been suggested that law and 
science, for example, would each constitute a different field, 319 a precise 
separation remains elusive. Equally problematic, arguments where Backing 
from one field is used to supplement a Warrant from a putatively different field 
appear common e.g. supplementing a warrant that smoking is bad for the 
health using a moral argument as backing.320 • 
After attempting to represent numerous legal arguments usmg Toulmin's 
scheme, N ewman and Marshall highlight several limitations with the scheme: 
Data must be extended to cover things more general than facts; how multiple 
facts leading to the same generalization should be represented is unclear; 
Claims were often not backed by a single statement but rather several operating 
together; Warrants and Backings are often implicit and grounded in common 
sense. 321 
These problems with Toulmin's model directly hint at another more general 
problem. As van Eemeren et al. question: 
Is the model really, as Toulmin claims, a model of the structure of 
argumentation on the micro-level? If this is to mean that it refers to the 
smallest unit of argumentation, then we think that this is not the case. By 
316 Indeed van Eerneren et al. ague that Toulrnin provides inconsistent and sometimes 
conflicting characterisations of Warrant and Backing: van Eemeren et al., above n. 272, 
155-159. 
317 Govier, above n. 279, 17; van Eerneren et al., above n. 272, 155. 
318 Toulmin, above n. 302, 14-5. 
319 Johnson quoted in Govier, above n. 279, 17. 
320 Ibid. 17. 
321 Newrnan and Marshall, above n. 314, 14-25. 
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including a backing, Toulmin turned his model from a model of single 
argumentation into a model of complex argumentation. 322 
Similar observations apply to the inclusion of Rebuttals. Rebuttal naturally 
appears to fall within the dialogical aspects of argument. Rebuttals are 
proposed by an opposing party or by an arguer playing 'devils advocate' and 
anticipating responses to his or her own argument. In a model that attempts to 
capture the most 'basic' structure of argument - argument in its simplest 
possible form - it thus seems more justifiable to omit rebuttals from the basic 
argument structure. Rebuttal can be reintroduced at a latter stage in 
investigating the dialogical aspects of argument. 
Given these criticisms, the model as originally presented by Toulmin is often 
not adopted. Toulmin's original conception of Warrant, Backing and Rebuttal 
appear overly complicated and unnecessary. However, Toulmin's emphasis on 
the non-deductive nature of everyday arguments and the need to support the 
inference from data to claim and the use of diagrams to illustrate his ideas are 
both important 
4.5 The standard method of argument diagramming 
Although Toulmin's method of argument analysis has not caught on, argument 
diagramming itself is a standard technique in argumentation theory. 323 
Although disagreements about argument diagramming remain, 324 the basic 
elements are sufficiently settled as to be called the 'standard method' of 
argument diagramming. 325 
In the standard method of argument diagramming, a characteristic distinction 
is the particular aspect of argument focused on. Broadly, arguments can be 
322 van Eemeren et al., above n. 272, 158. 
323 This can be traced to Toulmin and Beardsley: ibid. 175. 
324 E.g. how to diagram modalities and rebuttals: Freeman, above n. 301. 
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examined from a 'macro' and/or a 'micro' perspective. The analysis of 
argument on the micro level focuses on the relation between an individual 
premise and a claim. In addition to this microstructure, the standard method is 
also concerned with the macrostructure of argument - the ways in which 
recurnng patterns are often observed in the relation between groups of 
premtses and conclusions. Argumentation theorists argue that arguments 
display common macrostructures which play an important role m 
argumentation. 
4.5.1 Microstructure 
In contrast to Toulmin structures, the standard method of argument 
diagramming analyses the basic structure of all argument m terms of 
movement from the single premise to the single conclusion. 326 
!Premise I 
J 
IL Conclusion j 
Figure 7: The microstructure of argument 
While the terminology often differs, argumentation theorists almost universally 
adopt this structure. 327 
The simplicity of this structure contrasts with Toulmin's five-part model. No 
explicit distinction is drawn here between Premise and Conclusion and no 
distinctive Warrant or Backing are hypothesised. Each is simply treated as part 
of basic argument. Toulmin's concern with the need to justifY the move from 
Premise to Claim can be accommodated using multiple basic arguments 
'chained' together to form structures that are more complex. 
325 Walton, above n. 277, 84; Freeman, above n. 301, 1. 
326 Walton, above n. 277, 84. 
327 E.g. compare premise/conclusion, premise/claim, premise/standpoint, data/claim, 
claim/conclusion: van Eemeren et al., above n. 272, 16. 
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4.5.2 Macrostructure 
The various ways in which basic arguments can be chained together to form 
larger arguments ts called the macrostructure of arguments. Again the 
terminology used to describe the structures differs, however, the argument 
structures themselves remain largely the same. 328 
Within the standard method, the single premise and single conclusion is called 
a 'Single Argument'. 329 This is the simplest type of argument. As an example, 
Walton provides the argument: 
Webb was promoted to vice-president. 
Therefore, she will move to Pittsburgh. 330 
328 The divergence in terminology is partly due to the history of argument diagramming: van 
Eemeren et al., above n. 272, 175; Walton, above n. 277, 126. The terminology used by 
Walton is adopted here. Different theorists occasionally argue for the existence of further 
standard structures. For example, Walton argues that two premises can combine to support 
separate conclusions. 
Walton does not give a specific name to this argument structure but argues that it occurs 
when a linked argument (see below) combines with a divergent argument (see below). As 
discussed in detail throughout the remainder of this work, choosing the structures with 
which to represent arguments is a matter of choosing a representation for argument. 
Representations may be more or less appropriate, more or less useful in specific contexts. 
These structures may be more or less appropriate depending on the context of use. Hence, 
they will not be discussed in detail here. 
329 Walton, above n. 277, 85: 
330 Ibid. 84. 
Webb was promoted 
to vice-president 
She will move to 
Pittsburgh 
Figure 8: 'Single' argument 
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In a 'Serial Argument', the conclusion of one argument forms the premise in a 
subsequent argument. 331 Walton provides the following example: 
The room was sealed, and empty when we entered. 
Therefore no one could have left it. And therefore, the murderer was 
never in the room. 332 
I Premise I 
The room was 
sealed, and empty 
when we entered 
Figure 9: 'Serial' argument 
A 'Linked Argument' involves two or more premises and one conclusion. In a 
linked argument, 'the premises function together to give support to the 
conclusion. '333 While each premise supports the conclusion, none of the 
premises supports the conclusion independently.334 Walton provides the 
following example: 
331 Ibid. 89. 
332 Ibid. 89 adopted from Beardsley 
333 Ibid. 85. 
334 Ibid. 86. 
124 
Competent individuals are at liberty to make their own medical 
treatment decisions; incompetent individuals are not. Thus competence 
and liberty are inextricably intetwoven. 335 
Competent 
individuals are at 
liberty to make their Incompetent 
own medical individuals 
treatment decisions are not 
Competence and liberty 
are inextricably 
interwoven 
Figure 10: 'Linked' argument 
Walton argues that many deductively valid arguments, are linked arguments 
e.g.: 
If Sally has agreed to tun, J ane will not be elected. 
Sally has agreed to run. 
Therefore, J ane will not be elected. 336 
In contrast to the above linked arguments where prem1ses JOlll together to 
support a conclusion, in a 'Convergent Argument' there is more than one 
premise and each premise provides independent support for the conclusion. 337 
As an example, Walton cites: 
335 Ibid. 
I've opposed the death penalty all of my life. I don't see any evidence 
that it's a deterrent and I think there are better and more effective ways 
to deal with violent crime. 338 
336 Ibid. 87. 
337 Ibid. 
338 Ibid. 88. 
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I think there are 
I don't see any better and more 
\i evidence that effective ways to deal it's a deterrent with violent crime \I I Conclusion I I've opposed the 
death penalty all 
of my life 
Figure 11: 'Convergent' argument 
Finally, m a 'Divergent Argument' one premtse supports multiple 
conclusions. 339 
Figure 12: 'Divergent' argument 
However, while these argument structures are widely used, theorists can and do 
differ greatly as to when one particular argument structure is applicable rather 
than another. For example, whether a particular argument is an example of a 
linked argument or an example of a convergent argument. Theorists apply a 
multitude of tests in attempts to determine when an argument is linked or 
when an argument is convergent. 340 Such issues of interpretation however, 
339 Ibid. 91. 
340 Walton identifies five main tests: 
Falsity/No Support Test: If one premise is false, the conclusion is not given any support. 
Suspension/Insufficient Proof Test: If one premise is suspended (not proved, not known to 
be true), the conclusion is not given enough support to prove it. 
Falsity/Insufficient Proof Test: If on premise is false, the conclusion is not given enough 
support to prove it. 
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simply highlight the degree to which the analysis of everyday arguments is an 
interpretive process. This is not problematic for the technique of argument 
diagramming, which is neutral with respect to interpretation decision that 
happen to be made. 
The wide acceptance within argument theory of the standard method of 
argument diagramming suggests that the method would be the ideal basis on 
which to construct systems to aid legal sensemaking. 
4.6 Problems with the standard method of argument diagramming 
As a means to support legal sensemaking there are several problems with the 
standard method of argument diagramming. These problems relate to the 
ability of the method to represent argument and more generally the suitability 
of the method to support sensemaking. 
Suspension/No support Test: If one premise is suspended (not proved, not known to be 
true), the conclusion is not given any support. 
Degree of support test: What degree of support does each premise give to the conclusion? 
If the degree of support provided to the conclusion is significantly greater than each 
individual premise alone, then the argument is linked. Otherwise it is convergent. (Ibid. 
119-20.) 
Walton prefers the 'Degree of support' test; ibid. 181-2. The use of a particular test is a 
matter for discussion and argument within a group that is analysing an argument. As such 
it is peripheral to the current concern of diagramming argument structures. However, 
Walton indicates the interpretation of whether an argument is itself linked or convergent is 
an aspect of argument that can itself be diagrammed. By diagramming these interpretive 
choices, the method of diagramming would itself aid in the clarification and resolution of 
problems. As Walton states: 
Better, we think, as a policy for analysis of arguments, to admit that you don't really 
know what the non-explicit premise (or conclusion) is, in those cases where the textual 
evidence is incomplete. Even better, in cases where two argument diagrams are both 
possible, based on two different interpretation of the text of discourse, the evidence 
for both reconstructions should be laid out. (Ibid. 253.) 
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A commonly stated problem with diagramming is that a great deal of 
interpretation may be needed to diagram an argument in order to determine 
what structures to use. For example, whether to choose a 'linked' or 
'convergent' structure. However, while it is correct that interpretation is needed 
to choose amongst structures, as previously discussed in the context of 
enthymemes, a lot of interpretation is needed in deciphering arguments 
generally. Interpretation is not a problem peculiar to the diagramming of 
arguments. If a reader or listener interprets an argument, that person has to 
decide whether the argument is linked or convergent. The fact that they choose 
to express their interpretation in terms of an argument diagram is irrelevant. 
For example, if a reader had chosen, instead of diagramming their decision, to 
write 'This is a linked argument' or 'This is a convergent argument' the same 
objections should be made. This writing also 'masks' a lot of interpretation of 
the argument. Therefore, unless all choices are subject to this criticism, in 
which case the analysis and evaluation of arguments is impossible, it must be 
conceded that diagramming in itself is not at fault. When it is chosen to 
diagram a structure it is the interpretative decision that can be questioned, not 
the decision to diagram the decision as such. 
A more cogent argument is perhaps that diagramming arguments somehow 
'fixes' the interpretation in a reader's mind and so makes it less likely that they 
will reinterpret an argument once diagrammed. This is possible. On the other 
hand however, if an interpretation that is known to be contentious is flagged in 
the diagram as such, this concern might be mitigated. Indeed, if multiple 
interpretations are explicitly diagrammed this might alleviate the possibility of 
fixation and indeed contrary to the concern expressed, possibly keep 
alternative interpretations open for longer. In any event, it is not immediately 
obvious that diagramming argument structure 'locks' interpretation of that 
structure. This is open to and in need of investigation. Hence, that argument 
diagramming involves the interpretation of arguments is not itself a detraction 
from the method. 
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More problematic is that pnma facie the standard method of argument 
diagramming does not cover certain types of arguments. For example, it is not 
immediately apparent how analogies should be diagrammed. Standard texts 
commonly do not cover analogical argument. 341 As widely noted, analogical 
reasoning is common in everyday reasoning, in scientific reasoning and in legal 
reasoning. A method for diagramming analogies thus appears essential for any 
system that seeks to allow the easy diagramming of everyday argument and 
legal argument. 
The diagramming of analogies has however, occasionally been investigated. For 
example, N ewman and Marshall suggest three possibilities for diagramming 
analogies. Although Newman and Marshall's suggestions were made in relation 
to the use of Toulmin structures, these suggestions are equally helpful when 
examining the standard method. These suggestions are shown below in generic 
form and as applied by N ewman and Marshall in attempting to diagram an 
example from US law relating to the right of police officers to search property 
without a warrant: 
X is treated Y can be 
as T r treated as T 
X and Y are 
essentially 
similar. 
i 
X and Y share property A 
X and Y share property B 
Cars are Motorhomes can 
excepted from be excepted from 
judicial warrantr judici~l warrant 
reqmrement. reqmrement. 
Cars and 
m.otorhomes are 
essentiry similar. 
Both are mobile; 
Both can move quickly; 
Figure 13: Diagramming analogies, possibility 1342 
This method asserts that because X is treated in a particular way, Y can be 
treated in the same way - based on X and Y being similar on the specified 
341 For example, Walton does not provide a single mention analogies in his work on argument 
and argument diagramming. 
342 Adapted from: Newman and Marshall, above n. 314, 30. 
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grounds. This method explicitly highlights the similarity between situations and 
explicitly expands these similarities. 
The second method is more complex and highlights the argument supporting 
the conclusion in each of the situations said to be analogous. 
Xhas r Xhas 
property A propertyB 
Hotel rooms Hotel rooms 
are temporary rare afforded 
A implies B 
i 
Backing 
residences. full protection. 
Temporary residences 
are afforded full 
protection. 
i 
Cases 
····--···············--·····---·····---
Yhas r Yhas 
property A propertyB 
Motorhomes Motorhomes 
are temporary rare afforded 
residences. full protection. 
A impliesB 
i 
Backing 
Temporary residences 
are afforded full 
protection. 
i 
Cases and 
current case 
Figure 14: Diagramming analogies, possibility 2343 
With this method, the similarity between situations is not made as evident. 
The third possibility for diagramming analogies ts based on classification 
decisions which are often said to underlie analogies. 
Xhas Xhas 
pm~erty rx ,, . y T ""1;'"" 
A . d. AllY's m 1cates 
. have 
membership 
of category property B 
y 
Motorhomes Motorhomes 
are mobile. r should be 
classified as cars. 
Motorhomes can be 
~ excepted from 
r 
judici~l warrant 
reqmrement. 
Mobility is a crucial 
attribute of cars in 
the automobile 
exception. 
Cars are excepted 
from the judicial 
warrant requirement. 
Figure 15: Diagramming analogies, possibility 3344 
343 Adapted from: ibid. 
344 Adapted from: ibid. 
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Each of the possibilities discussed by N ewman and Marshall appears to express 
aspects of what is involved in analogical reasoning and as such are apparently 
suitable for diagramming analogies. Conversely however, the existence of 
multiple possibilities necessitates choosing one option in preference to the 
others. Moreover, other possibilities can be envisaged. For example: 
Cars :::::::i Motorhomesj 
Figure 16: Diagramming analogies, possibility 4 
This simply asserts that two situations are similar. Here, the assertion of 
similarity is made central, though the reasons supporting or detracting from 
that similarity are not initially provided. Various other possibilities can be 
imagined. 
Just as the standard method of argument diagramming does not deal with the 
diagramming of analogies, nor does it deal with several other aspects of 
argument. For example, arguments that depend on 'the balance of 
considerations', 'coherency' arguments, nor 'arguments to the best 
explanation.' 
Further, gtven that theorists increasingly focus on argument as a dialogical 
process - and that even the individual constructing and reflecting on an 
argument is regarded merely as a variant of this in which a single party adopts 
multiple roles - it is striking that the standard method of argument 
diagramming does not deal with the dialogical nature of argument. 345 While 
Toulmin's model does allow Rebuttals, as previously discussed, this has several 
problems. The standard method of argument diagramming could be modified 
to display counter-arguments. However, it is not immediately obvious how all 
345 E.g. van Eemeren and Grootendorst's 'pragma-dialectics' is concerned with understanding 
argument within a discourse and with specifYing norms for effective argument: van 
Eemeren et al., above n. 272, 274. 
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the interactions that can exist between arguments and counter-arguments 
should be expressed and diagrammed. 
These aspects of the standard method of argument diagramming - the 
questions surrounding the diagramming of analogies discussed by N ewman 
and Marshall, the omission of diagrams for various types of arguments, and the 
disregard of the dialogical aspects of argument - pose problems for the 
standard method of argument diagramming. Underlying the standard method 
of argument diagramming are at least three theoretical convictions. First is that 
methods other than 'formal' logic are required to analyse everyday arguments. 
Second is that diagramming is a helpful tool in such analysis. Third is that a 
'standard' method for analysis and diagramming exists. The first two of these 
convictions appear anecdotally, philosophically and psychologically well 
supported. However, the existence of multiple ways to diagram analogies hints 
at problems in the project of developing a single, universal, standard method 
of argument diagramming. 
Analogising can occur in many ways: analogising to a concept exemplified by a 
prototypical exemplar; analogising to a concept exemplified by multiple 
examples; and 'case to case reasoning' .346 When analogising to a prototypical 
exemplar, it is claimed the reasoners use that exemplar as the primary 
reference with which to form the analogy to the situation under consideration. 
In contrast, in analogising involving multiple examples, rather than referring 
to a single exemplar, the reasoning about the situation under consideration 
occurs with reference to those multiple examples. Finally, in case-to-case 
reasoning as with exemplar based analogising, the situation is only compared 
to one example. The difference with exemplar based reasoning however, is that 
while the exemplar is regarded as the paradigm example of a larger category, 
in case-to-case reasoning the two single cases are compared with each other as 
346 Helman, D.H., (ed.) Analogical reasoning: Perspectives of Artificial Intelligence, Cognitive 
Science and Philosophy ( 1 988) Kluwer. 
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such. The diagramming options examined above express different aspects of 
analogising. However, a single 'standard' method of diagramming must be able 
to accommodate each of these kinds of analogising. It is difficult to imagine 
how this might be done. 347 
Even if standard methods could be agreed to diagram each aspect of 
analogising, a subtler characteristic of diagramming emerges - each 
representation of analogising itself highlights and occludes particular aspects of 
analogising. For example, possibility 1 (figure 13) highlights the argument as to 
why two situations are similar and the properties on which that similarity is 
based. In contrast, possibility 2 (figure 14) highlights the consequences of a 
particular classification and the supporting authority for the classification. 
Possibility 4 (figure 16) simply asserts a bare similarity without itself discussing 
that similarity or its consequences. Just as each representation highlights aspect 
of analogising, each representation also de-emphasises aspects of analogising. 
For example, while possibility 4 (figure 16) highlights the similarity between 
cars and motorhomes, neither the arguments supporting the assertion of 
similarity, nor the consequences of it, are expanded upon. Each remains out of 
sight and hence occluded. In that each representation focuses on different 
aspects of analogising, each representation highlights and occludes different 
aspects of analogising. 
It is notjust in analogising that argument diagramming channels examination. 
The standard method focuses examination of argument in particular ways.348 
Comparing simple arguments diagrammed with Toulmin's model and with the 
347 The standard method could of course adopt an individual standard for each aspect of 
analogising. Difficulties with the diagramming of analogies are compounded by the lack of 
discussion of analogising in works examining everyday argument and argument 
diagramming. 
348 This is in addition to ignoring analogising, various types of argument and the dialogical 
aspects of argument. 
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standard method demonstrates this. Given the argument 'Andrew has red hair 
and so Andrew is short tempered', this could be diagrammed as: 
Andrew has Andrew is short 
red hair. tempered 
Figure 17: Questioning inferences 
However, as Toulmin emphasis.ed, the movement from premise to conclusion 
may need support - as in this argument. One unspoken implication in the 
above argument is that having red hair is connected to having a short temper. 
Toulmin might express this as: 
Andrew has Andrew is short 
red hair. ~~ 
.. 
tempered 
Red haired 
people are 
short tempered 
Figure 18: Toulmin's emphasis on inference warrants 
Here, 'Red haired people are short tempered' is used as a Warrant (in 
Toulmin's terms) to justifY the move from premise to conclusion. The standard 
method might diagram the argument as a linked argument: 
Red haired 
people are 
short tempered 
Figure 19: Diagramming inference warrants with the standard method 
Both diagrams indicate that the statements 'Andrew has red hair' and 'Red 
haired people are short tempered' are together proposed to justifY the 
conclusion. However, Toulmin's method emphasises that the move from 
premise to conclusion is itself an argument. 
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One possible objection to the above argument is that 'Not all red haired people 
are short tempered'. However, this single challenge can be read in at least two 
ways, diagrammed below: 
Not all red 
A haired people 
are short 
tern ered 
B 
Not all red 
haired people 
are short 
tern ered 
Figure 20: Challenging arguments 1349 
is shor 
In part 'A' of figure 20 the objection concerns whether it is justifiable to support 
the argument 'Andrew has red hair so Andrew is short tempered' with 'Red 
haired people are short tempered'. This revolves around what amounts to a 
good justificatory argument - about what the standards of argument are. In 
part 'B' of figure 20 in contrast, the challenge is to the acceptability of the 
justificatory statement itself- and is not related to the standards of justificatory 
argument. 
With the standard method of argument diagramming the objection 'Not all red 
haired people are short tempered' might be diagrammed as 
Red haired 
people are 
short tempered 
Not all red 
haired people 
are short 
tempered 
Figure 21: Challenging arguments 2 
349 This diagram is only loosely based on Toulmin's model, as previously discussed, Toulmin 
did not allow Rebuttals to attach to anything other than a Claim. Further, Toulmin did not 
provide any convention for indicating that one statement contradicts another statement -
indicated in the diagram by a connecting arrow marked by a cross. This convention is used 
in subsequent diagrams in this chapter. 
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This leaves unclear which of the objections is being made. Of course, which 
objection is being made can be expressed through a rewording of the 
statements themselves, or it may emerge during subsequent argument. 
However, it is not that these different representations prevent the expression of 
particular ideas, but rather that representations direct expression in particular 
ways. Representations direct the ways in which ideas are expressed. As argued 
by Zhang, and Larkin and Simon, representations direct thinking. 350 This is a 
fundamental property of representations themselves. 
In this light, even if conventions are adopted for diagramming analogies and 
other types of argument, and for diagramming the dialogical aspects of 
argument, these conventions will inevitably channel expression and channel 
thinking. 351 
That diagrams channel thinking is evident when attempting to apply argument 
diagramming in a legal context. Argument diagramming could serve many 
purposes, for example the better construction of arguments, the better 
communication of arguments or the better analysis of arguments, amongst 
other possibilities. Argumentation theorists suggest that argument analysis is a 
key application. As such, diagramming judicial judgments should be a perfect 
application for the method. Judgments are commonly said to report the 
justificatory arguments underlying judicial decisions. However, trying to 
diagram the arguments as presented in judicial judgments can be extremely 
difficult using the standard method. 
350 It is important to distinguish this aspect of representations from the interpretation of 
arguments that occurs in locating enthymemes or in the reading of arguments as linked or 
convergent. The latter are matters of interpretation that occur within a given framework. 
The former is concerned with choosing the framework, the conventions, in which to analyse 
and interpret arguments. 
351 Work examining argument with different representations supports this: see discussion 
above p. 97. 
136 
For example, below is an extract from the judgment of Lord Slynn in R v Bow 
Street Stipendiary Magistrate and others, ex parte Pinochet Ugarte (Amnesty 
International and others intervening)..352 
It is said (in addition to the argument that functions mean only 
international functions which I reject): 
(i) that the functions of the Head of State must be defined by 
international law, they cannot be defined simply as a matter of national 
law or practice; .... 
As to (i), I do not consider that international law prescribes a list of those 
functions which are, and those which are not, functions for the purposes 
of article 32 [ of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations 1961]. 
The role of a Head of State varies very much from country to country, 
even as between Presidents in various States in Europe and the United 
States. International law recognises those functions which are attributed 
to him as Head of State by the law, or in fact, in the country of which he 
is Head as being functions for this purpose, subject to any general 
principle of customary international law or national law, which may 
prevent what is done from being regarded as a function. (Lord Slynn)353 
~52 [ 1 998] 4 All ER 897. Hereafter 'Pinochet'. 
~5~ Ibid. 907. Although the result in this case was subsequently overturned this does not detract 
from the analysis presented here: R v Bow Street MetropoHtan StipencHai)' Magistrate and 
others, ex parte Pinochet Ugarte (Amnesty International and others intervening)(No 3) 
[1999] 2 All ER 97. 
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One possible way to diagram the argwnent presented by Lord Slynn m this 
passage is as follows: 
Functions of Head of State must be Only international functions can constitute acts 
in the exercise of functions as Head of State. defined by international law (they 
cannot be defined simply as a matter of 
national law or practice). 
,~ 
------~ ------~ 
Internatibnal law Role of ~ead of 
does not prescribe a 
list of those 
functions which are, 
and those which are 
not, functions for the 
purposes of article 
32 
State varies very 
much from country 
to country 
International law recognises those functions 
which are attributed to him as Head of State 
by the law, or in fact, in the country of 
which he is head as being functions for this 
purpose, subject to any general principle of 
customary international law or national law, 
which may prevent what is done from being 
regarded as a function. 
Figure 22: Diagramming judgments using the standard method 
However, the diagram presented above misrepresents an important aspect of 
Lord Slynn's judgment. The diagram suggest that Lord Slynn himself proposed 
two arguments: (a) Only international functions can constitute acts in the 
exercise of functions as Head of State; and (b) Functions of a Head of State 
must be defined by international law (they cannot be defined simply as a matter 
of national law or practice). The diagram does not indicate that (a) was rejected 
and it is unclear how this would be diagrammed given that no argument was 
provided. The standard method does not specifY how to diagram statements 
that do not easily connect to the main argwnent. The diagram further suggests 
that Lord Slynn used two premises, which he proposed, to reject his own 
argwnent (b). The diagram further suggests that Lord Slynn used these same 
two self-proposed premises to justifY the acceptance of a conclusion as to what 
the real rule should be. 
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In fact, the first two propositions, (a) and (b), that Lord Slynn considers were 
not proposed by him but by counsel for parties in the case. This is evident from 
other judgments and the words 'It is said', which commence the above passage 
of Lord Slynn's judgment. In this respect, the standard method misrepresents 
the 'flow' of the argument. Similarly, the standard method does not allow 
labelling of links, such as the use of 'X' to indicate the rejection or contradiction 
of a statement (and in this respect the above diagram does not strictly conform 
to the requirements of the standard method of argument diagramming). As 
discussed below, labelling in this way can aid comprehension of both links and 
propositions themselves, although it raises further 1ssues concernmg 
representational appropriateness. The point is not that the standard method of 
argument diagramming is of no value in analysing judgments, nor that the 
standard method is so fundamentally flawed as to be beyond useful adaptation. 
Neither is the case. For example, simply labelling statements with who made 
them is a modification to the standard method that could be made in order to, 
at least partially, address the dialogical nature of argument. 
Problems with the standard method of argument diagramming are hinted at by 
Govier who states that there is no 'theory of argument' than can be used to 
analyse all arguments. 354 In this light, the standard method of argument 
diagramming would apparently be one amongst many methods for argument 
analysis and no better, or worse, than Toulmin's model. As the work on 
354 Govier, above n. 279, 13. According to Govier, amongst other things a 'theory of argument' 
would discuss the nature and purpose of arguments and specifY and defend standards for 
the appraisal of arguments. It would specifY how many different types of arguments there 
are and what standards are appropriate to assess each type. It would explain when and why 
it is reasonable to read into discourse statements which are not explicitly stated, and 
whether and how the personalities and beliefs of arguers and audiences logically affect the 
merits of argumentation. See also Kopperschmidt who states that no unified theory of 
argument exists only discipline specific examinations: Kopperschmidt, 'An Analysis of 
Argumentation' p. 159, in van Dijk, T.A. (eds.) Handbook of Discourse Analysis: 
Dimensions of Discourse (1985) Academic Press, 160. 
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representation m psychology shows, representations channel thinking in 
particular ways and it is important to have the appropriate representation for 
the task. Choosing a representation appropriate for the argumentative task, 
rather than a universal representation, thus becomes central. 
More problematic as a means to support sensemaking, is that immediately 
preceding the above quoted passage, Lord Slynn expressly poses the question 
'What can constitute acts in the exercise of functions as Head of State?' This 
statement suggests that far from presenting and then rejecting two of his own 
arguments, his lordship has used two arguments presented by counsel for the 
parties to try to answer a question he has asked of himself. Two possible 
answers to this question are the responses of counsel for the parties. However, 
in the above quoted passage, his lordship rejects these solutions and instead 
presents argument justifYing his own preferred third solution. 
A possible diagram for this is: 
What can constitute acts in the exercise of functions as Head of State? I tlo------~)( -~------, 
Only international functions Functions of Head of State 
must be defined by 
international law, they cannot 
be defined simply as a matter 
of national law or practice. 
International law Role of a Head of 
does not prescribe a 
list of those 
functions which are, 
and those which are 
not, functions for the 
purposes of article 
State varies very 
much from country 
to country f.\nswers 
32 ~ 
Any general principle of International law recognises those functions 
customary international law or which are attributed to him as Head of State 
national law, which may+•----'-su-'bJ'--.e--'ct--'to:..........._,by the law, or in fact, in the country of 
prevent what is done from which he is head as being functions for this 
being regarded as a function. purpose. 
Figure 23: Diagramming judicial questions 
Again, it would be useful to be able to diagram the dialogical nature of 
arguments. It would be much clearer to expressly indicate on the diagram that 
the two possibilities rejected by his lordship were proposed by the parties in the 
case and that his rejection was a rejection of their arguments. And just as it is 
sometimes useful to label links with an 'X', it can be useful to indicate that a 
statements 'Answers' a question or that one statement is 'subject to' another. 
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The diagram indicates not only that it is useful to be able to label links between 
statements, but also that for sensemaking support it is necessary to diagram 
things beyond claims and conclusions. The ability to diagram questions, 
possible responses to those questions, the status of those responses and the ftnal 
answer adopted to a question are all necessary. This need arises from the 
nature of judgments and indeed of legal reasoning more widely. Rather than 
being reports of pure argument, judgments are expressions of, and legal 
reasoning generally involves, aspects of reasoning beyond argument. That is, 
aspects of reasoning wider than pure argument. While theorists argue that 
argument is central to reasoning - the converse consequence of this is that 
argument occurs within a wider framework of reasoning. Amongst other things, 
this framework involves asking questions, proposing answers, rejecting, and 
accepting those answers. Argument is a method used in responding to such 
questioning. 
While it can be said that judgments report the arguments that judges rely on to 
support their conclusions, judgments also report traces of the wider process of 
reasoning that the judgment stems from. 355 Hence, the difficulty for the 
standard method of argument diagramming in expressing all that a judgment 
contains. A consequence of this is that by itself the standard method of 
argument diagramming is not sufficient to diagram the structure of judgments 
355 Simon states that the judicial opinion: 
is not, and thus should not be perceived to be, an account of the process itself. It is 
best perceived as a snapshot image of the representation of the decision at the end 
point of the process: an exposition of the reasons that were perceived by the judge as 
best supporting the decision. (Simon, above n. 170, 35.) 
It may be true that a judgment does not express all the arguments considered during the 
making of a decision, but rather a selective sample of those arguments at the endpoint of 
decision. As a representation of the decision at the end of the decision process though, 
judgments nevertheless express more than the reasons perceived as best supporting a 
decision. 
141 
- or legal reasoning itself. Argument diagramming needs supplementation by 
methods with which to diagram these wider aspects of reasoning. 
4. 7 Diagramming reasoning 
The standard method of argument diagramming is inadequate to diagram all 
that is expressed in legal judgments and all the reasoning that is involved in 
resolving legal problems. While the standard method of argument 
diagramming provides several classifications with which to analyse arguments, 
the method does not express a number of aspects of argument and reasoning. 
As the basis for tools to aid lawyers in resolving legal problems, the standard 
method of argument diagramming is limited. The standard method of 
argument diagramming arose as a means to analyse pre-existing arguments, as 
a method to visualise argument as a product. The method is far less useful 
when seeking to augment the processes through which arguments arise. 
While it is useful to aid the examination and comprehension of arguments as a 
product, in many situations it would be useful to have support for processes of 
argumentation and the wider non-argumentative processes of reasoning of 
which argumentation is a part. Legal reasoning is aimed at practical problem 
solving. Faced with a problem, amongst other things lawyers must locate the 
relevant law, envisage possible solutions to the problem, assess the benefits and 
consequences of the possible solutions, choose a preferred option from 
amongst these possible solutions, and construct arguments justifYing the choice 
of the particular option and argument justifYing the rejection of the remaining 
options. In such situations arguments are not simply presented devoid of 
context. Rather, arguments are presented in order to justifY the acceptance of a 
particular response out of many possible responses. Argument is part of a 
process of reasoning. A reasoner does not typically know the outcome that will 
finally be achieved and is in the process of exploring options for a possible 
outcome. Which outcome is finally settled upon is determined by many things, 
such as how well that outcome is felt to explain an anomaly or answer a 
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question under consideration in comparison with the other options that are 
considered. 
"When argument is viewed as part of a process of reasoning, it is clear that the 
propositions and claims that make up the final argument as a product do not 
exist perfectly formed a prion: Those propositions are interactively and 
iteratively proposed, explored, rejected, accepted and refined as problem 
solving progresses. Thus, if the processes of reasoning and argument formation 
are themselves to be diagrammed, and not just the arguments that result from 
these processes, the method of argument diagramming must be supplemented 
to accommodate the reasoning interactions involved. 
4. 7.1 Diagrammatic elements 
As when diagramming arguments, a fundamental question that anses m 
attempting to diagram reasoning is - what representation should be used for 
reasoning? "What is to be diagrammed? "What elements are necessary and 
allowed in the diagram? Such questions apparently require knowing what the 
very elements of reasoning are - which itself apparently raises the question of 
how human reasoning operates. Answering these questions appears to require a 
fully-fledged theory of human reasoning. Reasoning and the intimately 
connected topics of judgment and decision-making are studied in many areas 
and from many different perspectives. Philosophy, logic, psychology, cognitive 
science, artificial intelligence and law, and legal theory, amongst others, all 
provide numerous examinations of reasoning. Such examinations focus on the 
different types of reasoning e.g. theoretical reasoning vs. practical reasoning 
that are evident in human problem solving, as well as the characteristics and 
variations in reasoning in different problem solving areas e.g. reasoning in 
science, reasoning in policy making, reasoning in medical decision making, 
common-sense reasonmg, and legal reasoning. The spirit of these 
investigations varies according to how reasoning is conceived and at what 'level' 
it is analysed. For example, systems such as Aristotle's syllogistic logic are 
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attempts to formalise important aspects of reasonmg and to specifY what 
constitutes acceptable reasoning. Such logics are normative in that they seek to 
specifY how reasoning should occur; they prescribe how it is rational to reason. 
Descriptive status has also been claimed for such logical theories, for example 
in the various theories of natural deduction which posit that people have 
deductive rules of inference, equivalent to the rules of logic, 'hard-wired' into 
their brains. If logic is accepted as all there is to reasoning then a system to 
diagram reasoning would simply have to provide visual equivalents to the 
logical rules with which statements are connected in the logic.356 Similarly, if 
expected utility theory is accepted as a description of how either people reason 
or a specification of how they should reason357 then visual presentations could 
be constructed on this. However, in a situation where not all possible solutions 
to a problem are known (or perhaps the issues, values and other influences that 
bear upon solutions to the problem) a large aspect of reasoning and decision 
making will involve exploration. For example, exploration of what possible 
options exist, what values are relevant and how those values influence the 
acceptability of potential solutions. While theory exists investigating such 
aspects of reasoning, it is fragmented. 358 In the absence of a unified theory, all 
that can apparently be aimed for is a partial theory of reasoning appropriate to 
the particular context. It is certainly not proposed to survey in detail these 
theories of reasoning, nor to propose a unified theory, or even to propose and 
defend any one particular conception of reasoning or legal reasoning. These 
tasks have been undertaken and widely discussed elsewhere. Legal reasoning is 
widely discussed in legal theory and various theories oflegal reasoning exist.359 
Rather, the present purpose is to indicate how researchers have approached 
the diagramming of reasoning and how such techniques might be used in a 
356 See BaJ:Wise and Etchmedy, above n. 257. 
357 See the discussion above n. 208. 
358 See discussion at 3.5.1. 
359 See discussion at eh. 3. 
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legal context. Responding to the question 'what is to be diagrammed?' becomes 
a matter of finding appropriate elements with which to express reasoning. 
Given the diversity of reasoning and its importance, it is surprising how few 
methods exist for expressing reasoning. The methods examined in his 
subsection - mind mapping and concept mapping, and design rationale - have 
been chosen in part to highlight the diversity of reasoning and the diverse 
approaches to diagramming reasoning. Design rationale as a representation 
for reasoning is discussed in depth because it provides a detailed framework for 
diagramming reasoning and because it has been highly influential in work on 
diagramming reasoning. The appropriateness of this method for supporting 
legal sensemaking is discussed. The examination of diagrammatic methods 
provided here forms a prelude to the examination provide in the next chapter 
of various computer systems for diagramming argument and reasoning. 
4.7.2 Brainstorming- mind mapping and concept mapping 
Mind mapping is a popular technique for 'brainstorming' developed by 
Buzan.360 The aim is to promote creativity by stimulating the free flow of ideas. 
In mind mapping, a central idea is written on a page and then ideas that are in 
any way felt related to it are drawn around the idea and connected to it. There 
is no restriction on what counts as an idea. Thus, amongst other things a 
concept could be a physical object, a concept, a question to be answered, a 
problem to be solved or a goal to be achieved. Diagramming continues so that 
each idea that was stimulated by the initial idea is itself used as the 'seed' for the 
generation of further ideas. Every further idea generated by these ideas is 
written on the diagram and connected to the idea which invoked it. This 
process continues until the person drawing the mind map exhausts their ideas. 
In this manner, a person can construct a visual 'map' of their ideas and the 
connections between their ideas. 
360 Buzan, T., Buzan, B., The Mind Map Book (1995) BBC Books. 
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Figure 24: Mind map about mind mapping 
Apart from the claim that the process of creating mind maps encourages fluid 
and creative thinking, it is claimed that once created such maps serve as a useful 
reference point for more structured thinking about a problem. 
Num~rous computer programs are dedicated to the construction of mind 
maps.361 Notably, mind mapping does not impose restrictions on what can be 
diagrammed nor on the connections that are allowed between ideas in the 
diagram. In this respect, mind maps are completely unstructured. 
Concept mapping is a technique similar to mind mapping.362 Novak developed 
Concept mapping during a long programme in educational research and it 
originated as a means for researchers to better comprehend the development of 
their subjects' knowledge during different stages of learning. However, Novak 
also reports that concept maps have proved useful for students themselves as an 
aid during learning. Students are encouraged to diagram the ideas in an area 
that they are learning about, and to draw links between ideas to indicate the 
361 Support for mind mapping is provided by many programs e.g.: Windows Mind Mapper 
(1994) EGLE Magic; SMART Ideas (1996) SMART Technologies Inc; VisiMap Lite (1998) 
CoCo Systems Ltd; !dons-For-Thinking (1999) Idon Thinking Resources Ltd. 
362 Novak, above n. 259. 
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to indicate the relationships between them. 363 N ovak reports that the method is 
a useful way for students to become aware of their own gaps in knowledge. By 
drawing diagrams, students get a better sense of what they do and do not know. 
J onassen calls concept mapping a 'mind tool' and argues it supports 
constructivist learning in students.364 
something 
else is not 
Figure 25: Concept map 
Like mind maps, concept maps are relatively unstructured, in the sense that 
there is little prescription on the what counts as an idea, on the connections 
that can be included in a map or on the connections that can be made between 
ideas. Concept mapping is not used as a means to provide a structured 
representation of reasoning or argument. 
Mind mapping and concept mapping are techniques that augment aspects of 
reasomng - they promote creativity and the externalisation of ideas and 
reflection on those ideas. However, both techniques are completely 
unstructured. Given this wide generality, it might be possible to express the 
exploratory questioning that occurs during reasoning. However, while 
supporting the creative, brainstorming, aspects of problem solving neither 
mind mapping nor concept mapping is specifically tailored to supporting 
problem solving. Given this generality, neither mind mapping nor concept 
363 Ibid. 
364 J onassen, above n. 219. 
365 A student's concept map, modified from: Fisher, K.M., 'Semantic Networking: The New 
Kid on the Block' (1990) 27(10) Journal ofResearch in Science Teaching 1001. 
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mappmg provides explicit support for processes of problem solving. In 
contrast, the techniques in design rationale examined below have been 
developed specifically to provide structured support for reasoning. 
4.7.3 Design Rationale 
Design rationale is the name gtven to a recent approach to supporting the 
design process. The philosophy underlying design rationale is that when 
designing artefacts, it is often insufficient simply to have the artefact itself -
knowing the reasoning behind the many design choices that make up the 
artefact is itself important. 366 Proponents of design rationale argue that 
allowing designers to express the reasoning behind their designs will improve 
those designs. Design rationale research investigates methods with which these 
choices and the reasoning behind them can be captured and stored for latter 
reference. It has been applied in various disciplines including computer design, 
architectural design and policy formulation. The latter is particularly 
interesting, based as it is on the idea that human problems essentially involve 
the 'design' of appropriate individual and institutional responses. This has clear 
overlaps with the diagramming of legal reasoning. Both efforts seek to capture 
aspects of reasoning to improve reasoning as it occurs and to store it for latter 
reference. Research into design rationale presents the most complex attempt to 
diagram problem solving, and as such is a good source of information for 
research into diagramming of legal reasoning. 
Various approaches to design rationale have been developed. These, and their 
computer implementations, are discussed in the following chapter. The 
remainder of this subsection examines the 'design rationale language' (DRL) 
developed by Lee. 367 DRL is the most recent and most complex approach to 
366 Buckingham Shum, S., Hammond, N., 'Argumentation-Based Design Rationale: What Use 
at What Cost?' (1 994) 40(4) International I ournal of Human-Computer Studies 603. 
367 Lee 1990a, above n. 82; Lee,]., 'SIBYL: A tool for managing group decision rationale' p. 
79, in Proceedings of the ACM Conference on Computer-Supported Cooperative Work 
148 
design rationale and so the following analysis will be based on the use of DRL. 
The remainder of this subsection outlines and discusses attempts to use DRL to 
diagram the reasoning in Donoghue v Stevenson. Rather than outline all 
aspects of DRL at the outset, its features and use will be highlighted through its 
application. The attempt here is to diagram the judgment of Lord Atkin in 
Donoghue v Stevenson. 
The following extract from Lord Atkin's judgment is used as a starting point. 
The numbers (1)-(6) in brackets above have been added to aid reference to the 
statements contained in the judgment. 
( 1 )My Lords, the sole question for determination in this case is legal; 
(2)Do the averments made by the pursuer in her pleading, if true, 
disclose a cause of action? (3)1 need not restate the particular facts. 
(4)The question is whether the manufacturer of an article of drink sold 
by him to a distributor, in circumstances which prevent the distributor or 
the ultimate purchaser or consumer from discovering by inspection any 
defect, is under any legal duty to the ultimate purchaser or consumer to 
take reasonable care that the article is free from defect likely to cause 
injury to health. (S)I do not think a more important problem has 
occupied your Lordships in your judicial capacity: important both 
because of its bearing on public health and because of the practical test 
which it applies to the system under which it arises. (6)The case has to be 
determined in accordance with Scots law; but it has been a matter of 
agreement between the experienced counsel who argued this case, and it 
appears to be the basis of the judgment of the learned judges of the 
Court of Session, that for the purposes of determining this problem the 
laws of Scotland and of England are the same.368 
(1990) ACM Press hereafter 'Lee 1990b'; Lee,]., Lai, Kum-Y., 'What's in Design Rationale?' 
p. 21, in Moran, T.P. and Carroll, J.M. (eds.) Design Rationale: Concepts, Techniques and 
Use (1996) Lawrence Erlbaum. 
368 Donoghue 578-9. 
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Using DRL, analysis begins with the statement of a 'Decision Problem' - which 
represents 'the problem that requires a decision. '369 An obvious candidate for 
the decision problem in the above quotation is the question Lord Atkin asks 
himself in (2). This could be diagrammed as: 
Decision problem 
Do the averments 
made by the pursuer 
in her pleading, if 
true, disclose a cause 
of action? 
Figure 26: The Decision problem in Donoghue 
Statement (3) will be ignored. Diagramming (4) immediately raLses problems 
however. What LS the relation between the question asked in (4) and the 
question posed m (2)? An obvious response would be that (4) is a refined, a 
more precise, restatement of the problem. We might expect to diagram this as: 
Decision problem 
Do the averments 
made by the pursuer 
in her pleading, if 
true, disclose a cause 
of action? 
jRefines 
Decision problem 
Is the manufacturer of an article of drink sold 
by him to a distributor, in circumstances 
which prevent the distributor or the ultimate 
purchaser or consumer from discovering by 
inspection any defect, under any legal duty 
to the ultimate purchaser or consumer to take 
reasonable care that the article is free from 
defect likely to cause injury to health. 
Figure 27: Related Decision problems in Donoghue 
369 Lee and Lai, above n. 367, 37. 
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The problem however, is that DRL does not contain a 'Refines' relationship 
with which to link objects. 
In DRL, the most obvious way to diagram the above relationship would be 
using the 'Is a Subdecision of relationship as follows: 
Do the avennents 
made by the pursuer 
in her pleading, if 
true, disclose a cause 
of action? 
Decision problem 
Is the manufacturer of an article of drink sold 
by him to a distributor, in circwnstances 
which prevent the distributor or the ultimate 
purchaser or consumer from discovering by 
inspection any defect, under any legal duty 
to the ultimate purchaser or consumer to take 
reasonable care that the article is free from 
defect likely to cause injwy to health. 
Figure 28: Sub decisions in Donoghue 
The 'Is a Subdecision of relationship is meant to indicate that answering the 
subdecision facilitates answering the parent decision. The problem with 
diagramming Lord Atkin's judgment in this way however, is that the 'Is a 
Subdecision of implies that there is 'more to come' - that the subdecision is 
only one amongst many decisions that will need to be decided. It thus fails to 
capture the notion that the second question replaces the first question. Once 
this second question is answered there are no further considerations needed to 
answer the first question. DRL thus immediately appears to require the 
massaging of reasoning to fit its constraints. 
A second possibility for diagramming the above relationship in DRL would be 
to use the 'Suggests' relationship in which the first question is said to suggest 
the second question. Again however, this fails to capture the notion that the 
second question is a more precise replacement of the first question. 
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Ignoring these problems (and proceeding usmg the DRL conventions 
diagrammed in figure 28) (5) poses further problems. Two obvious possibilities 
within DRL for diagramming (5) are to treat it as a series of 'Claims' or to treat 
(5) as a 'Criterion' backed by two 'Claims'. The first possibility is diagrammed 
below: 
Claim 
Do the averments 
made by the pursuer 
in her pleading, if 
true, disclose a cause 
of action? 
Is a Subdecision of 
Is the manufacturer of an article of drink sold 
by him to a distributor, in circumstances 
which prevent the distributor or the ultimate 
purchaser or consumer from discovering by 
inspection any defect, under any legal duty 
to the ultimate purchaser or consumer to take 
reasonable care that the article is free from 
defect likely to cause injury to health? 
Figure 29: Claims in Donoghue 
It is a matter of interpretation exactly what purpose (5) is intended to serve. It 
is reasonable to interpret the phrase merely as a remark on the question under 
consideration. However, another reasonable interpretation rs that m 
emphasising the seriousness of the question being considered Lord Atkin is 
expressing a consideration that influences how responses to the question will be 
resolved. Thus, the fact the no more important question has arisen influences 
latter assessments of possible solutions. 
A second alternative to diagramming (5) is thus to treat it rs a 'criterion'. 
However, DRL does not explicitly provide for criteria. Lee claims that all 
criteria can be restated as 'goals' and thus they are subsumed within the notion 
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of goals. In DRL goals are meant to describe 'desired states of the world'; 370 it is 
difficult to see how (5) could be interpreted in this manner without significant 
extra manipulation, interpretation and restatement. Figure 29 thus seems the 
best option when trying to diagram (5) within DRL. 
Similar complications anse when considering how to diagram (6). This too 
could be diagrammed as a Claim making a Comment: 
Do the averments 
made by the pursuer 
in her pleading, if 
true. disclose a cause 
of action? 
Is a Subdecision of 
Decision problem 
by him to a distributor, in circumstances 
which prevent the distributor or the ultimate 
purchaser or consumer from discovering by 
inspection any defect, under any legal duty 
to the ultimate purchaser or consumer to take 
reasonable care that the article is free from 
defect likely to cause injury to health? 
Claim 
The case has to be 
determined in 
accordance with 
Scots law. 
Figure 30: Claims as comments in DRL 
However, this seems to miss an important aspect of the claim that Scots law 
applies. This claim provides a standard for assessment of solutions to the 
question that has been asked, and thus does not merely comment on the 
question. In a sense, it too is a criterion that solutions to the problem must 
satisfY: 
370 Ibid. 37 fn 5. 
Do the averments 
made by the pursuer 
in her pleading, if 
true, disclose a cause 
of action? 
t Is a Subdecision of 
Decision problem 
Is the manufacturer of an article of drink sold 
by him to a distributor, in circumstances 
which prevent the distributor or the ultimate 
purchaser or consumer from discovering by 
inspection any defect, under any legal duty 
to the ultimate purchaser or consumer to take 
reasonable care that the article is free from 
defect likely to cause injury to health? 
Influences 
Criterion 
The case has to be 
determined in 
accordance with 
Scots law. 
Figure 31: Criteria in decision making 
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Restating the above statement as a goal - as a desirable state - greatly distorts it. 
For example 'The case should be determined in accordance with Scots law' 
misrepresents the imperative nature of the statement as expressed by the use of 
'has to'. 
The above problem highlights another difficulty using DRL to express legal 
reasoning - as yet ignored for simplicity. In DRL, all problems start with a 
'Decision Problem'. A Decision Problem is supposed to have the general form 
'Choose X optimal for Y.'371 However, it is obvious that the questions asked by 
Lord Atkin were not expressly of this form: 
The question is whether the manufacturer of an article of drink sold by 
him to a distributor, in circumstances which prevent the distributor or 
the ultimate purchaser or consumer from discovering by inspection any 
defect, is under any legal duty to the ultimate purchaser or consumer to 
take reasonable care that the article is free from defect likely to cause 
injury to health. 
It is very difficult to see how the above question could be restated in the form 
required by DRL. Perhaps it could be restated as: 
371 Lee, above n. 82, 112. 
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Find the optimal interpretation of the law such that it becomes clear 
whether the manufacturer of an article of drink sold by him to a 
distributor, in circumstances which prevent the distributor or the 
ultimate purchaser or consumer from discovering by inspection any 
defect, is under any legal duty to the ultimate purchaser or consumer to 
take reasonable care that the article is free from defect likely to cause 
injury to health. 
However, although the question might be restated in this form, this certainly 
involves much interpretation and manipulation and violates the aim of trying to 
use the system to capture reasoning as it is expressed. 
Even if the content of a Decision Problem is relaxed to that of a Goal, so that it 
'represents a desirable state or property' it appears difficult to shoehorn the 
above question into the required form. Again, it is difficult to see how the 
question could be easily restated to satisfY this form. It thus appears that in a 
legal context the necessity of starting all problem solving with a goal is too 
restrictive. Interestingly, in some of the examples used to illustrate the use of 
DRL, Goals are stated which do not seem to have the correct form. For 
example 
Figure 32: Inconsistencies in the use of DRL372 
Even on the part of the designers of DRL, there thus appears the need to 
commence reasoning with a question rather than a goal. 
The basic elements of DRL are problematic when diagramming legal reasoning 
and legal argument. It is informative to attempt to diagram further aspects of 
Lord Atkin's judgment in Donoghue. Lord Atkin continued his judgment: 
372 Lee and Lai, above n. 367, 37. 
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(7)The law of both countries appears to be that in order to support an 
action for damages for negligence the complainant has to show that he 
has been injured by the breach of a duty owed to him in the 
circumstances by the defendant to take reasonable care to avoid such 
injury. (8)In the present case we are not concerned with the breach of 
the duty; if a duty exists, that would be a question of fact which is 
sufficiently averred and for present purposes must be assumed. (9)We 
are solely concerned with the question whether, as a matter of law in the 
circumstances alleged, the defender owed any duty to the pursuer to 
take care. 373 
Given the restraints imposed by classifying (4) discussed above, (7) could be 
added to the diagram as an 'Alternative': 
373 Donoghue 579. 
Do the averments 
made by the pursuer 
in her pleading, if 
true, disclose a cause 
of action? 
by him to a distributor, in circumstances 
which prevent the distributor or the ultimate 
purchaser or consumer from discovering by 
inspection any defect, under any legal duty 
to the ultimate purchaser or consumer to take 
reasonable care that the article is free from 
defect likely to cause injury to health? 
j Facilitates 
In order to support an action for 
damages for negligence the 
complainant has to show that he has 
been injured by the breach of a duty 
owed to him in the circumstances by 
~e defendant to take reasonable car 
'----"'toc..:av=oid such in,c:i"tu"-'-'-rv .. _ __, 
Alternative 
Figure 33: Using Alternatives in DRL374 
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This structure is necessary because Alternatives are the preferred responses for 
Decision Problems in DRL. However, diagramming in this way has several 
problems. First, classifYing the statement as an Alternative implies that other 
alternative statements will also be linked to the parent. Lord Atkin does not 
provide them and indeed they do not seem necessary. Secondly, using a 
'Facilitates' connection between the Alternative and the Decision problem does 
374 Unfortunately, in different reports about DRL, its authors have changed exactly what 
relations exist in the system. So for example m an early report on DRL 
"Facilitates(Alternative, Goal)"; "Qualifies(Claim, Claim)"; "Queries(Question, Claim)" and 
"Influences(Question, Claim)" all appear in the system: Lee 1990a, above n. 82, 111. 
However in a latter discussion of the system none of these relationships are present. 
However, "Presupposes(Claim, Claim)"; "Achieves(Altemative, Goal)"; "Tradeoffs(Object, 
Object, attribute)"; "Suggests(Object, Object)"; "Raises(Object, Question)" and 
"Comments(Claim, Object)" all appear in the system: Lee and Lai, above n. 367, 36. In this 
discussion of DRL these differences are not examined and relationships from both version 
of the system are used interchangeably. 
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not really capture the fact that (7) is intended to respond to the parent to which 
it is linked in the above diagram. Thirdly, classifying (7) as an Alternative has 
the unfortunate consequence that (7) could not be the subject of argument 
within DRL. In DRL only a Claim can be the subject of argument. Thus, if there 
was disagreement about the correctness of (7) this could not be directly 
expressed within DRL. 
An alternative diagram incorporating (7) could be: 
Is the manufacturer of an article of drink 
sold by him to a distributor, in 
circumstances which prevent the distributor 
or the ultimate purchaser or conswner from 
discovering by inspection any defect, under 
any legal duty to the ultimate purchaser or 
consumer to take reasonable care that the 
article is free from defect likely to cause 
injury to health? 
In order to support an action for 
damages for negligence the 
complainant has to show that he has 
been in jured by the breach of a duty 
owed to him in the circumstances by 
the defendant to take reasonable 
care to avoid such injury. 
Claim 
Figure 34: Using Answers in DRL 
Diagramming in this way has the important benefit that (7) is classified as a 
Claim and thus becomes subject to argument. However, if (7) is classified as a 
claim then it becomes necessary to reconsider the classification of the parent to 
which it is connected. DRL does not allow links between a Claim and a Decision 
Problem. If the topmost node is reclassified as a Question, as in the above 
diagram, then a prima facie intuitive diagram can be created in which (7) is a 
Claim which Answers a Question that has previously been asked. Whether the 
Answers relationship is appropriate will be discussed in more depth below. 
However, while having the benefit of being intuitive, this diagram is not allowed 
in DRL for, as discussed above, the topmost node in the above diagram cannot 
be classified as a Question within DRL. 
A further possibility for diagramming (7) is to use the 'Raises' relationship: 
Is the manufacturer of an article of drink sold 
by him to a distributor, in circumstances 
which prevent the distributor or the ultimate 
purchaser or consumer from discovering by 
inspection any defect, under any legal duty 
to the ultimate purchaser or consumer to take 
reasonable care that the article is free from 
defect likely to cause injury to health? 
l Raises 
In order to support an action for 
damages for negligence the 
complainant has to show that he has 
been injured by the breach of a duty 
owed to him in the circumstances by 
the defendant to take reasonable car 
L-_ ____,to'-'a'-'v~o.id such in,...,i·urv :!.'-'.·· __ _, 
Questton 
Figure 35: Using the Raises relationship in DRL 
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However, the Raises relationship results in a Question object and so utilising 
this relationship requires reinterpreting and restating (7) in the form of a 
Question. Again, this involves manipulating the materials in order to fit them 
within the constraints of the system. 
The final option for diagramming (7) would be to use the 'Suggests' 
relationship: 
Is the manufacturer of an article of drink sold 
by him to a distributor, in circumstances 
which prevent the distributor or the ultimate 
purchaser or consumer from discovering by 
inspection any defect, under any legal duty 
to the ultimate purchaser or consumer to take 
reasonable care that the article is free from 
defect likely to cause injury to health? 
• 
Suggests I 
In order to support an action for 
damages for negligence the 
complainant has to show that he has 
been injured by the breach of a duty 
owed to him in the circumstances by 
e defendant to take reasonable car 
to avoid such in'u 
'-------';:....:;.--" Claim '--"""-'-----' 
Figure 36: Using the Suggests relationship m DRL 
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Although the diagram contains two arrows this is merely used to indicate that 
two possible diagrams could be drawn, one where the Decision problem 
suggests the Claim and another in which the Claim suggests the Decision 
Problem. The benefit of using the Suggests relationship is that (7) can again be 
classified as a Claim. The drawback however depends on how informative the 
Suggests link is regarded to be in this situation. It is difficult to see in what 
sense either the Claim is suggested by the Decision problem or in what sense 
the Decision problem is Suggested by the Claim. Neither captures the feeling 
that (7) was made as a response to an earlier query. 
Assuming that (7) is classified as a Claim, it is reasonable to classifY (8) and (9) 
as Questions raised by it. 
Claim 
In order to support an action for 
damages for negligence the 
complainant has to show that he has 
been injured by the breach of a duty 
owed to him in the circumstances by 
e defendant to take reasonable car 
to avoid such in· u 
Claim 
Sufficiently averred and 
for the present purposes 
must be assumed. 
Raises 
Figure 37: Claims raising Questions in DRL 
This does not raise particular problems. 
Lord Atkin continued: 
(10) It is remarkable how difficult it is to find in the English authorities 
statements of general application defining the relations between parties 
that give rise to the duty. ( 11) The Courts are concerned with the 
particular relations which come before them in actual litigation, and it is 
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sufficient to say whether the duty exists in those circumstances. (12) The 
result is that the Courts have been engaged upon an elaborate 
classification of duties as they exist in respect of property, whether real 
or personal, with further divisions as to ownership, occupation o control, 
and distinctions based on the particular relations of the one side or the 
other, whether manufacturer, salesman or landlord, customer, tenant, 
stranger, and so on. (13) In this way it can be ascertained at any time 
whether the law recognizes a duty, but only where the case can be 
referred to some particular species which has been examined and 
classified. (14) And yet the duty which is common to all the cases where 
liability is established must logically be based upon some element 
common to the cases where it is found to exist. .... 
( 15) At present I content myself with pointing out that in English 
law there must be, and is, some general conception of relations giving 
rise to a duty of care, of which the particular cases found in the books are 
but instances. 375 
( 1 0) intuitively appears to be a Claim, a claim about the state of the authorities 
in Scottish and English law. Three possible relationships that could exist 
between this claim and the prior question are 'Answers', 'Suggests' and 
'Comments'. Neither the Question seems to suggest the Claim, nor the Claim 
to Suggest the Question so this possibility will not be discussed further. It might 
be argued that the Claim Answers the Question or at least comments on it. 
Either of these two possibilities appears defensible.(! I) and (12) also appear to 
be Claims related to (10): 
375 Donoghue 579-80. 
1---- Claim 
The Courts are 
concerned with the difficult it is to find in 
particular relations the English authorities 
which come before themt------;~ statements of general 
in actual litigation, and Supports application defining the 
it is sufficient to say relations between parties 
whether the duty exists hat give rise to the duty. 
in those circumstances. 
r=--~ Claim .,-----1 
he result is that the Cou 
ave been engaged upon an 
laborate classification o 
uties as they exist m 
espect of property ... 
Figure 38: Relating claims in DRL 
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More problematic is including (13), (14) and (15) in the diagram. (13) and (15) 
are here interpreted as being alternative conceptions of the structure of the law 
as it existed when Donoghue arose and thus alternative answers to the 
Question asked by Lord Atkin. As alternative answers it would seem natural to 
use the 'Alternative' object in DRL to express this. However, the only ways that 
DRL allows Alternatives to be linked to a Question is through the 'Suggests' 
relationship or the 'Raises' relationship. The Raises relationship is unsuitable as 
it implies that the Alternative raises the Question. The Suggests relationship 
appears similarly unsuitable as neither the Question suggests the Alternatives 
nor the Alternatives suggest the Question. The second possibility is to classifY 
(13) and (15) as Claims and link them to the Questions as Answers: 
concerned witb the 
particular relations 
which come before tbem 
· n actual litigation, and it 
is sufficient to say 
whether tbe duty exists 
in those circumstances. 
----
Supports 
Supports 
Arts wen; 
/ 
.---- Claim ----. 
It can be ascertained at any 
time whether tbe law 
recognizes a duty only where 
tbe case can be referred to some 
particular species which has 
been examined and classified. 
t 
Supports 
I 
r--- Claim ---, 
e result is !bat the Co 
Answers 
""' 
.---- Claim -------.1 
I content myself with pointing out 
at in English law there must be, an 
is, some general conception of 
relations giving rise to a duty of care, 
of which tbe particular cases found· 
tbe books are but instances. 
Su,o:rti 
r---- Claim ----, 
The duty which is common to all 
tbe cases where liability is 
established must logically be based 
upon some element common to tbe 
cases where it is found to exist. 
Figure 39:Claims as answers in DRL 
162 
While this does seem to capture many of the aspects of the structure of the 
argument presented in this passage of Lord Atkin's judgment, it does not make 
clear that the two Claims, diagrammed above as Answers to the Question, are 
themselves alternatives to each other. As previously discussed, the Alternative 
object provided by DRL is unsuitable here as the links allowed between it and a 
Question are unsuitable and Alternatives cannot be the subject of argument 
(which it is necessary to allow, as they clearly are above). 
A final problem with DRL is that it does not allow factual statements or 
assumptions about the world to be directly included in the diagram. For 
example, Lord Atkin states: 
A manufacturer puts up an article of food in a container which he knows 
will be opened by the actual consumer. There can be no inspection by 
any purchaser and no reasonable preliminary inspection by the 
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consumer. Negligently, in the course of preparation, he allows the 
contents to be mixed with poison. 376 
The only conceivable way that such statements might be included in a DRL 
diagram might be to interpret them as 'Claims'. Interpreted in this way these 
Claims might be interpreted as supporting a particular conclusion: 
Claim Claim Claim . ---:---
There can be no inspection A manufacturer puts up an Negligently, in the 
by any purchaser and no article of food in a container course of preparation, he 
reasonable preliminary which he knows will be opened allows the contents to be 
inspection by the consumer. by the actual consumer. mixed with poison. 
~~ S~rts Supports~ • Claim ~ 
According the law of England 
and Scotland the poisoned 
consumer has no remedy against 
the negligent manufacturer 
Figure 40: Multiple claims supporting a conclusion in DRL 
However, interpreting these statements as Claims appears to misrepresent their 
nature. They are not presented by Lord Atkin as statements which are 
controversial and potentially the subject of argument. They are not claims that 
might need defending. They are statements presented as assumed to be true, 
or assumed to be true for the purposes of argument. Such statements are 
presented as a state of affairs upon which to base an argument. Requiring such 
statements to be classified as claims misrepresents their nature. 
Focusing on DRL and its shortcomings as a method for diagramming legal 
reasonmg ts not to criticise DRL as a system per se. DRL is an extremely 
interesting and important attempt to capture design rationale. Despite 
difficulties with DRL in its application to diagramming legal reasoning, DRL is 
suited to diagramming some aspects of legal reasoning. The simple notion that 
one Claim 'Supports' another Claim and that one Claim 'Denies' another Claim 
is often applicable. For example to diagram how cases are cited in support of or 
in objection to a particular claim. Interestingly, DRL does not contain means to 
diagram the 'macro' aspects of argument, such as whether premises are linked 
or convergent. DRL uses 'Groups' to link Claims (and other objects) together. 
376 Ibid. 582. 
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Objects within a Group are specified as being either disjunctive (they operate 
independently) or conjunctive (they operate in dependence on each other) and 
so could be used to express macro argument structw·es. No visual 
representation 1s provided for this however. DRL provides other interesting 
features, notably 'dependency management' and 'plausibility management'. 
Dependency management allows users to specify that aspects of a decision 
depend on other aspects of the decision. Thus, for example, if a Claim is 
rejected, then an Alternative that depends on that claim might be removed 
from the list of possible choices. Plausibility management is a specialised form 
of dependency management - here however, the plausibility of Claims and 
Alternatives is calculated and displayed based on the probabilities of the Claims 
and Alternatives on which they depend. Both dependency management and 
plausibility management provide limited, though interesting and potentially 
highly useful, degrees of automated reasoning management. 
DRL provides an interesting representation with which to diagram reasoning 
and provides interesting tools for aiding reasoning based on this 
representation. However, as a means for representing legal reasoning, DRL has 
several shortcomings. Legal reasoning has to be 'massaged' in order to be 
expressed using DRL. While DRL provides more support for diagramming 
reasonmg than does the standard method of argument diagramming, it is 
subject to several of the same concerns. Just as with the diagramming of 
argument, the diagramming of reasoning is based upon representations. These 
representations must be appropriate to the particular task that they are being 
used to support. DRL is an important approach to capturing design rationale, 
however, it presents difficulties for expressing legal reasoning. 
4.8 Discussion 
As work in the psychology of reasoning demonstrates, providing visualisations 
for arguments and reasoning can be highly beneficial. Argument theory 
provides the standard method of argument diagramming as a means to visually 
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present the structure of argument. However, attempting to apply argument 
diagramming to display the structure of legal argument is problematic. First, 
the standard method of argument diagramming does not explain how to 
diagram numerous aspects of argument- in particular, analogical arguments 
and dialogical aspects of argument. This is not to argue that the standard 
method of argument diagramming is invalid or without benefit. Rather, it 
emphasises that the diagramming system itself highlights and occludes 
particular aspects of argument. For example, the standard method of argument 
diagramming highlights the link between premises and conclusions. However, 
the method does not emphasise the nature of that link, for example whether it 
is based on a deduction or whether it is based on an analogy or whether it 
'supports' or 'detracts' from, 'accepts' or 'rejects' another argument. There is no 
universal theory of argument on which to base more comprehensive 
diagramming. 
Secondly, legal argument occurs in a wider framework of reasoning - the 
standard method of argument diagramming is not capable of expressing the 
structure of such reasoning. Again, this does not itself detract from the 
standard method of argument diagramming, it re-emphasises that the method 
highlights certain things and occludes others. When the goal is to diagram the 
processes of reasoning that precede the presentation of argument as a product 
something more than argument diagramming is necessary. A 'perfect' solution 
to diagramming problem solving would utilise a universally accepted theory 
that covers all aspects of reasoning. No such theory currently exists. In the 
absence of such all-encompassing theory, all that can be achieved is the more 
limited goal, a partial theory that is appropriate for informing about particular 
reasoning being considered. 
Researchers have proposed various methods for diagramming the structw·es of 
reasoning. One of the most recent and complex of these methods is DRL. 
However, the complex and specific nature of DRL itself means that legal 
reasoning must be 'massaged' to fit within its constructs. Like the standard 
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method of argument diagramming, DRL channels thinking in particular ways 
and highlights and occludes aspects of reasoning. As with the standard method 
of argument diagramming, it is not that the method is thereby invalid, only 
that it is more suited to some tasks than it is to others. 
In the absence both of a universal theory of argument, and of a universal 
theory of reasoning, all that appears achievable is a theory appropriate for 
particular circumstances. The particular representation that is chosen must be 
determined by the area the representation is designed to operate in and the 
aim it is designed to serve. Consequently, all that appears achievable are 
diagrams appropriate to particular circumstances. The following chapter 
exammes vanous computer systems that attempt to augment argument and 
reasonmg. 
5 Computer tools to augment argument and reasoning 
Give me a lever long enough and a prop strong enough and I can single-
handedly move the world. 
Archimedes 
5. 1 Introduction 
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The previous chapter examined methods to diagram argument and reasoning. 
That chapter argued that central to methods for diagramming argument and 
reasoning is the representation on which the method is based. An inherent 
aspect of representations is that they highlight and occlude aspects of argument 
and reasoning. These representations themselves channel reasoning and 
problem solving. 
This chapter examines various computer systems that have been built to aid the 
diagramming of argument and reasoning. Systems have been proposed for 
numerous purposes, from structuring writing, to pedagogy, to structuring 
meetings, to supporting control of the International Space Station.377 This 
diversity of uses reflects not only the broadly felt benefit of such systems but also 
the diverse origins of research. Research into hypertext has provided the 
framework for much important work. 378 However, work has also been 
performed from the perspective of 'computer supported cooperative work', 
377 O'Neill, J., Wales, R., 'CSCA Issues Raised by Mission Control for the International Space 
Stations'. Paper presented at workshop on Computer-Supported Collaborative 
Argumentation for Learning Communities, 1999, Stanford University. Available at 
http://d3e.open.ac.uk/cscl99/0N eill/ON eill-paper.html (accessed 3/3/2001) 
378 E.g.: Conklin, J., Begeman, M.L., 'giBIS: A hypertext tool for exploratory policy discussion' 
(1988) 6 ACM Transactions on Office Information Systems 303. 
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'computer-mediated-communication', 379 and 'computer-based learning'. 380 The 
examination of systems provided in this chapter has three purposes. First, by 
highlighting the diversity of systems which have been created and the wide 
range of uses to which these systems have been put this examination 
emphasises the extensive scope for the use of diagrammatic representation to 
augment human sensemaking. Secondly, through highlighting the diversity of 
existing systems this examination emphasises the variety of representations 
which have been, and which could be, created to augment sensemaking. 
Thirdly, through highlighting the variety of representations which have been 
and could be created to augment sensemaking, this examination substantiates 
the need for a theoretical basis with which to design, and choose amongst, 
diagrammatic representations that augment sensemaking. 
Systems designed to support the structuring of argument and debate can be 
analysed from a number of different perspectives - such as the type of computer 
platform they operate on and the field they were designed for use within. From 
the perspective of augmenting sensemaking, of most interest is the 
representation on which systems are based and the consequent structure 
imposed on argument and reasoning that occurs with the system. Of related 
interest are the automatic services provided for manipulation of these 
representations. 
In order to highlight the diversity of systems created to augment sensemaking 
and the diversity of the representations on which they are based this chapter 
specifically adopts a 'flat' classification scheme. This chapter examines systems 
according to whether they attempt to support argument or whether they also 
attempt to support wider aspects of reasoning. Systems are further classified 
according to whether or not they are designed to operate in or outside law. 
379 E.g.: Sillince, J.A.A., Saeedi, M.H., 'Computer-mediated communication: problems and 
potentials of argumentation support systems' (1 999) 26 Decision support systems 287. 
380 E.g.: Novak, above n. 259; Fisher, above n. 365;Jonassen, above n. 219. 
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However, given that there are few systems specifically designed to operate in 
law all these systems, whether they seek to augment legal argument and/or legal 
reasoning, are examined together. 
Following this introduction, the next subsection exammes systems built to 
support argument in various fields. The third subsection of this chapter 
examines systems built to support reasoning in various fields. The fourth and 
final substantive subsections in this chapter examines systems built to augment 
legal argument and legal reasoning. 
5.2 Systems supporting argument 
Much work exists examining automated argument and reasoning - both in and 
outside law. 381 In contrast, this subsection examines systems that support a 
person engaged in a task that is in some way argumentative. Methods to 
support argument are not new. One of the most straightforward methods for 
diagrammatically structuring arguments is using tables. Benjamin Franklin was 
an advocate of this technique, writing: 
My way is to divide half a sheet of paper by a line into two columns; 
writing over the one Pro, and over the other Con. Then, during three or 
four day's consideration, I put down under the different heads short 
hints of the different motives, that at different times occur to me for or 
against the measure. When I have thus got them all together in one view, 
I endeavour to estimate the respective weights ... find at length where 
the balance lies ... And, though the weight of reasons cannot be taken 
with the precision of algebraic quantities, yet, when each is thus 
considered, separately, and comparatively, and the whole matter lies 
before me, I think I can judge better, and am less liable to make a rash 
381 The limitations of these systems has been discussed above at 2.5. 
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step; and in fact I have fow1d great advantage for this kind of equation, 
in what may be called moral or prudential algebra. 382 
Tables can be structured in various ways and research m educational 
psychology provides empirical evidence of the benefits of tables as means to 
structure arguments. 383 
Tabular methods for orgamsmg arguments will not be investigated in any 
further detail - for present purposes, it is sufficient to be aware that tables can 
be used to organise arguments. The remaining examination will focus on 
'richer' network-based representations. Such network-based representatio~s are 
composed of 'nodes', and 'links' that connect those nodes together. Nodes 
typically contain text and are typically labelled according to what 'type' of text 
they contain. 384 Toulmin's argument representation scheme385 and DRL386 are 
both classic examples of network-based representation schemes. Toulmin 
contained labelled nodes including 'Data', 'Claim' and 'Warrant'. DRL 
contained labelled nodes including 'Decision Problem', 'Claim' and 'Question'. 
Toulmin's scheme and DRL differ however, in not only the type and number of 
nodes provided, but also in that DRL utilised labelled links as well as labelled 
nodes. Links in Toulmin's scheme remain unlabelled. It is the kinds of nodes 
and links that a particular system uses which comprise its representation. The 
variety amongst such representations is striking, in not only the specific nodes 
and links provided, but also in the choice of, or dearth of, nodes and links that 
any particular system provides. The 'weight' of representations varies from the 
'heavy', many different nodes and links, to the 'light', few predefined types of 
382 Benjamin Franklin cited in Shafir, Simonson and Tversky, above n. 235, 11-12. 
383 See: work by Robinson and colleagues, above n. 262. 
384 The use of textual nodes and links to connect those nodes provided the early impetus for 
work in hypertext on such systems. More recently, research has explored the use of media 
other than text in nodes, such as images, sounds and movies. Systems are commonly 
referred to as 'hypermedia' systems to reflect this widening. 
385 See above discussion ofToulmin schemes: chapter 4.4. 
386 See above discussion of DRL: chapter 4. 7.3. 
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nodes and links. Regardless of whether systems are heavy or light however, 
many allow customisation and the definition of new types of nodes and links. 
One of the benefits of computer-based systems is that they allow automation. 
Once a representation is stored in a computer, it can be manipulated in ways 
that would often otherwise be unimaginable. Such manipulation can be 
straightforward, such as storage and printing, or the facilitation of easy editing 
and reorganisation. Automation can however, be more complex; for example, 
DRL uses information about Answers and Options to automatically remove 
from view those Options which have become invalid. Even 'semi-formal' 
representations can facilitate useful automation m the support of 
argumentation. 387 
The difference between argument support systems and systems that support 
reasoning can in some cases be quite small. Some systems use a representation 
that can be interpreted as supporting argument, or in addition, as supporting 
reasonmg. For the purposes of this examination, only systems which are 
specifically aimed at argument support are examined under this heading. 
However, nothing hinges on how any particular system is classified. 
387 A 'semi-formal' representation IS one in which 'structure' information is represented 
formally while 'content' information is represented informally: Smolensky, P., Bell, B., Fox, 
B., King, R. and Lewis, C., 'Constraint-based Hypertext for Argumentation' in Hypertext 
'87 Proceedings (1987) ACM Press, hereafter Smolensky 'Hypertext for Argumentation', 
219. For example, Toulmin's representation scheme distinguishes Data, Claim and 
Warrants and specifies ways in which they can relate. However, the details of any Data, 
Claim or Warrant are not considered. Smolensky's distinction is useful in that it highlights 
the purpose of any given representation - the distinction drawn cannot be a definite one 
however. 
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5.2.1 Augment 
The inspiration for much work on hypermedia systems and the augmentation 
of human work using computers came from Engelbart. In pioneering work 
exploring the concept of augmentation, Engelbart proposed a system, 
appropriately called 'Augment', designed to improve human work. Notably, in 
discussing Augment, one of the key examples that Engelbart provided revolved 
around 'structuring an argument.' 388 Engelbart was concerned with the way that 
traditional ways of working structure the way that people think about problems: 
You usually think of an argument as a serial sequence of steps of reason, 
beginning with known facts, assumptions, etc., and progressing toward a 
conclusion. Well, we do have to think through these steps serially, and 
we usually do list the steps serially when we write them out because that is 
pretty much the way our papers and books have to present them--they 
are pretty limiting in the symbol structuring they enable us to use. 389 
Engelbart regarded computers as providing a means whereby people could free 
their thinking from old methods: 
The old paper and pencil methods of manipulating symbols just weren't 
very adaptable to making and using symbol structures to match the ways 
we make and use conceptual structures. With the new symbol-
manipulating methods here, we have terrific flexibility for matching the 
two ... 39o 
For Engelbart the power of computer-based tools arose from the facilitation of 
manipulation of representations, such as the as the ability to edit, re-word, 
compile, and delete the statements that make up an argument. Engelbart 
discussed how a user might: 
establish arbitrary linkages between different substructures, and of 
directing the computer subsequently to display a set of linked 
388 Engelbart, above n. 79, III.B.4. 
389 Ibid. 
390 Ibid. 
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substructures with any relative positioning we might designate among 
the different substructures. You can designate as many different kinds of 
links as you wish, so that you can specify different display or 
manipulative treatment for the different types. 391 
Engelbart made several astute observations, such as how linkages could be used 
to compile lists of the antecedents and consequents of statements, how labelling 
nodes such as by the time they were added, could aid argument 
comprehension, and how things such as the spatial layout and the use of 
underlining could provide useful information and aid comprehension. 
However, Engelbart's primary concern was to show how computers could be 
beneficial in general. As such, he did not discuss in detail the particular types of 
nodes and linkages nor the layouts and services that could be provided with 
such representations. 
Interestingly, for Engelbart, it was the little things that were important: 
impressive new tricks all are based upon lots of changes in the little 
things you do. This computerized system is used over and over and over 
again to help me do little things--where my methods and ways of 
handling little things are changed until, lo, they've added up and 
suddenly I can do impressive new things. 392 
5.2.2 Toulmin based systems 
Toulmin's work is amongst that which has inspired the most work on argument 
diagramming. 393 As Toulmin's first main work was published in 1958, he did 
not discuss the use of computers to diagram arguments. Toulmin did however, 
291 Ibid. 
292 Ibid. 
292 See previous discussion ofToulmin's work: 4.4. 
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use diagrams to illustrate his arguments about the structure of argument and 
this has inspired numerous computer systems. 
These systems have diverse goals. For example, early versions of 'Belvedere' 
' 
were 'designed to support the practice of critical discussion'394 and to help users 
understand 'the ·logical and rhetorical relations within a debate'. 395 Belvedere 
was designed to help teach high school students about argumentation in 
scientific fields. Although early versions of Belvedere were loosely based on 
Toulmin structures 396 
' 
they contained some specialisation for scientific 
argumentation by allowing negative as well as positive links, by allowing 
multiple linkages to allow complex arguments and by providing a 
'Miscellaneous' node. 397 Researchers have explored the use ofToulmin schemes 
in various educational settings. 398 
Toulmin's analysis has been used in many other systems. For example, Lowe 
uses Toulmin's scheme to represent the structure of reasoning and debate. 399 
Homer-Dixon and Karapin use Toulmin's scheme to analyse arguments about 
394 Suthers, D., Weiner, A., 'Groupware for Developing Critical Discussion Skills' p. 341, in 
Schnase, J.L. and Cunnius, E.L. (Eds) Proceedings of the First International Conference on 
Computer support for Collaborative Learning (1995) Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. 
395 Ibid. 
396 Ibid. 343. 
397 Ibid. 
398 Fulkerson, above n. 315; Zumbach proposes using Toulmin structures to support problem 
based learning: Zumbach, J., Reimann, P., 'Combining Computer Supported Collaborative 
Argumentation and Problem-Based Learning: An Approach for Designing Online Learning 
Environments' (1999) Paper presented at workshop on Computer-Supported Collaborative 
Argumentation for Learning Communities, 1999, Stanford University. Available at 
http://d3e.open.ac.uk/cscl99/Zumbach/Zumbach-paper.html ( accessed 22/2/2001 ). 
399 Lowe, D.G., 'Cooperative structuring of information: the representation of reasoning and 
debate' (1985) 23 Journal of Man-Machine Studies 97 
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the arms race. 400 Ball, and Gasper and George use Toulmin's scheme to analyse 
arguments in public policy.401 Toulmin's scheme has also been modified and 
combined with other representation schemes.402 Numerous systems in law have 
been constructed around Toulmin's representational method, these are 
discussed separately. 403 
5.2.3 NoteCards 
N oteCards was an early hypertext system built around an analogue of the cue 
card.404 In NoteCards, information could be recorded on virtual cards and 
these cards could be linked with each other. In this way, a structured network of 
cards could be constructed. This network would represent the user's 
understanding of the information contained in the cards. To aid construction, 
manipulation and comprehension of information contained in cards, 
N oteCards provided graphical presentations of the network of cards. The 
whole network of cards could be graphically presented, as well as selected local 
areas of the network. 
Designed as a general system without specialisation for any particular use, 
N oteCards did not impose any structure on the type of cards used, or on the 
400 Homer-Dixon, T.F., Karapin, R.S., 'Graphical Argument Analysis: A New Approach to 
Understanding Arguments, Applied to a Debate about the Window of Vulnerability' (1989) 
33 International Studies Quarterly 389 
401 Ball, W.J., 'Using Virgil to Analyze Public Policy Arguments: A System Based on Toulmin's 
Informal Logic' (1994) 12(1) Social Science Computer Review 26; Gasper and George, 
above n. 314. 
402 See the discussion of Aquanet in the following sub-subsection and the discussion of 
Toulmin-based systems in law at: 5.2.2. 
403 See discussion: 5.4.2. 
404 Halasz, F.G., Moran, T. and Trigg, R.H., 'NoteCards in a Nutshell' p. 45, in Proceedings of 
the ACM CHI +GI Conference (1987) ACM Press; Halasz, F.G., 'Reflections on NoteCards: 
Seven issues for the next generation of hypermedia systems' (1998) 31 Communications of 
the ACM 836. 
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way that. they could be connected. As such, N oteCards did not itself provide 
explicit support for argumentation. However, a prominent feature of 
N oteCards was that the system was highly customisable. Users could define 
types of cards and specifY ways in which cards could be clustered together and 
interconnected. The systems allowed almost complete customisation of the 
work environment. 405 
The flexible environment provided by N oteCards has been used to construct 
numerous systems. For present purposes the most interesting of these systems 
is Aquanet. 406 Aquanet uses NoteCards to build a computer environment for 
constructing and manipulating Toulmin structures. Indeed, the criticisms 
reported by Newman and Marshall of Toulmin structures as an argument 
representation method were encountered while using Aquanet. 407 
5.2.4 TEXTNET 
Unlike Augment and NoteCards which were both conceived as general systems 
to construct and manipulate representations in some manner, TEXTNETwas a 
system primarily designed to aid the composition and comprehension of 
scientific texts. 408 As such TEXTNET facilitated writing by providing support 
for the organisation of pieces of text into nodes and their linked connection. 
Nodes contained 'chunks' of text, which could be interconnected using labelled 
links. In TEXNET, in addition to supporting authoring, this structure was 
envisaged as a means to support reader comprehension of texts. Users could 
use the structure given to a document as a means to navigate a document while 
reading it. Moreover, by adding their own nodes and links, readers could 
comment on and critique documents being read. 
405 Halasz, Moran and Trigg, ibid. 
406 Marshall, Halasz, Rogers, andJanssen, above n. 303. 
407 For a discussion of these problems, see: 4.4.1. 
408 Trigg, R.H., Weiser, M., 'TEXTNET: A Network-Based Approach to Text Handling' (1986) 
4(1) ACM Transactions on Office Information Systems 1. 
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TEXTNET supported argwnent through the provision of labelled nodes and 
through their connection with labelled links. TEXTNET divided nodes and 
links into two main types: (1) nodes containing the substance of a scientific text 
and links, such as 'Summary', 'Argument-by-Analogy', 'Example' and 
'Continuation', for connecting those substantive nodes; and (2) nodes 
containing argwnent or comment on a scientific text and links, such as 
'Refutation,' 'Support', 'Comment', 'Criticism', 'Argwnent-Immaterial' and 
'Style-Incoherent', to connect that commentary to the main text. However, it 
should be noted that a network could potentially become confusing as the same 
types of nodes and links could be used both by an author for structuring a 
docwnent and by a reader for commenting on a docwnent. 
The difference is striking between the representation provided by TEXTNET 
and both Toulmin's scheme and the standard method of argwnent diagram. 
TEXTNET contains not only different elements in its representation, but also 
many more elements in its representation of argwnent. In this respect, 
TEXNET provided a comparatively 'heavy' vocabulary. 
While providing support for the creation of docwnents however, the main focus 
was not on idea exploration or argumentation but on reading and 
comprehension- specifically reading and criticism in the scientific community. 
5.2.5 Scholarly Ontologies Project - SchoiOnto 
ScholOnto is a project in several respects similar m atm to TEXTNET. 
TEXTNET focused on expressing the relationships between claims made within 
single docwnents as support for improving the writing process, or claims made 
about single docwnents. Also focusing on scientific text, the use of 'rhetorical 
networks' has been proposed as a means to enhance scientific information 
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retrieval. 409 Rather than attempting to represent the details of the arguments 
presented in a single document, rhetorical networks aim to provide a broad 
description of how a particular document fits with other literature to which it is 
related .. To this end, Kircz proposes that every text be stored with a rhetorical 
network representing whether the text supports or detracts from the ideas that 
the text discusses and whether the text supports or detracts from, is consistent 
with, or contradictory to, other relevant literature in the field. 410 In this way, 
Kircz proposes that researchers would be better able to appreciate the overall 
shape of a field of research. 
The idea of rhetorical networks has recently been pursued in the ScholOnto 
project.411 Unlike TEXTNET, ScholOnto aims to support expression of 'high' 
level inter-document relationships relationships between documents 
themselves.412 ScholOnto is envisaged as a system with which authors could 
broadly describe the content of their documents. In describing the content of 
their document, authors would indicate how the document relates to the ideas 
which it discusses (see figure 41) and how the document fits within existing 
409 Kircz, J.G., 'Rhetorical Structure of Scientific Articles: The case for argumentational analysis 
in information retrieval' (1991) 47(4) Journal of Documentation 354. The idea of using 
rhetorical structure to improve information retrieval has also been explored in law: Dick, 
above n. 303; Hosking, P., 'Argument Representation and Conceptual Retrieval for 
Litigation Support' (1994) Technical Report CS-TR-94/19: Department of Computer 
Science, Victoria University of Wellington, New Zealand. Interestingly, the latter attempt to 
provide a detailed representation of the arguments presented in texts and to use this for 
legal information retrieval. 
410 Although Trigg and Weiser did mention in passing the use of TEXTNET to explore 
document relationships, this is not something they explored in depth. 
411 http://kmi.open.ac.uk/projects/scholonto/ 
412 In contrast to systems that represent the detailed argumentative contents of single 
documents - intra-document relationships - systems can also represent the relationships 
between groups of documents - inter-document relationships: Buckingham Shum, S., 
Domingue, ]. and Motta, E., 'Scholarly Discourse as Computable Structure' (2000) 
Knowledge Media Institute, Technical Report, KMI-TR-93. 
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research in the field (see figure 42). Although the structures are different to 
those in TEXTNET, ScholOnto provides a comparatively heavy representation. 
Authors would express this in terms of a standard 'ontology' of objects and 
claims about those objects (see figure 41 ). ScholOnto is very similar to Kircz' 
idea of rhetorical networks, however while Kircz only envisaged expression of 
rhetorical structures ScholOnto allows expression of more general contents . 
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413 Ibid. 5. 
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Once the contents of documents have been described using ScholOnto, readers 
could navigate the network of documents - a network which captures knowledge 
about the research area (see figure 43). 
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Figure 43: Browsing a conceptual area in Schol0nto415 
So for example, all documents that support a particular theory could be found, 
as could all documents that contradict a particular theory. Automatic services 
could be used to browse and search the area. The authors argue that with such a 
network of documents researchers could more easily and efficiently grasp the 
intellectual structure of a domain.416 
414 Buckingham Shum, S., Motta, E. and Domingue, ]., 'ScholOnto: an ontology-based digital 
library setver for research documents and discourse' (2000) 3 International Journal on 
Digital Libraries 237. 
415 Ibid. 
416 This work has interesting overlaps with systems commonly used both in academia and 
professionally, such as 'Web Of Science' and 'Current Law' which allow searching based on 
the citation relationships between documents. ScholOnto also overlaps with the provision of 
document 'keywords'. All of these aim to support understanding of an area through 
provision of information about document interrelationships. ScholOnto however, attempts 
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5.2.6 Argnoter 
Argnoter was an early system developed by XEROX as part of a larger project 
investigating the creation of tools to support 'collaborative decision making'. 417 
In Argnoter, decision making is broken down into a three phase process: 
proposing; arguing and evaluating.418 Proposing provides possible solutions to 
a problem; a brainstorming tool is provided to facilitate this. Arguing involves 
the argumentative examination of proposals and evaluation involves assessment 
and choice from amongst the proposals. Argnoter provided a simple means 
with which participants at a meeting could argue about proposals.419 
Participants could simply label arguments as for or against particular proposals 
- as either 'pro' or 'con'. 420 It is left to participants to evaluate arguments and to 
determine which proposal has the strongest arguments. According to the 
creators of Argnoter, problems arise with argument simply because people do 
not express their assumptions and arguments or the criteria by which they 
assess options. Hence, simply through making explicit the arguments and. 
making explicit the ways in which arguments support and detract from 
proposals, Argnoter provides support for the evaluation of arguments and 
to produce a 'richer' representation of the relationships between documents - and a 
representation based on the argumentative relationships between documents. 
417 Stefik, M., Foster, G., Bobrow, D., Kahn, K., Lanning, S. and Suchman, L., 'Beyond the 
chalkboard: Corn puter support for collaboration and problem solving' ( 1 987) 30( 1) 
Communications of the ACM 32. 
418 Ibid. 38. 
419 Ibid. 38. 
420 SPIDER is a tool very similar to Argnoter. Boland describes SPIDER as a tool with which 
managers can communicate and exchange understandings of the situations they face. Like 
Argnoter, SPIDER relies on a simple node and link representation in which links are simply 
labelled as '+' or '-'; Boland, R.J.J., Maheshwari, A.K., Te'eni, D., Schwartz, D.G. and 
Tenkasi, R.V., 'Sharing Perspectives in Distributed Decision Making' p. 306, in Proceedings 
of the conference on Computer Supported Cooperative Work ( 1 992) ACM Press. 
182 
proposals.421 By making these explicit, Argnoter hoped to improve group 
decision-making. Recent experiments support the idea that diagramming can 
make explicit, tacit knowledge, that making knowledge explicit can change that 
knowledge and that potentially this can affect decision-making.422 
Interestingly, in addition to making explicit the actual arguments that decision-
makers rely upon, the creators of Argnoter suggest that the beliefs underlying 
arguments could also be made explicit. They suggest beliefs could be subsumed 
within general categories such as: 'compatibility'; 'cost'; 'development time'; 
'efficiency'; 'feasibility'; 'simplicity'; and 'utility'.423 Once made explicit, they 
propose that individual beliefs could be marked as 'true' or 'false' and the 
consequences for the argument that rely on those beliefs traced through the 
argument.424 While an interesting idea, the extent to which beliefs can be 
consistently categorised is debatable - however since this proposal was not 
discussed in any depth it will not be further considered. 
5.2. 7 Argument Representation Language 
The Argument Representation Language (ARL) is a representation designed to 
support 'reasoned discourse'. 425 To this end, Smolensky et al. have produced a 
tool that helps: 
people create and assess reasoned arguments and communicate these 
arguments to others. The tool provides reasoners with a language, ARL, 
421 Stefik et al., above n. 417, 38. 
422 Rodhain, F., 'Tacit to explicit: transforming knowledge through cognitive mapping - an 
experiment' p. 51, in Proceedings of the 1999 ACM SIGCPR conference on Computer 
personnel research ( 1999) ACM Press, 51 
423 Stefik et al., above n. 417, 39. 
424 Ibid. 
425 Smolensky 'Hypertext for Argumentation', above n. 387, 216. 
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for expressmg their arguments m a clear, prectse, and relatively 
standardized fashion. 426 
As Smolensky et al. note, the key is to provide: 
A language which has sufficient expressive power to represent 
realistically sophisticated arguments427 
ARL thus provides numerous link types with which to classifY relationships 
between pieces of text and thereby to support argument. These include 'Claim,' 
'Asserts,' 'Main-Point,' 'Supports,' 'Contradicts,' 'Relevant-to,' 'Requires,' 
'Refutes,' 'Mapped' and 'Mean'. In both the type of objects provided and their 
richness, ARL is similar to TEXTNET and ScholOnto. Notably, despite the 
richness of the vocabulary provided, the authors argue that users must be able 
to define their own link types. 428 
In terms of expressmg arguments, the most relevant objects in ARL are 
'Claims' and 'Arguments' which can be related through, the most relevant ways 
for present purposes, 'Contradicts' and 'Supports' links. As indicated above, 
ARL provides various other entities with which to structw·e reasoned discourse. 
These do not focus on expressing wider aspects of reasoning such as does DRL. 
Smolensky et al. regard one of the largest benefits of representing reasoned 
discourse as the automation that is made possible.429 ARL focuses heavily on 
how to perform computations over the arguments expressed in the system. For 
example, Smolensky et al. discuss how larger argument forms - such as a 
'misrepresentation' - can be defined within the system. A 'misrepresentation' 
would occur when someone presents another's argument in an inaccurate 
426 Ibid. 217. 
427 Smolensky, P., Fox, B., King, R. and Lewis, C., 'Computer-Aided Reasoned Discourse or, 
How to Argue with a Computer' p. 109, in Guindon, R. (eds.) Cognitive Science and its 
application for human-computer interaction (1 988) Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, hereafter 
Smolensky 'How to Argue', 112. 
428 Smolensky 'Hypertext for Argumentation', above n. 387, 218-9. 
429 Smolensky 'How to Argue', above n. 427, 128. 
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manner. Smolensky et al. suggest that misrepresentation is characterised by the 
existence of arguments connected to other arguments in standard and 
distinctive ways. Smolensky et al. suggest that by defining such argument forms, 
a computer implementation of ARL could automatically detect the presence of 
a misrepresentation in an argument. This is an interesting goal. Its success 
however depends on the ability to unambiguously define the ways in which 
arguments interconnect in each argument form. The diversity and complexity 
of everyday argument casts doubt on this possibility - however, since ARL 
remains largely unimplemented this will not be examined further. 
5.2.8 ReasonAble! 
'ReasonAble!' 1s a system based on a simple 'Claim' -supports-'Conclusion' 
structure and 1s primarily designed to help students learn how to argue.430 
ReasonAble! uses a graphical interface with which users can construct 
arguments. 
ReasonAble! contains several interesting features. First, ReasonAble! contains 
an automated assistant which provides advice to users when they input 
arguments into the system. For example, when a user inputs a Claim, the 
assistant informs users to focus on what point is being made and to formulate it 
in a single sentence. When a user inputs multiple claims into the system, the 
assistant asks whether the claim 'helps' or whether it independently supports a 
conclusion - thus forcing the user to focus on whether the claims are parallel or 
convergent. 431 This is an interesting automated implementation of aspects of 
argument theory and is not something offered by other systems. 
430 www.goreason.com 
431 However, ReasonAble! is based on a particular representation of argument in which 
convergent claims are split into a 'main' claim and a helper claim. 
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Secondly, ReasonAble! contains a mechanism whereby users can assess the 
strength of their arguments. This is achieved through a simple mechanism 
whereby users select how well supported they think an argument is (see figure 
44). 
Figure 44: Evaluating claims using ReasonAble! 
The strengths of claims and objections is visually indicated in ReasonAble! By 
the colour of the claim and the colour of the link to a Conclusion that it 
supports (see figure 45 ). 
ReasonAble! is an 
interesting program 
ReasonAble~ 
supports 
argument. 
ReasonAble! 
provides 
automation 
Figure 45: Evaluated arguments in ReasonAble! 
However, while the strength of arguments can be specified and visually 
indicated, ReasonAble! does not use these assessments to automatically assess 
the status of conclusions.432 
432 ReasonAble! provides a further mechanism for evaluating premtses through their 
classification into types of 'Ground'. However, as implemented in ReasonAble!, Grounds are 
problematic (for example, they cannot be the subject of argument) and it is difficult to see 
what they add to argument creation and evaluation. They will not be discussed further . 
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Notably, ReasonAble! has been used to teach informal reasonmg m an 
undergraduate university course. Research reports that students who studied 
using ReasonAble! performed significantly better than did a control group 
taking a conventional course in informal reasoning. 433 
5.2.9 Argument Maps 
Horn has argued for the use of Argument Maps to display that nature of 
complex scholarly arguments.434 There are several notable aspects of Horn's 
work. First is that the maps do not make use of a standardised vocabulary. 
Although aspects of debates are linked as in other approaches, linkage is ad 
hoc. Further, the maps make large use of clip art and other imagery to 
illustrate and emphasise points made during debate. Although too small to 
appreciate the detail, figure 46 is an argument map created by Horn and 
colleagues as part of a series to illustrate the status of debate surrounding the 
question of whether or not computers can think. Figure 46 illustrates the 
general structure of argument maps as envisaged by Horn. 
433 van Gelder, T., Bulka, A., 'Reason!: Improving Informal Reasoning Skills' presented at the 
Australian Computers in Education Conference, 2000, University of Melbourne. 
434 Horn, R.E., Yoshimi, J., Deering, M. and McBride, R., 'Using Argumentation Analysis to 
Examine the History and Status of a M~ or Debate in Cognitive Science' p. 1102, in Shafto, 
M.G. and Langley, P. (Eds) Proceedings of the Nineteenth Annual Conference of the 
Cognitive Science Society (1997) Erlbaum. 
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Figure 46: Horn's argument map about artificial intelligence 
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Figure 4 7 provides more detail from a map created by Horn concernmg 
whether the Turing test is a good test for detecting intelligence in computers. 
47 Nod Block, 1981 
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Figure 4 7: Detail from an argument map about the Turing test. 
Horn's maps are striking not only for their breadth and complexity but also the 
richness of the imagery that they use. 
The second notable aspect of the argument maps created by Hon1 is that they 
have been created by a joint team of academics and are thus comprehensive 
and to some degree authoritative commentaries on the areas that they cover. As 
such, these argument maps are sold as teaching resources and have received 
praise as useful teaching tools. 435 However, there is of course nothing inherent 
m Metzinger, T., 'Teaching Philosophy with Argumentation Maps: Review of Can Computers 
Think? The Debate by Robert E. Horn' (1999) 5(30) PSYCHE: An interdisciplinary journal 
of research on consciousness http://psyche.cs.monash.edu.au/v5/psyche-5-30-metzinger.html 
(accessed 21/2/2001 ); Chandler, J ., 'Mapping The Great Debates' ( 1999) The Philosopher's 
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m the techniques for creating argument maps that requrres either 
comprehensiveness or contributions from domain experts. 
Unfortunately, while Horn's maps are impressive, Horn does not provide 
detailed discussion of how to create maps and there is no computer 
environment dedicated to doing so. While Horn advocates the extensive use of 
clip art, it remains for the individual to make use of this as they see fit. Creation 
of argument maps retains a large element of art. 
5.2.1 0 A diversity of diagrams 
From the above examination, it ts evident that the idea of argument 
diagramming - 'argument mapping' - is widely interpreted. Systems differ 
greatly in the r:_epresentation of argument that they impose. Indeed, the idea of 
an argument diagram sometimes seems to be lost. For example, the 
'Multimedia Forum Kiosk' allows comments to be linked with categories such as 
'and', 'or', 'but' and 'i.e.'. 436 Strangely however, while the graphical 
representation of the argument provides a photo of the contributor to the 
argument, it provides no representation of their substantive contribution -
while it is possible to 'see' who has responded to who during an argument it is 
not possible to see the actual content of their arguments. In this 'argument 
map' it is thus not possible to 'survey' the overall structure of the argument -
only to survey the structure of the sequence of contributions that make up the 
argument. 
The representation of argument provided in a system is extremely important as 
it directs how argument will occur using the system. For many tasks though, 
The Philosopher's Magazine 11. The type of argument map envisaged by Horn has also 
been used commercially in an attempt to improve decision-making: see www.austhink.org. 
436 Hoadley, C.M., Hsi, S., 'A multimedia interface for knowledge building and collaborative 
learning' p. 103, in INTERACT '93 and CHI '93 conference companion on Human factors 
in computing systems (1993) ACM Press. 
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supporting argumentation ts insufficient and support for wider aspects of 
problem solving is necessary. The following subsection examines systems that 
attempt to represent and support aspects of problem solving wider than 
argument. 
5.3 Systems supporting reasoning 
Systems to represent argument are useful. However, to fully support 
sensemaking representing reasoning is also often necessary. Various systems 
exist which attempt to support aspects of reasoning. Mind mapping tools, as 
aids to brainstorming, have already been discussed.437 However, various other 
tools attempt to provide more structured support for reasoning. Like argument 
support tools, these tools vary greatly in the situations they are designed to be 
used in and support, and in the representations they provide. 
Reasoning is investigated from many perspectives and in many fields. An 
important element of this research into reasoning is the development of 
models designed to improve decision-making. Decision analysis and the use of 
models such as expected utility theory can undoubtedly be of benefit for 
numerous tasks. Graphical representations of such decision analytic methods 
are well developed and widely used.438 However, such quantitative methods are 
not examined here. This examination focuses on systems which support 
qualitative reasoning. 439 Moreover, the following examination is not presented 
as comprehensive - innumerable systems have not been examined which could 
nevertheless in some way said to support reasoning. The systems examined 
here have been included partly because they have proved influential, and more 
simply, merely to highlight the diversity of systems that exists and the diversity 
of representational structures they employ in the support of reasoning. 
437 See 4. 7.2. 
438 For example, decision trees. 
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5.3.1 Discussion systems 
A popular objective for system creators is to support group reasoning through 
facilitation and organisation of group communication. Numerous systems exist 
that facilitate joint discussion and that facilitate discussion of, organisation of, 
and commentary upon documents. 
5.3.1.1 lfyjJerJVews 
HyperNews is a variation of the traditional Usenet News.440 HyperNews 
modifies Usenet News in several ways. Two of these are that in HyperNews, 
discussion is hyper-linked, and contributions to a discussion all have an 
associated type. This type indicates how the contribution relates to the existing 
discussion. Contributors to a HyperNews discussion label their contributions as: 
'None', 'Question', 'Note', 'Warning', 'Feedback', 'Idea', 'More', 'News', 'OK', 
'Sad', 'Angry', 'Agree', 'Disagree'. These have associated visual icons. 
Kind of 1\.lt>ssae;t>: 
r. ;t., None r <f Idea 
r Question r ..., More r @ .Angrj 
r .li.t Note r News r ~ Ag,ee 
r & Warning r © Ok r ~Disagree 
r G Feedback r ® Sad 
Figure 48: Types of HyperNews contributions 
The rationale underlying such labelling is that it allows readers to more quickly 
and easily scan a discussion, judge its tone and select parts of the discussion that 
they wish to read. While HyperNews contains the straightforwardly 
argumentative 'Agree' and 'Disagree' labels, other labels provided in the system 
are far more diverse. 
439 For a discussion for the importance of the distinction between quantitative reasoning and 
qualitative reasoning, see: 3.5. 
440 www.hypernews.org 
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Notably, HyperNews has been used as a central element m the 'OpenLaw' 
project. 441 OpenLaw is described as: 
an experiment in crafting legal argument in an open forum .... we will 
develop arguments, draft pleadings, and edit briefs in public, online. 
Non-lawyers and lawyers alike are invited to join the process by adding 
thoughts to the "brainstorm" outlines, drafting and commenting on 
drafts in progress, and suggesting reference sources.442 
As indicated, OpenLaw seeks to solicit public contribution in the research and 
organisation of public interest lawsuits. Using HyperNews, amongst other 
things, participants can discuss the issues in a case, suggest arguments relating 
to those issues, critique arguments made by others and suggest new argument. 
Figure 49 is a sample from an OpenLaw discussion concerning a proposal to 
extend the term of copyright protection in the United States of America. 
11 Gonruweut Re;.pot~Se Bne!O.nl!ue by wseJtzer, Jul 07, 15:30 
1 ® Hanuow,zatrou and lile coP}lW!t e.'Ueru.1.ou by guest, JuJ 21, 2 3:3 7 
2 ~ CoUUllents on the Go'\'ernmeut Re:>pouse Bnef by jms, JuJ 25, 19:55 
1 ~ bow chd "'~ years :mddelJiy become "uufrur" " by phiUit, Jut 26, 20:49 
2 'I What ex.as;tly do the "lbrtats of the c:bgtta1 age" haw to do wlfh a 9~ year commflt term 
.\ ~ a retllilfk by Mr JtL~bce BlacbJ!m by phiUit, Aug 12, 10:20 
.\ '9 "Rtde oflessq knn" by guest, Jul 30, 15:50 
-1 q> don't let them get away \\1th tt by ph Wit, Aug 04, 20:49 
1 tl "llUihor i!Ud Ins depeudeuts" • bere<htary pmyege·~ by pns, Aug 17, 17:32 
(_ ~ J,t tends ut that chrecllou by philJit, Aug 17, 19:39 
5 cp pllbhc mterest EQUALS pnbkc domaw by phiUit, Aug 12, 16:41 
12 Boston Globe e<htonal by guest, Oct 05, 11:46 
1 .!1. Jbe wboJe tltmg ssqJlS to be sbpptng under tbe radar by eclectro, Oct 06, 1 0:3 6 
(_ *' a few took note by ph Wit, Oct 11, 00:04 
B .!i AllY trapscgpt yer~ by guest, act 12, 15:14 
1 ;:• sh1{ Wj!tlmg by aJex _ rnsseU, Oct 19, 06:09 
2 TnnJscqptuow oulme by wseJtzer, Nov 06, 21:29 
1 q> llltereslmg readtng• by jms, Nov 14, 19:23 
2 ~ What's uext" by jms, Nov 14, 19:26 
1-1 !1 Treaty Powq. CounueJ"ce Power and Copj!@J.t by Paul Fenimore, Oct 19, 12:51 
Figure 49: Example OpenLaw discussion 
OpenLaw has been used to collect information and argument that has formed 
the basis of submissions in litigation in the United States of America concerning 
441 http://eon.law.harvard.edu/openlaw/ 
442 Ibid. 
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the Microsoft monopoly trial, open access to cable networks, the circumvention 
of digital encryption controls, and the extension of the copyright term. 
5.3.1.2 Digital Document Discourse Environment {D3E_r!J 
D3E is an environment for publishing documents. For present purposes, one of 
its interesting aspects is that readers can comment on documents in the system. 
The comments that readers make are hyper-linked to the section of the 
document which is being commented upon. As a simple aid to navigation, 
comments are labelled as 'Agree', 'Disagree' or 'Unclassified'. 
~:~t~~~~f~i~~~~~~,~~~!~~~~~i~;~:l7e~~;~~~":i~:~~~~~ff~~~··:~~~ve~~£ .~3 ~. 
'~ .0ii@@itY &rmpomnce'ofideas·(JI¥E ~ditor(Simcm Biick{ng~ SWon)J,:! o llfar.J99i 
~irtl~iiS~~~e~~~~~--~"~, ...•.. ····· .. 
. :,:4J:'tirrti:foduc1iofL~The' Com'f uter:.as'~'Commilriication Mediuin{.!JMi Editor (SI' men Buckingham 51-!umJJ, 1 o Mw 1998 
Figure 50: Example discussion provided by D3E444 
This is reminiscent (though simplified) of the types of commentary facilitated by 
HyperNews. D3E differs from HyperNews however in the tight integration it 
provides between documents and discussion about documents. In HyperNews, 
443 http://d3e.open.ac.uk/ 
444 Taken from a discussion of an article published in the 1998 volume of the Journal of 
Interactive Media in Education (JIME), discussion available at: http://www-
jime.open.ac.uk/Reviews/get/repenning-98-7 -reviews.html 
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document browsing occurred separately to discussion about those documents. 
In D3E, comments link directly to relevant documents and parts of documents. 
5.3.1.3 Open Meeting 
'Open Meeting' was a program designed to 'support productive, wide-area 
collaboration for policy planning and problem solving'. 445 The system, which 
ran over the World Wide Web, allowed users to discuss proposals for 
bureaucratic reforms, such discussion then being used as feedback to refine 
those reforms. To provide some structure to the comments made by users, all 
comments had to be categorised within defined types. Open Meeting allowed 
seven types of comments: 'Agree'; 'Disagree'; 'Qualify'; 'Alternative'; 'Example'; 
'Question'; and 'Answer'. 
Icon 
'Y.~ 
but.. 
Link Type 
Agree 
Qualify 
Description 
A reason to support the 
recommendation or action. 
A qualification that explains exceptions 
or extensions for a recommendation or 
action. 
• Alternative An alternative way to implement a 
Disagree 
Example 
Question 
Answer 
recommendation or action. 
A reason to challenge why or how a 
recommendation or action can work. 
A report of a promising practice that 
illustrates one good way to realize a 
recommendation. 
A question about a recommendation or 
action. 
An answer to someone else's question. 
Figure 51: Contributions in Open Meeting 
445 Hmwitz, R., Mallery,J.C., 'The Open Meeting: A web-based system for conferencing and 
collaboration' in Proceedings of the Fourth International Conference on The World-Wide 
Web (1995) World Wide Web Consortium. 
Available at: http://www .w3.org/pub/Conferences/WWW4/papers2/349 (accessed 3/ 12/2000) 
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This is reminiscent of Hyper News. However, in Open Meeting, only certain 
links between comments were allowed. For example, no 'Alternative' was 
allowed for a 'Qualification' or an 'Alternative' to an 'Example' were allowed. 
The creators of the system regarded such contributions as illogical. 446 
Open Meeting is interesting for its use in an official government sponsored 
context. Open Meeting was used to elicit and structure discussion about reform 
of the federal administration in the United States of America. Its creators rate 
this use of Open Meeting as a success.447 
Intergovernmental Tax Filing. ReJ)OAng. and 
Payments 
Jltecommandallon 'for "••ngln~terlng 1h~ Information 
Technology 
" I'Orrtl•lna Pnlctlo .. 
l:lutermdiv•• 
~~~~~2S.~EST7 
~M'1~~ls"l"7l1{150«- t994 lltCBESTJ 
w..-a-.-..... nt. 
~.,.=}1&~'?1G94 2S:6T EST} 
Figure 52: Discussions with Open Meeting448 
446 However, some of further moves that are excluded as illogical seem highly sensible, e.g. an 
alternative to a question; an alternative to an alternative; and an alternative to an answer. 
447 Hurwitz and Mallery, above n. 445. 
448 Ibid. 
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The discussion systems examined here are interesting first because of the wide 
use they have received. Both HyperNews and D3E are used daily. Secondly, 
these systems are interesting for the variation amongst the representations that 
they utilise. Not only are different types of comments supported, but the ways 
that those comments can be linked to previous comments varies. While 
HyperNews and D3E do not restrict linkages, Open Meeting imposes a defined 
semantics on links. Interestingly, the linear structure imposed on contributions 
itself inherently limits linkage between contributions - contributions can only 
concern the immediately preceding comment. Network-based representations 
in contrast, allow potentially unlimited linkage between any node and any 
other. Interestingly, each of these systems attempts minimal formalisation of 
contributions to a discussion - comments are simply given a general label 
indicating their overall tone. This contrasts with Toulmin and DRL for 
example, which respectively support formalisation of detailed aspects of 
argument and reasoning. 
5.3.2 Belvedere 
Belvedere is an interesting system for diagramming reasoning developed by 
Suthers et al. Belvedere was designed to aid high school students in learning 
about scientific reasoning and arguments in science. Interestingly, Belvedere 
has existed in various different forms. Each of these forms has provided a 
slightly different representational structure. 
In its early forms, Belvedere was based on Toulmin's model of argument, 
though modified for use specifically in a scientific context.449 These versions of 
Belvedere contained objects such as 'Principle', 'Theory', 'Hypothesis', 'Claim', 
and 'Report'.450 However, early versions of Belvedere sometimes operated 
without the 'Principle' and 'Report' objects but instead providing 'Warrant', 
449 Suthers and Weiner, above n. 394. 
450 Ibid. 
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'Observation'/'Data' and 'Law' objects. Similarly, the way objects were linked in 
early versions of Belvedere varied. Belvedere sometimes used 'Supports', 
'Explains', 'Conflicts', 'Justifies' and 'Undercuts' relationships while at other 
times omitting the 'Justifies' and 'Undercuts' relationships and using 'Causes' 
and 'Negates' relationships instead.451 
Belvedere is thus interesting because it has experimented with the underlying 
representation that is provided. As Suthers states, the objects and relationships 
included in the system depend on the particular knowledge and skills of its 
users - thus part of the process in the design of Belvedere was to design: 
argumentation palettes . . . for everyday and scientific argumentation. 
The palettes vary in granularity, distinctions available (e.g., whether 
'justifications" are included as a component type), and relationships 
emphasized (e.g., theory versus domain). We plan to use these palettes 
to effect transitions between everyday and scientific argumentation in a 
manner fitting students emerging competencies and readiness to 
appreciate new distinctions. 452 
Interestingly, later verswns of Belvedere contain much simpler objects and 
relationships. For example, recent versions of Belvedere merely allow 'Data' to 
be linked to 'Hypothesis' through 'Consistency' and 'Inconsistency' 
relationships. 453 According to Suthers, the simplification of the objects and 
relationships provided in recent versions of Belvedere arose because students 
were not able to understand the distinctions between objects provided in earlier 
versions. 454 This probably relates in part to the structure ofToulmin arguments 
on which Belvedere was based. Even for readers knowledgeable in a domain it 
451 Ibid. 
452 Ibid. 
453 Suthers, above n. 81. 
454 Ibid. 
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can be difficult to classifY objects within Toulmin structmes.455 Fmther, early 
versions of Belvedere sometimes contained 'Theory', 'Hypothesis', 'Warrant' 
and 'Law'. However, it is very difficult to precisely state what the difference is 
between a 'Warrant' and a 'Theory', a 'Warrant' and a 'Hypothesis' or a 
'Warrant' and a 'Law'. Difficulties encountered using the objects within 
Belvedere highlight the need for clear and appropriate representations. The 
simplification of the representation underlying Belvedere dming its evolution 
could be taken to suggest that simple, 'light', representations are more 
appropriate than complex representations. However, the ambiguities in the 
various representations used in Belvedere detract from this conclusion. 
Moreover, as Suthers stresses, the light representational system is for use by 
non-expert students and is designed, on the contrary, to 'scaffold' their 
learning. In a context where users are a knowledgeable and well-trained group 
with a large degree of homogeneity, representational schemes that are more 
complex might be appropriate. 
Belvedere supports reasoning and argument as engaged in by early high school 
science students. Belvedere does not (or rather with its adjustable pallets, has 
not yet been used to) support wider reasoning tasks. Research indicates that 
Belvedere is successful in prompting and constructive argument amongst 
students who use it. 456 
5.3.3 Issue-Based Information System (IBIS) 
IBIS is an approach to problem solving developed by Rittel and Weber as a 
means to tackle 'wicked problems'.457 Interestingly, in IBIS argumentation plays 
an important role in exploring and deciding wicked problems. IBIS is itself 
widely used but has additionally been highly influential in efforts to create 
455 See the discussion of Toulmin's scheme: 4.4.1. 
456 Veerman, above n. 264. 
457 For a discussion of 'wicked problem' see: 3.5.1. 
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computer tools to support problem solving, m particular, work on design 
rationale. 
The IBIS theory of problem solving revolves around 'Issues', 'Positions' and 
'Arguments'. Issues are used to diagram problematic facets of a situation -
Issues spotlight specific aspects of a problem that must be addressed. Possible 
solutions to Issues are called 'Positions'. 'Argument' nodes are used to argue 
about the advantages or disadvantages of Positions. 
The IBIS method defines specific relationships by which Issues, Positions and 
Arguments can be related to each other. For example, Positions can be linked 
to Issues with a 'Responds-to' link, Arguments can be linked to a Position with 
either a 'Supports' or an 'Objects-to' link, Issues can 'Generalize' or 'Specialize' 
other Issues. Figure 53 illustrates all the nodes and links allowed in IBIS. 
GENERALIZES 
OR 
REPLACES 
QUESTIONS OR ANY NODE 
7-::;;;o.-----.---' IS-SUGGESTED-BY~PE 
QUESTIONS OTHER 
IS-SUGGESTED-BY OTHER 
SUPPORTS 
OB ECTS-TO 
Figure 53: Objects and links provided in IBIS458 
IBIS promotes a particular view about the way problems are structured and the 
way that they should be resolved. The IBIS method has spawned several 
variations including giBIS, wiBIS and the commercial program Questmap459 
458 Conklin and Begeman, above n. 378, 305. 
459 www.gdss.com. Also: Hashim, S.H., 'WHAT: An argumentative groupware approach for 
organizing and documenting research activities' ( 1991) 1 I oumal of Organizational 
Computing 275. OMNI is another issue based system like giBIS. Its primary uniqueness is 
its application to business decisions and the use of voting procedures to close issues: Lange, 
B., Treleaven; J.B. and Gershman, A., 'OMNI: a model for focused collaborative work 
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and has been used for a variety of tasks including policy planning, 460 meeting 
support461 and architectural design. 462 
Interestingly, despite a seemingly general representation having general 
applicability, users of IBIS can have trouble fitting their work within IBIS 
constructs.463 It is thus not only Toulmin's representations, with their 
comparatively complex constructs, that can cause confusion. However, there is 
some evidence . that in the case of IBIS, users soon learn to use the 
through issue management' p. 190, in Proceedings of the conference on Organizational 
computing systems (1993) ACM Press. Horita disrusses an 'Argumentative Analysis of 
Options' which is in many ways similar to IBIS: Horita, M., 'Folding Arguments: A Method 
for Representing Conflicting Views of a Conflict' (2000) 9 Group Decision and Negotiation 
63. However, Horita uses the number of supporting and detracting argument connected to 
an Option to calculate a 'positive ground rate' - a number intended to indicate how 
strongly Arguments support an Option. However, an assessment needs to be conducted of 
the utility of such a single number to express degree of support - especially given that such 
calculation does not capture the individual strength of particular arguments in supporting 
or detracting from a proposition. While some arguments might be strongly supportive, 
others might be only weakly supportive. Detracting arguments might be strongly detracting 
while others only weakly so. Further, the utility of a single number as an expression of 
degree of support as compared to indicating the arguments for and against a proposition 
needs to be assessed. 
460 Rittel and Weber, above n. 206. 
461 Conklin and Begeman, above n. 378; Conklin, J., Begeman, M.L., 'giBIS: A tool for all 
reasons' ( 1 989) 40 I ournal of the American Society for Information Science 200; Conklin, 
]., 'Seven Years oflndustrial Strength CSCA in an Electric Utility' (1999). Paper presented 
at workshop on Computer-Supported Collaborative Argumentation for Learning 
Communities, 1999, Stanford University. Available at 
http://d3e. open. ac. uk/cscl99/Conklin/Conklin-paper. h tml ( accessed 15/3/20001 ). 
462 Fischer, G., McCall, R. and Morch, A., 'JANUS: Integrating Hypertext with a Knowledge-
based Design Environment' p. 105, in Proceedings of Hypertext '89 ( 1 989). 
463 Isenmann, S., Reuter, W.D., 'IBIS--a convincing concept ... but a lousy instrument?' p. 163, 
in Proceedings of the conference on Designing interactive systems: processes, practices, 
methods, and techniques (1997) ACM Press, 169; Conklin, above n. 461. 
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representation - suggesting that while all representations structure thinking and 
need to be learned, some can nevertheless be clearer than others. 464 
5.3.4 Design Rationale 
In specialised contexts, specialised representations may be appropriate. One 
area in which a lot of work has been performed on the structuring of problem 
solving, is 'design rationale.' As indicated when discussing DRL,465 design 
rationale seeks to capture and represent the kind of reasoning that the 
designers of artefacts engage in during the design process and the rationale 
underlying why problems involved in the design of an artefact were resolved 
the way they were.466 This work has been inspired by Rittel and Weber's IBIS 
method (above). In addition to DRL, QOC is another prominent method in 
design rationale. 
5.3.4.1 Questions, Options, Criteria (QOC) 
The QOC system is composed of 'Questions', 'Options' and 'Criteria'. Questions 
express key issues involved in a design. 467 Options provide tentative answers to 
Questions. Criteria provide information about an Option, they support or 
object to the Option, and are used to assess Options amongst each other. 
Figure 54 illustrates the objects in QOC. 
464 Isenmann, ibid. 170. 
465 See above 4. 7.3. 
466 Buckingham Shum and Hammond, above n. 366. 
467 MacLean, A., Young, R.M., Bellotti, V.M.E. and Moran, T.P., 'Questions, Options, and 
Criteria: Elements of Design Space Analysis' p. 53, in Moran, T.P. and Carroll, J.M. (Eds) 
Design Rationale: Concepts, Techniques and Use (1996) Lawrence Erlbaum. 
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Figure 54: Objects provided in the QOC method 
Superficially, the system for problem solving promoted in QOC is similar to 
that in IBIS. However, while QOC and IBIS do provide slightly different 
objects it is misleading to conclude that this as the biggest difference that exists. 
As Stumpf discusses in detail, the representations differ in that while IBIS 
focuses on structuring how issues are discussed, QOC focuses on the process by 
which alternatives are generated and evaluated - a difference that Stumpf 
characterises as encouraging 'depth-first' search and 'breadth-first' search 
respectively. 468 Seemingly small representational differences can be 
consequential. 
5.3.4.2 Design Rationale Language DRL 
DRL, which has already been discussed and applied in a legal context,469 is a 
second influential system aimed at capturing design rationale. DRL is described 
as a 'Qualitative Decision Management System'.470 While the detailed 
468 Stumpf, S., 'Argumentation-based Design Rationale - The Sharpest Tools in the Box' 
(1 998) Computer Science Department, University College London, Research Note 
RN/98/103. 
469 See: 4. 7.3. 
470 Lee I 990a, above n. 82. 
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application of DRL to the diagramming of a legal judgment has previously 
been discussed, it is worthwhile examining more general aspects of this 
representation. 
The representation used in DRL is much more complex than that provided in 
either IBIS or QOC. DRL consists of three fundamental objects that Lee 
regards as central to decision making: GOALS; ALTERNATIVES; and 
CLAIMS. 471 Goals are ends to be achieved. Alternatives indicate possible ways to 
achieve a Goal. Claims are linked together to represent the arguments for 
choosing amongst alternatives and can relate to each other through: 
SUPPORTS; DENIES; or QUALIFIES links.472 Other relations included in the 
system such as QUERIES or INFLUENCES cannot link daims.473 Notably, Lee 
states that statements of relation between claims are themselves subject to 
argument and hence can be the subject of argument.474 DRL also provides 
various other objects for discussing designs, however, different versions of DRL 
have utilised different representations, the details of which are not important 
for present purposes. Echoing the idea of argument maps, Lee calls diagrams 
created using DRL, 'decision graphs'. 475 
Lee has produced a computer-system, SIBYL, which supports constructions of 
representation using DRL. Interestingly, in SIBYL the user does not view the 
whole decision graph underlying a question at any one time. Instead, the 
system displays specific aspects of the graph according to the problem currently 
being worked on. 476 SIBYL has a number of automatic services inbuilt: 
dependency management;477 plausibility management;478 viewpoint 
471 Lee 1990a, above n. 82, 111. 
472 Ibid. 113. 
473 Ibid. 112. 
474 Ibid. 113. 
475 Ibid. Ill. 
476 Ibid. 116. 
477 Ibid. 116-8. 
204 
management;479 and precedent management.480 Each of these servtees ts 
provided to help users create, navigate, manipulate and understand decision 
graphs. Dependency management attempts to automatically 'prune' 
alternatives from a graph as those alternatives become unacceptable or 
impossible. Dependency management relies on the user precisely stating how 
alternatives relate to the goal. 481 Plausibility management attempts to indicate 
which is the most acceptable amongst a series of alternatives. Plausibility 
management depends on the user assigning a plausibility measurement to 
claims and relations entered into the system.482 Precedent management 
attempts to support the reuse of decision graphs in latter problem solving.483 
DRL and QOC are in some respects similar and according to MacLean, the 
main difference between the two systems is the increased number of nodes that 
exist in DRL. However, to conflate a mere difference in number of nodes with a 
similarity between the systems is misrepresentative. The focus of reasoning in 
DRL is quite different to that in QOC. DRL focuses reasoning on very different 
objects than does QOC and focuses reasoning into smaller fragments. 
According to Lee, the major difference between IBIS and DRL is that IBIS does 
478 Ibid. 118-22. 
479 Ibid. 122-4. 
480 Ibid. 124-6. 
481 Ibid. 118. 
482 Ibid. 120. 
483 One problem in precedent management is determining when a problem relates to common 
goals. Lee states that simply matching the names used to describe goals is insufficient since 
goals can be differently described and instead suggests providing a taxonomy of goals from 
which users can select when constructing decision graphs: ibid. 126. The similarity is 
notable between this suggestion and the use of a taxonomy of beliefs in Argnoter and 
indeed, fields for Warrants in Toulmin's scheme. The possibility of each remains 
questionable. 
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not contain the equivalent of the Goal contained in DRL.484 Other differences 
are that unlike DRL, IBIS allows the creation of arbitrary link and node types. 
Moreover, IBIS does not allow argument about links themselves. In IBIS it is 
not possible to directly discuss or argue about whether links themselves are 
appropriate. For example it is not possible to directly dispute whether an 
Argument connected to another with a Supports link really does provide 
support. 
Perhaps the major difference between SIBYL and both QOC and IBIS is that 
while the latter two focus on the presentation of objects, SIBYL focus on the 
automated service that can be provided with a representation. 485 
5.3.5 Convince Me 
'Convince Me' is described as a 'domain-independent computational 'reasoner's 
workbench'. 486 Like Belvedere, Convince Me is designed to support students 
reasonmg about science problems. Convince Me is based around a simple 
'Evidence' and 'Hypothesis' representation in which evidence and hypothesis 
can support or contradict each other. There is nothing striking in this 
representation. 
484 Ibid. 128. However, the Goal node is used in DRL multiple ways -when used as a general 
question is largely corresponds the IBIS Issue node. IBIS does not contain an equivalent to 
the use of a Goal node to state a criteria. 
485 E.g. the management of the dependency among objects: ibid 129. For a detailed discussion 
of and comparison between IBIS, QOC and DRL see: Stumpf, above n. 468. 
486 Schank, P., Ranney, M., 'Improved Reasoning with Convince Me' p. 276, in Proceedings of 
CHI'95 (1995) ACM Press; Ranney, M., Schank, P., 'Toward an Integration of the Social 
and Scientific: Observing, Modelling, and Promoting the Explanatory Coherence of 
Reasoning' in Read, S. and Miller, L. (Eds) Connectionist and PDP models of social 
reasoning (1998) Lawrence Erlbaum. 
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The innovative aspect of Convince Me however, is that it includes a model of 
'explanatory coherence'. 487 This model proposes that statements are more 
acceptable to the degree that they are believed, that they are self-consistent and 
to the degree that they are not contradicted. In Convince Me, users can assign 
'weights' to Evidence and Hypothesis to indicate how strongly they believe or 
disbelieve each statement. To this extent, Convince Me is similar to 
ReasonAble! However, Convince Me's model of explanatory coherence enables 
the system to itself calculate weights for each statement, which indicate the 
support for each statement. 
Convince Me's authors suggest that by reflecting on the differences between 
weights self-assigned to statements, and those generated by the system, students 
can refine their beliefs and understanding of a subject. Schank and Ranney 
have conducted experiments that ostensibly illustrate improved learning in 
students who use Convince Me.488 
Interestingly, one of the original applications used to illustrate the operation of 
the theory of explanatory coherence was a murder trial. 489 Thagard attempted 
to diagram the evidence and claims presented during trial and thereby 
calculate the 'strength' of the prosecution case. The precise operation of the 
theory of explanatory coherence is beyond the scope of this examination. 
Suffice to say that its operation critically depends on what statements it is 
chosen to include m a diagram and how it is chosen to connect those 
statements together. The operation of the theory of explanatory coherence 
intrinsically depends on how a problem is represented. Such application does 
show however that the theory of explanatory coherence and systems like 
Convince Me might have wider application than to teaching high school 
sctence. 
487 Thagard, P., 'Explanatory Coherence' (1989) 12 Behavioral and Brain Sciences 435. 
488 Schank and Ranney, above n. 486. 
489 Thagard, above n. 487. 
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5.3.6 Combined representation systems 
Different representations facilitate different aspects of reasoning. In an attempt 
to overcome the limitations of any particular representation, researchers 
attempt to combine representations, for example, allowing users to brainstorm 
ideas and then to restructure those ideas in terms of a more structured 
representation. Attempts are also made to combine structured representation 
systems themselves; for example, DRAMA is a program that utilises a 
representation integrating elements from IBIS and DRL.490 Several authors 
have noted the split highlighted here between systems that primarily represent 
argument and those that primarily represent reasoning. On the one hand, 
systems such as Toulmin's represent the 'micro-structure' of arguments and on 
the other hand, systems such as IBIS, QOC and DRL represent wider aspects of 
reasomng. Researchers have sought to combine mtcro and macro 
representation schemes in order to provide richer systems. 
Several systems combine Toulmin's scheme with the IBIS representation of 
problem solving. For example, SEPIA is a 'hypermedia' authoring environment 
that is designed to facilitate the collaborative creation of documents. 491 SEPIA 
provides a 'planning space' in which authors can externalise plans and goals 
and establish an agenda for document creation - this provides coordination for 
collaborative document creation.492 The IBIS representation is used to structure 
this space. In addition, SEPIA provides an 'argumentation space' which 
facilitates the elaboration of the argumentative structure underlying a 
document. Toulmin structures are used to structure this space. However, while 
490 http://www.enviros.com/index/softw/drama/ 
491 Streitz, N., Haake, J.M., Hanneman, J., Lemke, A., Schuler, W., Schiitt, H. and Thiiring, 
M., 'SEPIA: A Cooperative Hypermedia Authoring Environment' p. 11, in Proceedings of 
ECHT ( 1 992) ACM Press. 
492 Ibid. 
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both IBIS and Toulmin structures are used, there is no coordination between 
them, both spaces remain separate and distinct. 
Author's Argumentation Assistant (AAA) is another tool designed to support the 
writing process.493 Like SEPIA, AAA integrates the IBIS problem structuring 
representation with Toulmin's argument representation scheme.494 However, 
AAA contains several additional nodes and links, such as a 'Fact' node type, 
which can link to all node types, an 'Answer' link indicating that a position 
answers an issue and 'Contributes' indicating that a position or argument 
contributes to another position or argument. 495 In addition, new types of links 
and nodes can be defined,496 as can schemas, which are collections of nodes. 497 
Unlike SEPIA, AAA integrates the IBIS and Toulmin representations into a 
single representation.498 Despite the representational differences, SEPIA and 
AAA are designed for similar uses. 499 
An interesting aspect of AAA ts that it has separate Argumentative and 
Rhetorical modes. 500 While the argumentative mode is used for constructing 
and organising arguments, the rhetorical mode enables the author to organise 
the issue and argumentative structures that are created and to arrange them 
493 Schuler, W., Smith, J., 'Author's Argumentation Assistant (AAA): A Hypertext-Based 
Authoring Tool for Argumentative Texts' p. 137, in Rizk, A., Streitz, N., and Andre, J. 
(eds.) Hypertext: Concepts, Systems and Applications (1990) Cambridge University Press. 
494 Ibid. 140. 
495 Ibid. 143. 
496 Ibid. 146-8. 
497 Ibid. 148. These are reminiscent of the argument forms in ARL. Here however, schemas 
are not used as the basis of automated reasoning and so are perhaps more valuable. 
498 However, both schemes are altered during this integration, for details: ibid. 144-5. 
499 The systems differ in several ways however. For example, while SEPIA is designed for 
collaborative authoring, AAA is designed for the individual author. While SEPIA supports 
hypermedia documents, AAA is limited to text documents. 
500 Schuler and Smith, above n. 493, 145. 
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according to his or her rhetorical objectives and principles. 501 In rhetorical 
mode, argumentation structures can be spatially reorganised and atmotated. 
AAA envisages writing as a linear movement commencing with argumentation, 
moving to rhetorical organisation and then to final text production.502 
5.4 Review of systems in law 
This subsection focuses on systems that have been built for use in law. 
Intriguingly, the evidence theorist Wigmore performed pioneering work on 
diagrammatic evidence analysis - long before the benefits of the diagrammatic 
analysis of argument and reasoning became widely accepted. Wigmore's work is 
examined below. However, there remain few systems in law for diagramming 
argument or reasoning and apart from Wigmore's groundbreaking work, these 
systems are based on the systems previously examined. 
This subsection examines diagrammatic oriented computer systems that have 
been constructed to support legal argument and legal reasoning. While much 
work has been undertaken on argumentation in law, on computer models of 
legal argument, and on computer-based models of legal reasoning, for the 
reasons discussed earlier, this work is not examined here.503 This review focuses 
solely on systems in which the visual presentation of argument or reasoning is a 
priority. 
5.4.1 Wigmore on evidence analysis 
In 1913, Wigmore proposed a new and innovative method for evidence 
analysis. Wigmore's method is straightforward and revolves around 'charting' 
501 Ibid. 
502 Ibid. 149. 
503 The adequacy or otherwise of these frameworks as frameworks for legal argument is a 
separate topic to that examined here. In addition to focusing on representation this work is 
concerned with reasoning wider than argument. 
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the structure of the evidential elements that constitute a proof. For this 
purpose, Wigmore proposed various conventions for constructing and 
structuring diagrams in order to best represent this evidence. 
In developing his method, Wigmore apparently had two goals. First, he stated 
a desire to turn the process of proof into a 'science' - to discover the 'principles 
of proof.'504 Secondly, he wanted to provide a better method for understanding 
evidence. Whatever is made of the first goal, 505 the arguments for a more lucid 
presentation of information are as valid as when originally proposed. 
Wigmore's method is an examination of techniques for structuring evidence to 
best prove a proposition and to aid understanding of chains of proof. 
Central to Wigmore's work is his vtew that it is important to provide 
information about the proof presented in a case in a form in which it can be 
easily understood. He argued that: 
to the extent that the mind is unable to juxtapose consciously a larger 
number of ideas, each coherent group of detailed constituent ideas must 
be reduced in consciousness to a single idea; until the mind can 
consciously juxtapose them with due attention to each, so as to produce 
its single final idea. 506 
This has clear parallels with recent work on external representations and 
diagrammatic representations. 
504 Wigmore, J.H., 'The Problem of Proof (1 913) VIII(2) Illinois Law Review 77. 
505 It is unclear precisely what Wigmore envisaged in a 'scientific' method of proof, however, 
this goal must be understood in light of his statements that his charting scheme was not 
designed to specifY what 'ought logically to be our belief - an impossibility according to 
Wigmore as logic had not yet established such laws: ibid. 82-3. 
506 Ibid. 80. 
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To 'enable all the data to be lifted into the consciousness at once'507 Wigmore 
devised a detailed system of symbols and relations aimed at classifYing all the 
kinds of evidence that could be presented in a case, and the kinds of 
assessments that could be made about that evidence. Figure 55 provides 
examples of these evidence symbols. 
D 
n 
0 
Testimonial evidence affirrnatory (M 
testifies that defendant had the knife). 
Testimonial evidence negatory (M testifies 
that defendant did not have the knife). 
Circumstantial evidence affmnatory (knife was picked 
up where defendant was; hence, defendant had it). 
Circumstantial evidence negatory (knife was found in 
deceased's hand; hence, defendant did not have it). 
Figure 55: Wigmore's evidence symbols 
In total, Wigmore's system incorporated 14 types of evidence (with associated 
symbols) classifYing testimonial evidence, circumstantial evidence as well as 
evidence offered by the defendant, evidence offered by the prosecution, facts 
known as general knowledge, facts presented to the tribunal's own senses, and 
explanatory evidence and corroborative evidence offered by either party. 
Relations between p1eces of evidence were indicated by their spatial 
arrangement in a diagram m relation to each other, and with the use of 
symbols to connect them. Figure 56 shows two of the ten basic relational 
symbols that Wigmore proposed. 
507 Ibid. 82. 
+ Provisional credit given to affirrnatory 
I evidence, testimonial or circumstantial, is 
shown by adding an arrow-head 
Provisional credit given to negatory evidence, 
testimonial or circumstantial, is shown by 
adding an arrow-head above a small cipher. 
Figure 56: Wigmore's assessment symbols 
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Further symbols could be used to express, amongst other things, strong credit, 
doubt, belief, and strong belief. Thus: 
A supposed fact tending to prove the existence of another fact is placed 
below it. 
A supposed explanatory or corroborative fact, tending to lessen or to 
strengthen the force of a fact thus proved, is placed to the left or right of 
it, respectively. 
A single straight line (continued at a right angle, if necessary) indicates 
the supposed relation of one fact to another.508 
Wigmore illustrated the use of his system with various examples, building up 
complex diagrams. Figure 57 illustrates part of an evidence chart created by 
Wigmore. 
508 Ibid. 85. 
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? 
33 U. had uneasy consciousness of guilt about J.' s disappearance. 
34 U. lied about J.' s going to Gran by. 
35 U. said J. had gone there, though J. was dead. 
36 Anon. witness to this. 
37 J. might really have gone there, not being killed till later. 
38 U. was conscious that the well was a place where damaging 
things would be discovered. 
42 U.lied about the reason for Olds and K. searching the well. 
43 Anon. witness to this. 
47 U. knew that J. was dead, though others did not. 
j 
48 He gave away J.' s boots and said that J. would not come back; 
this was about the middle of January. 
49 Anon. witness thereto. 
50 Like others, U. may merely have believed that J. had given up 
work at the farm. 
Figure 57: A Wigmore chart for Commonwealth v Umilian509 
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In an extended examination of evidence analysis methods, Anderson and 
Twining state that the Wigmore's method is the 'most rigorous and 
comprehensive' of methods available. 510 They point to two key benefits of 
509 Ibid. 93. This diagram is included simply to illustrate the general style of Wigmore 
diagrams and it is not possible to fully interpret without all the associated evidence and 
relation symbols. 
510 Anderson, T., Twining, W., Analysis of Evidence (1991) Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 106. 
214 
Wigmorean analysis. First, such analysis highlights the structure of argument; it 
creates an awareness of the steps in evidential proof that are typically glossed 
over or left implicit and by making such steps explicit it makes it easier to judge 
the soundness and probative force of arguments. 511 Secondly, the method 
forces taking facts seriously, it forces a rigorous and coherent connection 
between the controlling propositions of law and the actual data. 512 In short, the 
method forces precision and promotes rigorous analysis.513 
Although a handful of researchers endorse Wigmorean analysis,514 Wigmore's 
proposals have not proved widely popular. Twining and Anderson, speculate 
two reasons for this. First 'Wigmore failed to develop fully the uses and 
limitations of the chart method as a practical tool.'515 Secondly, the sheer 
complexity of the method has proved daunting: 
In our experience, resistance to learning these symbols is a significant 
obstacle to mastering the basic techniques ofWigmorean analysis.516 
Twining and Myers seek to address the first reason through a detailed analysis 
and demonstration of the method. In order to reduce the complexity of 
learning and using Wigmore's method, Anderson and T~ining simplifY the 
number of symbols used- from twenty-five, to eight.517 However, Anderson and 
511 Ibid. 119. 
512 Ibid. 
513 Ibid. 142-3. 
514 Tillers, P., Schum, D, 'Charting New Territory in judicial Proof: Beyond Wigmore' (1988) 9 
Cardozo Law Review 907; Robertson, B., Vignaux, G.A., 'Taking Fact Analysis Seriously' 
(1993) 91 Michigan Law Review 1142. Hosking has used a Wigmore like notation as the 
basis of a legal information retrieval system: Hosking, above n. 409. However, as Anderson 
and Twining note that 'no two masters of the method are likely to produce identical charts 
for the same case' this casts doubt on the possibility of using such complex representations 
for information retrieval as envisaged by Hosking: Tillers and Schum ibid. 131. 
515 Anderson and Twining, above n. 510, 106. 
516 Ibid. 107. 
517 Ibid. 144ff. 
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Twining do not discuss how computer support might alleviate the 'considerable 
effort required to draw and revise' charts518 or indeed change charting itself. 519 
The differences are interesting between Wigmore's method for representing 
assessments of legal evidence, Toulmin's argument analysis scheme and 
schemes to represent reasoning such as DRL and IBIS. Essentially, Wigmore's 
system is highly specialised and strongly tailored specifically for evidence 
analysis. The representation thus does not provide means to express 
assessments about many aspects of argumentation, nor ways to diagram and 
structure wider aspects of reasoning. As previously discussed, the ability to 
diagram both things is often useful. Several systems have been proposed to 
diagram such aspects of reasoning. 
5.4.2 Toulmin based systems 
Toulmin's model of argument, and computer systems built around this system, 
were described above.520 Several computer systems that utilise Toulmin 
structures have been built in law. Most of this work has utilized Toulmin 
structures within an artificial intelligence paradigm - in order to provide more 
robust expert systems,521 or as the basis for models of automated argument.522 
518 Ibid. 153. 
519 When charting evidence, Wigmore advises to examine all the proof and all the propositions 
to be proved and after considering their interrelations, to then commence charting. The 
effort in creating charts that Anderson and Twining allude to, arises when propositions for 
a chart have been decided upon and graphically arranged, but latter need to be revised. 
Anderson and Twining do not appreciate that computer support, which would allow the 
interactive charting of evidence and propositions, would also likely change charting itself by 
making it a more fluid process. Similarly, computer support would remove the need for 
separate 'key lists' and hence improve the clarity of charts. 
520 Respectively, see: 4.4 and 5.2.2. 
521 Stranieri, Gawler and Zeleznikow, above n. 303; Zeleznikow, J., Stranieri, A. and Gawler, 
M., 'Project Report: Split-Up- A Legal Expert System which Determines Property Division 
upon Divorce' (1996) 3(4) Artificial Intelligence and Law 267. 
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Dick has used Toulmin structures to encode information as the basis for 
information retrieval. 523 The focus m this work has been on automation. 
Toulmin structures have however, also been used as the basis for systems that 
augment argument construction and that augment legal education. 
Significant early work on argument augmentation utilised Toulmin structures 
as the basis for computer tools. N ewman and Marshall created a system, 
'Aquanet', to support the formulation, organization, and presentation of 
arguments. 524 Representing legal argument was an important test of Aquanet's 
benefits. 525 Aquanet provided. a graphical workspace with which users could 
construct diagrams of the arguments presented in legal proceedings. Using 
Aquanet, N ewman and Mar shall analysed various United States Supreme Court 
cases and attempted to use Toulmin's scheme to represent aspects of the oral 
arguments presented in the cases. Using Toulmin's scheme in this way proved 
problematic. 526 Notably as well as highlighting problems with Toulmin's 
representational scheme itself, N ewman and Marshall also note the need for 
representational structures with which to organize reasoning. 527 In particular, 
they discuss the value of using IBIS or DRL extensions. One such system, 
discussed below, has been constructed in law. 
522 Freeman and Farley, above n. 303. 
523 Dick, above n. 303. This work is very similar to that of Hosking the difference being the 
representation scheme used, see: Hosking, above n. 409. The limitations in Hosking's work 
apply equally to Dick's work, and problems with identifYing appropriate Toulmin structures 
with which to encode an argument (see 4.4.1 for a discussion of these problems) apply, 
mutatis mutandis, to the work of Hosking. 
524 Marshall, Halasz and Rogers, above n. 303. 
525 Marshall, C.C., 'Representing the Structure of a Legal Argument' p. 121, in The Second 
International Conference on Artificial Intelligence and Law: Proceedings of the Conference 
(1989) ACM Press; Newman and Marshall, above n. 314. 
526 For a discussion of the problems with Toulmin's scheme and problems encountered by 
Newman and Marshall, see: 4.4.1. 
527 N ewman and Marshall, above n. 314, 33-5. 
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Systems to teach legal argument have also been constructed based on 
Toulmin's representation scheme. Bench-Capon et al. propose a system that 
uses Toulmin structures to support training in the skills of legal argument.528 
Bench-Capon et al.'s proposal is for a system that would structure 
argumentation conducted between two students. Each student would input their 
argument into the system, indicating, for example, whether they were making a 
claim, providing data for a claim, providing a warrant for one of their previous 
arguments or challenging one of the other student's arguments. The system 
would mediate the argument between two students by managing the dialogue 
between them - keeping track of which statements had been challenged, which 
statements had been accepted and which statements remained as yet 
unconsidered. Although a prototype system has been built, this prototype does 
not support the graphical construction or manipulation of the argument. 529 
Work by Carr and Hair tentatively supports the benefit of creating such systems 
to help teach the skills of legal argument. 530 
Loui et al. have also constructed an interesting system based on Toulmin's 
representation scheme.531 Room 5 is designed to support public argument 
about topics. The system runs over the World Wide Web and the public can 
access the system, review arguments already in the system and enter new 
arguments into the system. Room 5 is an interesting parallel to discussion 
systems such as HyperNews used in the OpenLaw project. 532 Apart from being 
an interesting idea, Room 5 is notable for the visual representation of 
528 Bench-Capon, T.J.M., Leng, P.H. and Staniford, G., 'A Computer Supported Environment 
for the Teaching of Legal Argument' (1998) 3 The Journal of Information, Law and 
Technology. Available at http://www.law.warwick.ac.uk/jilt/98-3/capon.html (accessed 
1!4/2001). 
529 This is however, an extension that the authors discuss. 
530 See the discussion of this work above at p. 97. 
531 Loui et al., above n. 303. 
532 See: 5.3.1.1. 
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arguments that it uses. Unlike other systems based on Touhnin structures, 
Room 5 uses a matrix layout for arguments. 
Figure 58: Matrix layout ofToulmin structures in Room 5 
In this matrix presentation, argument support is indicated not by a connecting 
arrow, but by 'encapsulation'. A supporting statement is contained in the 'box' 
provided by the supported statement. Similarly, a counterargument is placed 
beside the argument that it contradicts. In addition, statements are coloured 
according to which party in the dispute made the statement. The use of 
encapsulation rather than arrows to indicate argumentative relationships is said 
to avoid the 'pointer spaghetti' that can affect network-based representations.533 
This matrix presentation of Toulmin representations highlights an aspect of 
diagrammatic representations that has been glossed over thus far 
m Loui et al., above n. 303, 209. 'Pointer spaghetti' is a phrase used in computer supported 
cooperative work when there are so many boxes and links that structure becomes difficult to 
distinguish and the screen resembles a tangled mass of spaghetti. 
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diagrammatic representations involve both an underlying representational 
vocabulary that shapes their use, and a visual presentation which itself 
influences representational comprehension. Thus, while matrix presentations 
might avoid pointer spaghetti, they can have other affects on representational 
use. 534 The following chapter examines in more detail the visual aspect of 
representations. 
5.4.3 Statutor 
Statutor is another system developed for teaching in law.535 Unlike the teaching 
systems based on Toulmin's representational scheme however, Statutor is based 
on a simple claim-supports-conclusion model. Statutor is designed to teach 
students about substantive elements of legislation. To this end, in Statutor 
students must construct a 'proof tree' that connects facts and propositions of 
law together in order to prove an ultimate proposition. When using Statutor to 
teach students to solve problems, students are visually presented with the 
conclusion to be established, as well as a selection of factual statements 
concerning the problem. Students must choose from amongst these factual 
statements and construct a 'proof tree' that supports the conclusion that must 
be established (figure 59). 
534 Suthers is one of the few system designers to explicitly note the importance of visual 
presentation on representational use: Suthers and Weiner, above n. 394. However, the lack 
of work in this area restricts Suthers to concluding that this is a topic for future research. 
535 Hegarty, C., Routen, T., 'Statutor: Intelligent Tutoring System?' in BILETA '96 Conference 
Proceedings (1996) The Journal of Information, Law and Technology (JILT). 
Available at http://elj.warwick.ac. uk/jilt/BILET NI 996/3hegarty/default.htm/ ( accessed 
3/4/2001) 
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Figure 59: Proof tree constructed in Statutor536 
As indicated in figure 59, the statements constituting a proof can be connected 
with an arc in order to indicate that they conjointly support the conclusion -
that the argument is linked. Arguments not joined in this way are convergent. 
Similarly, the reason a statement supports a conclusion can be indicated on the 
link connecting the two. The system can provide limited feedback on proof 
trees that students construct. 537 
Statutor is interesting for the specific context that it operates in, because its 
creators report very positive student comment on the graphical presentation of 
the arguments, and because its creators suggest that Statutor improved 
students' 'logical perception' of arguments. 538 
5.4.4 ArguMed 
ArguMed is an argument assistance system developed by Verheij. 539 Early 
versions of ArguMed were presented as a useful tool for teaching legal 
536 Adapted from: ibid. 
537 Centinia, F., Routen, T., Hartmann, A. and Hegarty, C., 'STATUTOR: Too intelligent by 
half?' p. 121, in Hage, J.C., Bench-Capon, T.J.M., Cohen, M.J., and van den Herik, H.J. 
(eds.) Legal knowledge based systems JURlX '95: Telecommunication and AI & Law (1995) 
Koninklije Vermande. 
538 Ibid. 129. 
539 Verheij, B., 'Automated argument assistance for lawyers' p. 43, in Proceedings of the 
Seventh International Conference on Artificial Intelligence and Law ( 1 999) ACM Press. 
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argument, however, difficulties were noted with this. 540 ArguMed is presented as 
the basis for a system to provide automated argument assistance to lawyers. 
ArguMed uses an argument structure similar to that in Toulmin in which 
reasons support conclusions and where links between reasons and conclusions 
must be warranted (if challenged). 
? ArguMed is an interesting program. 
! ArguMed supports the graphical construction of argument. 
Figure 60: The most basic possible argument in ArguMed 
The precise details of the theory of argument which ArguMed embodies will not 
be discussed here. For present purposes, it is sufficient to indicate that this is a 
strict representation of argument based on 'Reasons', 'Conclusions' and 
'Warrants' and does not attempt to represent wider aspects of reasoning. 
ArguMed however, embodies a formal defmition of argument, which allows it to 
calculate the status of statements. As statements are challenged and as new 
statements are added, the system simultaneously displays the status of 
arguments higher in the argument chain. 541 
5.4.5 GeoMed 
GeoMed was created as part of a long-running research project on computer-
based argumentation and was created as a: 
ArguMed is a successor to Argue!: Lodder, A.R., Verheij, B., 'Computer-Mediated Legal 
Argument: Towards new Opportunities in Education' (1999) 2 The Iournal of Information, 
Law and Technology. Available at http://www.law.warwick.ac.uk/jilt/99-2/lodder.html 
(accessed 15/3/200 1). 
540 Lodder and Verheij, ibid. Verheij says the user interface was too unfamiliar for intended 
users and that the argumentation theory was not sufficiently transparent: Verheij, ibid 44. 
Argue! itself implemented a theory of argument called Cumu!A: Lodder and Verheij, ibid. 
This emphasises how the theory of argument must be separated from its presentation. 
541 For further details, see: Verheij, above n. 539. 
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mediation system for the World Wide Web, which shall enable public 
review procedures in a way which is more efficient, transparent, fair and, 
it is hoped, democratic than current practice. 542 
To this end, GeoMed implements a version of the IBIS representation of 
problem solving. However, the IBIS method is modified to allow argument that 
is more detailed. As originally presented, IBIS only allowed pro and con 
arguments about Positions. In addition, GeoMed allows pro and con arguments 
about other arguments. This allows more debate to occur within the system. 
Like ArguMed, GeoMed also implements a formal model of argument, which 
allows the system to calculate and display the status of arguments. 543 With this 
formal model of argument, GeoMed can be used to make simple inferences 
about the quality of the alternative positions for an issue. 
5.5 Discussion 
The previous chapter examined methods to diagram argument and reasoning 
and argued that central to methods for diagramming argument and reasoning 
is the representation on which the method is based. This chapter reviewed 
numerous computer systems that have been constructed to augment argument 
and reasoning, both specifically in law, and more generally. 
One of the most conspicuous aspects of all these systems is their diversity - in 
particular the diversity amongst the representations upon which each is 
founded. While there is some commonality in systems that seek to support 
argumentation, even here the difference in representations is striking. Given 
however, that representations channel argument and reasoning by highlighting 
and occluding different aspects of argument and reasoning, it is essential that a 
representation be appropriate for the use to which it is put. System designers 
542 Cordon, T.F., Karacapilidis, N., 'The Zeno Argumentation Framework' p. 10, in The Sixth 
International Conference on Artificial Intelligence and Law: Proceedings of The 
Conference ( 1 997) ACM Press. 
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however, rarely explicitly discuss the importance of 'representational fit'. 
Without such discussion it is difficult to assess the adequacy of any particular 
system. The following chapter examines theories of representation for insight 
they might provide into the choice and design of appropriate representations 
to support argumentation and reasoning. 
543 For details: ibid. 
224 
6 Legal Sensemaking Support Systems 
If all you have is a hammer, then everything looks like a nail. 
Anonymous 
6. 1 Introduction 
The centrality of representations in the construction of computer systems in law 
has been emphasised throughout this work. People have, often intuitive, 
representations of the area in which they work. Computers operate using 
explicit representations of a domain in which they operate. Chapters 4 and 5 
examined various representations of argument and reasoning which 
researchers argue can support sensemaking. These representations may be 
useful for supporting legal argument and legal reasoning. However, one 
striking aspect of these representations is their diversity. Given this diversity, 
some means is necessary to choose amongst representations. This chapter 
examines whether, and if so how, a principled choice might be made between 
representations that are useful for legal sensemaking. 
An important aspect of diagrammatic representations, thus far not emphasised, 
is their visual presentation. Psychological literature indicates that visualisations 
are important and influential in sensemaking. Just as representations affect 
sensemaking, the visualisation of a representation can also affect 
representational use, and hence sensemaking. Work on argument support and 
reasoning support systems typically does not discuss the choice behind a 
particular visualisation. This chapter examines whether a principled choice can 
be made amongst representations and visualisation to support reasoning and 
argument. 
The following subsection analyses two maJOr theoretical approaches to 
analysing representations. It is concluded that while loose guidelines can be 
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provided for evaluating representations, no determinate method exists to 
choose amongst them. The third subsection examines visualisations and 
theories concerning the construction of visualisations. As with representations 
themselves, it is concluded that such theories do not determine how to choose 
amongst possible visualisations. Choosing amongst representations and 
visualisations for those representations retains an element of art. Despite the 
lack of definitive design guidelines, the fourth subsection discusses a class of yet 
largely unexplored legal knowledge-based system - legal sensemaking support 
systems. 
6.2 Representations for sensemaking 
As discussed in chapter 2, a representation is a conceptualisation of a domain -
it is a picture of the objects and concepts that are important in a domain and 
how they interact. Thus a representation of law as rules promotes legal rules as 
the important point of focus and promotes a view of legal reasoning as the 
application of those rules. More generally, representations of law that reuy 
legal objects focus exclusively on those objects. This exclusive focus is to the 
exclusion of other aspects of the legal setting. Most notably, the objectification 
of law ignores the role of the legal thinker. 
This is a general characteristic of representations. Representations only 
represent certain things. Representations represent those things that are part 
of the representation and ignore those things that are not part of the 
representation. Representations highlight those things that are part of the 
representation and, by implication, de-emphasise those things that are not part 
of the representation. Representations filter perception. 
This point ts comparatively straightforward in the context of descriptive, 
natural language, representations of a domain. If a representation needs 
clarification or to be extended, it is simply a matter of describing the 
clarification or of describing an extension. It is different however with external, 
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diagrammatic, representations. While descriptive, natural language, 
representations can leave much implicit, external diagrammatic representations 
are characterised by their explicitness. 
In the most general terms a representation 1s something that stands for 
something else - it is a model of the thing that is represents. This indicates the 
existence of a represented domain and a representing domain and a 
connection between the two. 544 Representations differ in the aspects of a 
domain that are represented, the objects chosen to do the representing and the 
relation between them. 
Represented domain Representing domain 
Figure 61: Representing and represented domains 
In figure 61 for example, the '>' symbol is used to represent '0' and the '/' 
symbol is used to represent 'o'. There is no necessary relationship between 
either of these though, and '>' could instead have been used to represent'([', 
giving a different representation. There is thus a multitude, of possible 
representations, both because the things that can be represented are 
multitudinous and the ways that they can be represented are multitudinous. 
The benefit however, is that by using a system of representation that is clearer 
and simpler than the original domain itself, insight can be gained into that 
represented domain. Hopefully, the system of representation is easier to 
manipulate and conceptualise than the original domain. 
544 Palmer, S.E., 'Fundamental Aspects of Cognitive Representation' p. 259, in Rosch, E. and 
Llyod, B.B. (Eds) Cognition and Categorization (1978) Lawrence Erlbaum. 
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The variability of representations can be seen in systems supporting 
sensemaking through the visualisation of argument and reasoning. The systems 
examined in chapters 4 and 5 highlight the multitude of representations for 
argument and reasoning that exist. The choice of particular representation by 
which to represent sensemaking amounts to choosing a vocabulary through 
which to work and reason. This vocabulary is composed of symbols that are 
used to represent the area being worked on and reasoned about. The 
representation that is used in a system underlies the things that can be done 
with that system. At a broad level, certain things cannot be expressed in certain 
representations. At a more subtle level, certain representations are more 
amenable to certain forms of thinking. Representations direct thinking into 
defined paths. 
Broad classes of representations have been proposed to support creattvtty, 
reasoning, argument and negotiation. However, both the diversity amongst 
representations within each group, and the similarities between representations 
in different groups casts doubt upon the universality of such classifications. 
Given the multiplicity and variety of representations that have been proposed, 
it would be desirable to be able to make a systematic, theoretically underpinned 
choice about the representation that is chosen in any given situation. It would 
be desirable to make a justified choice about what representation is the most 
appropriate in a given situation. This is an issue rarely discussed in 
examinations of computer supported argument and reasoning visualisation. 545 
545 In computing, perhaps the most comprehensive examination of problem representations 
and symbol systems has been undertaken in the fields of cognitive science and artificial 
intelligence. However, subject to the discussion below, these will not be discussed in detail 
here. Cognitive science and artificial intelligence have been overwhelmingly concerned with 
jnternal representatJons. That is, the way information is represented in the mind and the 
processes that operate on these representations. These are important philosophical 
questions. However, they are separate to the question examined here. Only relatively 
recently has cognitive science become interested in external representations. Cognitive 
scientists have proposed various theories in an attempt to explain the usefulness, creation 
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Making such a reasoned choice amongst representations requrres 
understanding more about representation itself. Two influential theories of 
representation are that provide by Goodman and the more recent theory of 
'structure mapping'. Each of these will be analysed in turn. 
6.2.1 Goodman 
Goodman has provided one of the most influential studies of representational 
systems. According to Lee, Goodman has provided the locus classicus of 
comparative study between graphical and linguistic systems, stating that 
Goodman's apparatus has formed the basis for nearly all subsequent 
examinations of the subject. 546 Similarly, Goel states that Goodman's apparatus 
is the most sophisticated yet developed for the study of graphical systems.547 
Goodman's account is interesting not only for its discussion of representations 
in general but also because this discussion was provided in the context of visual 
representation systems. This has clear potential in investigations of visual 
support for sensemaking. In the choice of appropriate representations to 
support legal sensemaking, Goodman may thus provide some guide. 
Goodman was primarily concerned with the nature and function of 
representation in the arts. However, in order to investigate this he developed a 
sophisticated apparatus for examining representations in general. Goodman 
analysed representation in terms of 'symbol systems'. Essentially a symbol 
system consists of a group of symbols - the representing domain - which refer to 
and processing of external representations. This work has in turn spawned work in 
psychology and computing, under the rubric of magrammatic reasoning that examines the 
benefit of and provision of support for reasoning with different external representations. 
546 Lee, J., 'Words and pictures- Goodman revisited' (1998) Paper presented at workshop on 
Visual Representations and Interpretations 1998, University of Liverpool, hereafter Lee 
'Goodman revisited'. 
547 Goel, V., Sketches ofThought (1995) MIT Press, 18. 
229 
another domain - the represented domain (see figure 61). 548 Goodman 
discussed the characteristics of symbol systems in detail and provided five 
criteria with which to analyse symbol systems: 
1. symbols of the same type must be interchangeable with each other - they 
must be 'indifferent'. 549 
2. the symbols must be 'articulate' - it must be possible to distinguish the 
symbols from each other.550 
3. the fragment of the represented domain referred to by a symbol must.be 
'unambiguous'551 -the symbol must always refer to the same fragment of 
the represented domain. 
4. the aspects of the represented domain referred to by symbols must be 
'disjoint'552 - symbols cannot refer to the same part of the represented 
domain. 
5. the system as a whole must be 'semantically differentiable' in that for 
every part of the represented domain it must be possible to determine 
whether it is referred to by a symbol. 553 
The first two of these criteria specifY properties of the representing domain. 
For present purposes, nothing is lost in simply saying that the representing 
domain must consist of symbols. 554 In the systems examined in this work it is 
not distinguishing symbols which is difficult, but distinguishing what those 
symbols refer to. 
548 Goodman called these the 'symbol scheme' and 'field of reference' respectively: Goodman, 
N., Languages of Art: An approach to a theory of symbols (1976) Hackett Publishing 
Company. 
549 Ibid. 132. 
550 Ibid. 135-7. 
551 Ibid. 148. 
552 Ibid. 150. 
553 Ibid. 152. 
554 These two of Goodman's criteria aim to determine if symbols do in fact exist. 
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Essentially, Goodman specifies baseline criteria for the existence of clear 
symbol systems. As Goodman discusses, symbol systems that satisfY these five 
requirements are, essentially, more precise than those that do not meet the 
requirements. 555 
Goodman applied this framework to analysing numerous representational 
systems, from musical scores, to architectural drawings, to paintings, to natural 
languages such as English. Notably, the apparatus does not distinguish between 
visual and other representations. Given this apparently wide applicability, the 
apparatus would thus appear suitable for exammmg diagrammatic 
representations to support legal sensemaking. The apparatus suggests a means 
to select amongst diagrammatic representations to support sensemaking and 
moreover, criteria for the design of diagrams to support sensemaking. 
Representations could apparently be selected and designed so as maximise 
their precision and clarity. Representations that do not meet the five 
requirements could be rejected in favour of those that do, or modified to 
comply. 
6.2.2 Difficulties with Goodman's apparatus 
Unfortunately, there are several difficulties with attempting to use Goodman's 
apparatus as a basis for designing diagrammatic representations to support 
legal sensemaking. Notably, relatively few representations meet all of 
Goodman's requirements. For example, natural languages do not meet all the 
criteria. This suggests a strictness in the criteria. The criteria apparently sift out 
systems that are nevertheless extremely useful. Although few representations 
satisfY all the criteria, however, Goodman's analysis may still be a useful 
framework with which to examine representations. 
555 Under Goodman's apparatus, the maJor distinction is between notational and non-
notational symbol systems. The attractive property of notational symbol systems is that they 
are semantically precise. 
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A second concern apparent with Goodman's apparatus is that it does not 
explicitly discuss visual representations. While the criteria can be used to 
examine visual representations, the criteria have little to say about what, if 
anything, makes visual representations unique and beneficial. Goodman was 
concerned to provide a broad theoretical examination of representation and 
representations. He was not concerned to provide examinations of specific 
'types' of representation. As Goodman states, the apparatus is not designed to 
ensure a good vocabulary for a given task. 556 Thus: 
a good many other features that might be thought essential are not 
covered either. No requirement of a manageably small or even finite set 
of atomic characters, no requirement of clarity, of legibility, ... of ease of 
writing or reading, of graphic suggestiveness of mnemonic efficacy, 
has been imposed. 557 
Given both the strictness in the apparatus and the lack of specific examination 
of visual representations, the criteria might at most be a minimal foundation 
for assessing diagrammatic representations to support legal sensemaking. The 
criteria might specifY a very broad first sort of possible representations that 
would then need to be distinguished on other grounds. 
Most problematic is the argument that Goodman's apparatus is not adequate to 
distinguish between representations at all. Simply, Lee argues that without 
background knowledge it is not possible to either unambiguously determine 
what amount to symbols within a system, nor to determine to what they refer. 558 
In essence, Lee argues that while Goodman requires that aspects of the 
representing domain and the represented domain be differentiated, Goodman 
provides no indication as to how this differentiation occurs. There are many 
556 Ibid. 154. 
557 Ibid. 
558 Lee 'Good man revisited', above n. 546 ,'Symbol systems in use'. 
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ways of looking at any represented domain, many perspectives that can be 
taken, but which perspective should be taken is not something that the 
apparatus addresses. In the representing domain, there are many ways to refer 
to a represented domain, but which of these should be adopted is not 
something that the apparatus addresses. According to Lee, problems with 
Goodman's apparatus can only be addressed by examining the 'reality of 
practice'559 i.e. the way symbols are actually used. This is certainly not a criticism 
of Goodman, only an indication of further limits on what can be hoped for 
from the apparatus. 560 Given a represented domain and symbols to refer to it, 
the apparatus can broadly indicate how reference should be structured. 
However, the apparatus can do no more than this. The apparatus cannot 
indicate what the representing domain should be, or what the represented 
domain should be, or how the representing and represented domains should 
be divided. 
6.2.3 Structure mapping 
While Goodman's examination may be the locus classicus of work on 
representation, concerns with the ability of the framework to fully explain the 
nature of representation have motivated much further work. Prominent 
amongst these is the concept of structure mapping of which various researchers 
stress the importance. The joint work of Gurr, Lee and Stenning is a good 
example of this. 561 
Lee argues that Goodman's apparatus ts insufficient to determine 
representation and that rather than the five criteria provided by Goodman, the 
559 Ibid. 
560 Although Goodman himself anticipated these, acknowledging the role of context m 
determining what amounts to the symbols of a system: Goodman, above n. 548, 138-9. 
561 For an examination of theories of representation, and a more detailed examination of 
theories that employ the idea of structure mapping and differences between them, see: 
Shimojima, above n. 254. 
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key criteria is that the representation be 'systematic'. 562 Lee expands this idea 
stating that all formal representations and notations are based on 'structure-
mappings' that preserve 'higher-order' properties in a represented domain. 563 
In the context of diagrams, this means that the elements that compose a 
diagram must relate to each other in ways that reflect the relationships in the 
represented domain. Venn diagrams are said to illustrate this. Venn diagrams 
are used to illustrate set relationships in mathematics and are illustrative of 
'structure mapping' because mathematical set inclusion is mapped to spatial 
inclusion in the diagrams. Set inclusion is a higher-order property because it 
refers to a relationship between objects- sets- in the represented domain. Venn 
diagrams provide a systematic mapping because they use spatial inclusion, a 
higher-order relationship between objects of the representing domain, to 
represent set inclusion. This is discussed in more detail below. Systematicity 
appears a powerful criterion for specifYing representations. 
The major issue for representations then is how to ensure systematicity.564 Gurr, 
Lee and Stenning propose four criteria to enhance systematicity - diagrams 
should be: 
1. lucid; 
2. sound; 
3. laconic; and 
4. complete. 565 
A lucid representation is one in which a symbol in a representation represents 
at most one object in the represented domain. A non-lucid representation is 
562 Lee 'Goodman revisited', above n. 546. 
563 Ibid. 
564 Gurr, C., Lee, J. and Stenning, K., 'Theories of Diagrammatic Reasoning: Distinguishing 
Component Problems' (1998) 8 Minds and Machines 533, 551. 
565 Gurr, above n. 253, 333. 
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one in which a symbol in the representation represents more than one object in 
the represented domain. Figure 61 illustrates a lucid representation. 566 
A sound representation is one in which every symbol in the representation 
represents at least one object in the represented domain. An unsound 
representation is one in which a symbol does not represent anything in the 
represented domain. Figure 61 does not illustrate a sound representation as'+' 
and'%' are not used to refer to anything. 
A laconic representation is one in which every object is represented by at most 
one symbol in the representation. A non-laconic representation is one in which 
some object in the represented domain is represented more than once. Figure 
61 illustrates a laconic representation. 
A complete representation ts one in which every object in the represented 
domain is represented by at least one symbol in the representation. An 
incomplete representation is one in which some object in the represented 
domain is not represented. Figure 61 does not illustrate a complete 
representation, as two elements of the represented domain are not referred to 
by anything in the representing domain. 
Despite an apparently different focus, it is interesting how similar these criteria 
actually are to Goodman's. Although the requirements are differently 
expressed, the major differences appear to be the requirements of soundness 
and completeness. Thus, a symbol that is not lucid would not be disjoint within 
Goodman's apparatus. Although Goodman did not explicitly require 
laconicism, this is inherent in the requirement that symbols be disjoint. 567 
Goodman's criteria did not enforce soundness and would allow symbols that 
did not represent anything. Goodman's criteria similarly did not enforce 
566 Above p. 226. 
567 Goodman, above n. 548, 151-2. 
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completeness and would allow things to remain unrepresented. In this respect, 
these criteria impose further restrictions on the relationship between 
representing domain and represented domain. While Goodman specified 
criteria to test the clarity of the link between representing domain and 
represented domain, soundness and completeness specifY wider characteristics 
that are desirable for that link. 
Despite criticism of Goodman on the ground that knowledge of context is 
necessary to understand a representation however, the same criticism applies to 
these criteria. There is no way to apply these criteria without wider knowledge -
there is no way to determine what amounts to a systematic representation 
without knowledge of the represented domain and the use of the 
representation. Lee, Gurr and Stenning acknowledge as much, as Gurr states, 
to apply the criteria: 
requires an understanding not only of the domain which the diagram 
represents, but also of the task or purpose for which the representation 
is to be used. 568 
Hence, the notion of systematicity, which the criteria were designed to ensure, 
cannot be definitively specified. For if a representation only acquires a mapping 
by virtue of use in a community for particular ends then the use made of a 
representation in a community must be understood before systematicity can be 
discussed. As Gurr, Lee and Stenning state, the: 
nub of the matter in all cases, however, is that structures of objects and 
relations have to map to structures that are in some suitable sense 
"similar". 569 
This similarity provides a means to interpret diagrams m a sensible way. 
However, this leaves the problem: 
of what counts as similar here. Wherever some properties and so on are 
preserved, some are not. 570 
568 Gurr, above n. 253, 334. 
569 Gurr, Lee and Stenning, above n. 564, 543. 
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Despite Goodman's theory and attempts to use 'structure mapping to clarify it, 
all that can be concluded is that the properties to be preserved and included as 
part of the vocabulary must be those that are relevant to the inferential 
objectives of making the mapping.571 
6.2.4 The need to define use 
Despite all the criteria, again it is knowledge of the context of use that informs 
the quality of a representation. It is this knowledge that informs the 
appropriateness of a particular representation. Both Goodman's criteria and 
systematicity collapse into methods to constrain meaning in a representation. 
However, what a representation should be taken to mean is external to the 
criteria. 
Given the importance of knowledge about the domain a representation will be 
used in and knowledge about the use to which a representation will be put, it is 
surprising that neither Goodman, nor Gurr, Lee and Stenning make choice of 
domain and task an explicit first requirement for representations. Perhaps this 
is because all were primarily interested in the theoretical structure of the link 
between representing and represented domains. 
The importance of explicitly exammmg domain and use when assessmg 
representations is however emphasised by various researchers. For example, in 
discussing external representations Peterson highlights the need for a good 
'task-fit'. 572 Task-fit focuses on the appropriateness of a representation for its 
context of use. As Peterson states, a representation is: 
570 Ibid. 
571 Ibid. 
Created, consulted or manipulated as a means to an end. We may wish 
to manipulate it ... ·to draw inferences of some particular sort . . . to 
572 Peterson, D., 'Introduction' p. 7, in Peterson, D. (Ed) Forms of Representation (1996) 
Intellect Books, 9. 
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develop ideas in an exploratory manner; to land an aeroplane or 
determine a transport schedule; to help us to play, transpose or re-
arrange a piece of music; to show that it constitutes an axiom-set with the 
property of completeness to develop a scientific theory with predictive 
properties; to communicate something to a particular group of people; 
to augment internal working memory; and so on. 573 
In addition to task-fit, Peterson highlights the need for 'ontology-fit' .574 
Ontology-fit focuses on whether the particular features of a domain picked out 
by a representation are appropriate. As Peterson states: 
In order to land an aeroplane we need to consider runways any pylons 
but not the positions of underground gas mains and the boundaries of 
electoral constituencies. 575 
Essentially, Peterson makes express, requirements that are inherent in both 
Goodman's representation and in theories of representation based on the 
requirement of systematicity. 
Together, the necessity of delineating task and ontology can be called the 'use' 
criteria. In contrast, the requirements discussed by Gurr, Lee and Stenning can 
be called the 'link' requirements. 576 
573 Ibid. 
574 Ibid. 
575 Ibid. 
576 Goodman's requirement of indifference and articulate symbols will not be discussed further. 
It is a boundary requirement for symbols to be so called. For clarity of discussion such 
symbols will be assumed. Goodman's requirements that the field of reference indicated by a 
symbol be unambiguous, disjoint and differentiable are covered by Gurr, Lee and 
Stenning's criteria and will be discussed within them. 
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6.2.5 Practical criteria 
While the use criteria and the link criteria focus representational choice, they 
neither individually or jointly ensure representational fit and in addition to the 
use and link criteria researchers often resort to practical criteria for assessing 
representations. Conversely, Goodman's explicit exclusion of practical 
assessments such as legibility, graphic suggestiveness and mnemonic efficacy 
from his representational requirements highlights his interest in the theoretical 
nature of the representational link. In examining Toulmin's structure, Newman 
and Marshall propose four criteria for assessing representations: coverage; 
perspicwiy, 'encodabJlity' and comprehensJbJJity.577 Coverage assesses 'whether 
the phenomena we recogmze as central are captured by the 
representation.'578 This covers the same ground as assessment of ontology-fit. 
Perspicuity examines how well a representation 'delineates and highlights 
salient structural characteristics of the domain.'579 This assessment is related, 
though subtly different to an assessment of coverage. While coverage assesses 
whether the elements of a domain are included in a representation, assessment 
of perspicuity examines how well the representation highlights the relevant 
aspects of the domain. This is not a requirement imposed by the other theories 
of representation examined above. 
Encodability concerns 'how readily and consistently elements' in a field can be 
mapped to elements provided by a representation.580 This is not a requirement 
explicitly imposed by the other theories of representation examined above. 
Goodman's requirements that symbols have invariant, disjoint and 
distinguishable fields of reference is in some part similar to this encodability 
requirement. A representation that did not meet these requirements would not 
be consistent under the encodability requirement, and vice versa. However, 
577 Newman and Marshall, above n. 314, 27. 
578 Ibid. 
579 Ibid. 29. 
580 Ibid. 31. 
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Goodman's criteria have no requirement of 'ready' encodability. The ease or 
difficulty of using a representation is irrelevant to Goodman's criteria, which 
are solely concerned with setting boundary conditions for what amounts to a 
representation. The criteria for assessing representations provided by Gurr, 
Lee and Stenning do not explicitly require ready encodability. Ready 
encodability might be said to be inherent in Peterson's requirement for task 
and ontology fit. If a representation does not allow ready encoding it might be 
said not to be good for its particular task. Essentially, however, this turns on 
how widely the requirements are read. The requirement for task and ontology 
fit could be interpreted as both a theoretical requirement and a practical 
requirement. If the latter, then it overlaps with the requirement for ready 
encodability. The net result though, is that in assessing the practicalities of 
representations, ready encodability is desirable. 
Finally, Newman and Marshall require representations be comprehensible.581 
However, it is unclear precisely what this requirement covers. Newman and 
Marshall state that comprehensibility is used to 'throw into relief aspects of a 
domain that are not highlighted by a representation. 582 Examining those 
aspects of a domain not covered by a representation could undoubtedly be 
beneficial, for example to highlight whether task and ontology choice have 
been appropriately made. Assessing what is not covered by a representation 
could thus lead to reassessment and redesign of the representation. However, 
the converse, assessment of task and ontology fit, which involve choosing what 
is to be represented, inherently involves choosing what is not represented. 
Assessing perspicuity and readiness of encodability can also, peripherally, 
indicate what has been left out of a representation. In this respect, assessment 
of comprehensibility is superfluous. Nevertheless, specifically examining what a 
representation omits, rather than indirectly examining this through focusing 
on what is included in the representation, cannot be detrimental. The purpose 
581 Ibid. 32. 
582 Ibid. 
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here is not to propose orthogonal criteria for what amounts to representations 
in a general sense, only to find useful guidelines for design of representations 
and examination of existing representations. In another sense, examination of 
comprehensibility may be different from examination of task and ontology fit. 
For while a representation selects things to represent, and omits other things, 
the number of things that are not represented is potentially enormous. 
Focusing on comprehensibility could provide a focused way to reassess those 
things omitted from a representation. 
In addition to good task-fit and good ontology-fit, Peterson also discusses user-
fit and circumstance-fit as requirements for representations.583 User-fit 
examines the extent to which a representation is useful for any individual user, 
with their own cognitive strengths, capacities, and expertise.584 Process-fit 
examines how easy a representation is to manipulate.585 Circumstance-fit 
examines how the environment in which a representation is used affects the 
representation. For example, blackboards, paper and computers all allow and 
encourage different manipulations - implying that different representations 
would be appropriate. 586 
In discussing representations, Sloman proposes vanous assessments for 
representations, including: learnability, expressive power, stability, ease of 
construction, extendibility and robustness.587 
The point is not that any one of these assessments, or that combining all these 
assessments, will result in the appropriate representation for a given task; only 
to emphasise that representations must be judged according to their context of 
583 Peterson, above n. 572, 10-11. 
584 Ibid .. 10 
585 Ibid. 
586 Ibid. 11. 
587 Sloman, A., 'Towards a general theory of representations' p. 118, in Peterson, D. (Ed) 
Forms of Representation (1996) Intellect Books, 136-7. 
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use and that there are many facets to this. These criteria are not exhaustive and 
others could potentially be added. In contrast to 'use' and 'link' assessments, 
which examine epistemological adequacy, these practical assessments must be 
made after examining the actual use of a representation. 
6.2.6 Visualisations 
The above assessments are concerned with structuring a meaningful mapping 
between a set of symbols, which constitute the representing domain, and the 
represented domain. Notably however, despite Goodman's interest in art, 
Peterson's interest in external representations, Gurr, Lee and Stenning's 
interest in diagrammatic reasoning and Newman and Marshall's interest in 
Toulmin structures, none of the above representational assessments actually 
discuss the visual aspects of representations. For just as different 
representations can be provided for a domain, so too can different 
visualisations be provided for a representation. 
As with selection amongst representations themselves, it would be desirable to 
be able to make a reasoned, theoretically underpinned choice between 
alternate possible visualisations for a representation. Amongst other things 
according to Gurr, Lee and Stenning, cognitive theories of diagrammatic 
reasoning aim to explain how diagrammatic vocabularies are used, their syntax 
and soundness, and the general pragmatic issues that surround the use of 
diagrams. 588 The suggestion ts that cognitive theory can provide a 
comprehensive theory of diagrammatic reasoning - including guidelines for 
the visual design of representations. Unfortunately, cognitive theories of 
diagrammatic reasoning actually provide limited guidance for the design of 
diagrams. 
588 Gurr, Lee and Stenning, above n. 564. 
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The controversy over simply specifYing exactly what constitutes a diagram 
highlights the difficulty for cognitive theory in specifYing what amounts to a 
good diagram. Work on this 'boundary' problem attempts to elaborate the 
defining elements of diagrams, to elaborate what constitutes 'textual' 
representation and hence what the differences are between textual and 
diagrammatic representations. 589 Pinpointing the 'essence' of diagrams would, 
prima facie, help clarifY what amounts to a diagram and aid the design of 
better diagrams. However, even defining this boundary has proved elusive. 
Larkin and Simon suggest that: 
the fundamental difference between our diagrammatic and sentenial 
representations is that the diagrammatic representation presen,es 
explicitly the information about the topological and geometric relations 
among the components of the problem, while the sentenial relation does 
not.sgo 
589 Unfortunately, much of this work seems confused. Firstly, the terms sentenial and linguistic 
are sometimes used in substitution - in contrast to diagrams. However, there can obviously 
be great difference between sentenial in the sense of textual representations and linguistic 
representations which can be construed much wider to include spoken aspects of 
communication. However, even if "textual" is used instead of "sentenial" of "linguistic" the 
contrast with diagrammatic representations still seems artificial. Goel is one of the few to 
note that theories must explain these intuitively based categories and not merely assume 
them: Goel, above n. 547. As Gurr acknowledges, words on the printed page are also visual, 
and so perhaps diagrammatic (although Gurr maintains a distinction based on linearity see 
below): Gurr, above n. 253. The difficulty is increased when we consider that elements of 
design and layout are obviously important in textual communication. On a surface level, 
witness the importance of font choiCe, text colour, text size, holding, italics and 
underlining. More deeply, the use of spatial layout is important, such as headings, 
indentation, and tables. The textual obviously contains elements of the visual. The use of 
this false dichotomy in much work in cognitive science examining diagrammatic reasoning 
is problematic. 
590 Larkin and Simon, above n. 246, 66. 
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Thus, in designing diagrams topological and geometric relations should 
apparently be preserved. 
However, while seemingly intuitive this cannot be a fundamental characteristic 
of diagrams. There are obvious graphical representations that do not conform 
to this. For example, many paintings seemingly preserve few of the topological 
or geometric relations of what they represent. 591 The intention might however, 
have been to restrict this definition to diagrammatic rather than pictorial 
representations. Even with this limitation though, the requirement is 
problematic. For example, the tube map does not maintain the topological and 
geometrical relations of the train lines and stations that it represents.592 Or 
more precisely, it does not preserve all of them. For this is a key problem for 
the above definition. It leaves unclear what information is to be preserved in 
the diagram. In speaking of preserving 'the' topological and geometric 
relations, Larkin and Simon oversimplify the issue. Perhaps anticipating such 
problems, Larkin and Simon provide a second defining distinction whereby in 
a sentenial representation 'elements appe.ar in a single sequence' whereas in a 
diagrammatic representation 'information is indexed by two-dimensional 
location.'593 Shimojima however, demonstrates the existence of 'sequential 
diagrams', diagrams in which elements appear in a single sequence. 594 Larkin 
and Simon's intuitive classifications cannot provide the sought for criteria. 
Stenning and Oberlander locate the difference between 'graphical' and 
'sentenial' representations elsewhere. According to Stenning and Oberlander 
graphical representations exhibit 'specificity' in that they: 
591 Goodman discussed this at length: Goodman, above n. 548. 
592 Whitby, B., 'Multiple knowledge representations: maps and aeronautical navigation' p. 67, 
in Peterson, D. (Ed) Forms of Representation (1996) Intellect Books, 69-70. 
593 Larkin and Simon, above n. 246, 68. 
594 Shimojima, above n. 254, 318. 
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compel specification of . . . information, in contrast to systems that allow 
arbitrary abstractions. 595 
Thus while a description of a man may 'fail to mention whether or not the man 
is wearing a hat', a picture 'has to go into details'. 596 However, it is certainly not 
the case that diagrams must be specific about what they represent. For 
example, we could choose to utilise the age-old astrological symbols to 
represent men and women: 
Figure 62: Non-specific diagrams 
Such usage no more represents whether a man is wearing a hat thap it does 
whether a woman is wearing a skirt. As with any diagram, some information is 
specified and some is left unspecified and the key is determining what 
information is and is not specified. Diagrams are in this respect not necessarily 
any more specific than textual representations. Specificity cannot of itself be the 
defining characteristic of diagrams. 
In revtewmg theories of diagrams, Shimojima exammes theories which 
characterise the distinction between diagrammatic and sentenial 
representations as based on the use of 'relational symbols'. 597 Accordingly, 
sentenial representations represent relations using symbols whereas diagrams 
represent relations by relations. 598 For example: 
the word "precedes" in the sentence "A precedes B" is not a relation ... 
although it "means" a relation. In the case of a map, however, "the fact 
that one place is to the west of another is represented by the fact that the 
595 Stenning and Oberlander, above n. 246, 99. 
596 Dennet quoted by Shimojima, above n. 254, 323. 
597 Ibid. 318-20. 
598 Ibid. 318. 
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corresponding place on the map is to the left of the other; that is to say, 
a relation is represented by a relation. "599 
Shimojima argues however, that sentenial languages do not necessarily use 
relational symbols. Thus 
A is-left-of B; 
and 
AB 
are both sentenial representations of the fact that 'A' is to the left of 'B', yet only 
the first uses a relational symbol.600 Similarly, Shimojima argues that diagrams 
often use relational symbols - such as lines and arrows in genealogical charts to 
indicate family relationships.601 Use of relational symbols cannot then be 
determinative of diagrams. 
The final characteristic often argued to define diagrams is that diagrams utilise 
the 'intrinsic' properties of graphics to represent the domain. 602 Venn diagrams 
are the near universal example used to illustrate this idea. Venn diagrams 
represent relations such as: 
All A's are B's; and 
All B's are C's 
Figure 63 illustrates this as a Venn diagram. 
599 Ibid. 
600 Ibid. 319. However, in a strong sense the second example does seem to be understood in a 
different way to the first. For example, in the sentence 'B is-to-the-right-of A' the 'relational 
symbol' cannot be removed to give 'BA'. This however, does not overcome Shimojima's 
second objection. 
601 Ibid. 320. 
602 Shimojima reviews several theories that adopt this approach, including his own: ibid. Gurr, 
Lee and Stenning adopt this approach. 
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Figure 63: Venn diagram 
According to Gurr et al., the use of circles to represent A, B and C 
automatically results in the conclusion that all A's are C's. Gurr et al. state that 
spatial inclusion automatically maps to set inclusion giving this 'free ride' .603 
While the fact that all A's are C's is not explicitly stated it is immediately evident 
from the diagram. This is inherent from the use of spatial inclusion to 
represent set inclusion. The idea of intrinsic constraints suggests that 
diagrammatic representations should utilise such inherent properties of the 
diagram to represent properties in the represented domain.604 
The notion of 'intrinsic' constraints is intuitively appealing and is suggestive as 
to why Venn diagrams improve reasoning for the type of problems they 
represent. Unfortunately, the discussion of intrinsic properties is sparse and it 
is difficult to understand what 'intrinsic' properties generally exist. In the case 
of set inclusion in Venn diagrams, a mapping between the domain and 
inherent aspects of the diagram may appear 'natural'. Unfortunately, it is 
difficult to see what such a mapping would involve in general. 
Gurr provides another example in which letters represents integers and a 
connecting arrow represents the 'greater-than' relation. Thus '1 <2<3<4' could 
be represented by 
Figure 64:Representing '<' 
603 Gurr, Lee and Stenning, above n. 564, 554 
604 The mapping should be lucid, laconic , sound and complete as discussed above. 
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This seems straightforward. Here a 'path' of connecting arrows maps the 
transitivity of the 'greater-than' relation. Just as 1 <3 indicates that '1' is less 
than '3', so the chain of arrows between 'A' and 'C', ~. indicates that 'A' is 
less than 'C'. Gurr indicates a number of possible variations on this 
representation: 
D 
Figure 65:Second representation for'<' 
Here the greater-than relation is also indicated by box size. 
However, rather than clarifying the notion of intrinsic constraints, that at least 
two ways can be found to represent '<' using only squares and arrows indicates 
that there is in fact nothing intrinsic in the graphical objects themselves that 
represent the '<' relation. 605 Rather, it is the meaning placed upon the 
properties of the graphic objects. It is a matter of choice to interpret the size of 
a square as indicating the relative size of the number represented. For example 
relative number size could also be indicated by rotation of a square from the 
vertical. 
Figure 66: Rotation indicating relative size 
Figure 67 indicates that D is greater than A. Given that there are multiple ways 
to represent information, what an intrinsic mapping might amow1t to is 
unclear. 
605 Further, in the second representation "->" and the size of the square are both used to 
indicate "greater-than". This violates the criteria of laconicism. Goodman's and Gurr's 
criteria can be used to clarity graphical representations So to that extent the criteria do 
specifY what the elements of a representation should be. However, the criteria do not 
specifY that "->" should be used in preference to siZe, or any other feature of the 
representation. 
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What inherent structure might amount to in systems to support legal 
sensemaking is unclear. For example, a simplified argument system might 
represent 'Claims' and 'Conclusions', and the 'supports' and 'detracts' 
relationships that can exist between them. Representations typically use 
structures such as in figure 67 to display this. 
I Claim l' Conclusion 1 L _ L _ - supports ---. - detracts ---. 
Figure 67: Graphic elements in a representation of argument 
There is nothing 'intrinsic' in this however, and 'supports', for example, could 
be indicated in a number of ways as in figure 68. 
Figure 68: Alternative representations of 'supports' 
Indeed, Toulmin uses the first possibility, Wigmore something similar to the 
second possibility and DRAMA the third possibility. 
Moreover, argumentative relationships can be indicated usmg completely 
different forms, such as tables or the use of matrix representations (e.g. 
RoomS). In this respect, Suthers suggests it will become easier to perceive and 
remember argumentative relationships as a representation moves from text, to 
table and matrix representations to network-based representations.606 The work 
of Robinson and colleagues provides some support for this. 607 It remains an 
open question however, whether any similar effect can be found for other 
aspects of argumentative presentations. 
While it is difficult to determine an intrinsic representation for the basic 
support relationship, this becomes even more difficult when considering other 
606 Suthers, above n. 81. 
607 See: 3.5.3. 
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aspects of argument, such as deduction, induction and analogising (compare 
the multiple possibilities discussed at 4.6). How broader aspects of argument, 
such as coherence arguments and argument as to the balance of consideration 
should be intrinsically represented is even less clear. It is similarly difficult to 
imagine what an intrinsic representation would be in diagrams representing 
aspects of reasoning. 
More pertinent 1s Gurr's observation that the representation should be 
consistent. As Gurr emphasises, the diagram should consistently employ the 
visual elements of which it is constituted. For example, the consistent use of 
shapes makes a diagram easier to understand. Thus, in systems such as 
Toulmin's, IBIS and SIBYL, if it is chosen to represent Claims using rectangles 
and Issues using ovals, all Claims and Issues should be represented using 
rectangles and ovals respectively, and rectangles and ovals should not be used 
to represent anything else. While a sensible suggestion, this is far from the idea 
of inherent diagrams suggested by Venn diagrams - there seems nothing 
'inherent' in using a rectangle to represent a claim rather than an oval or a 
triangle. 
Perhaps the notion of inherent structure prohibits representations employing 
practices such as using red arrows to indicate a 'support' relationship- red is 
too frequently used for indicating, and hence associated with, warning or attack. 
Similarly, it may caution against using a crossed link to indicate support. 
X !> 
Figure 69: Problems in inherent structure 
The cross is too often used for, and hence associated with, attack. Even in these 
situations however, there does not seem anything inherent in these 
visualisations - apart from their drawing on familiar everyday cues. 
Interpreted in this manner, part of the problem is the term 'intrinsic' itself. The 
word 'intrinsic' suggests that there are inherent, 'natural'' properties of 
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diagrams that can be used in representation. Properties that are natural in the 
sense that they are based on immutable scientific laws. Rather, representations 
are 'intrinsic' only in the sense that they make use of 'common' interpretations -
interpretations that tap into shared understandings. As Scaife and Rogers state, 
someone using a diagram must have knowledge about the diagrammatic 
conventions employed.608 They write: 
A circuit diagram, an architectural plan or a mathematical notation 
comprise a set of meaningless symbols to the uninitiated; they only take 
on their intended meaning through the conventions associate with 
them.609 
Understood in this way, diagrams are more 'specific' as required by Stenning 
and Oberlander, and 'intrinsic' to the degree they trade on shared 
understandings for their diagrammatic conventions. That a diagram is more 
specific and is intrinsic are then merely products of the existence of these 
shared conventions - they are not properties of diagrams themselves but 
imported from shared understandings which constrain the sense that is made, 
the meaning, of the diagram. 
If 'intrinsic' is understood in this manner, this is not itself problematic. It 
merely amounts to the claim that if diagrams are easy to interpret it is because 
they 'piggyback' on common understandings. In terms of diagram design this 
merely indicates that diagrams should highlight those aspects of importance in 
a representation and that these diagrams should be based on shared 
understandings. The problem for designing diagrammatic representations for 
the manipulation of arguments and reasoning is that there is no commonly 
agreed visual system by which to represent common argument elements such as 
implies, supports, detracts from, contradicts, analogy, etc. The lack of a visual 
608 Scaife, M., Rogers, Y., 'External cognition: how do graphical representations work?' (1996) 
45 International Journal of Human-Computer Studies 185, 195. 
609 Ibid. 199. 
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system by which to represent aspects of argument is reflected in the number of 
different representations seen in the various systems already produced. 
Moreover, while a representation can attempt to trade on common 
understandings, this does not ensure that the representation will be clear. This 
is particularly the case where diagrammatic representations combine with 
textual representations. While the objects may themselves be relatively 
unambiguous, as a natural language the text is ambiguous. Moreover, 
combining the two leads to further possible ambiguities where the text does not 
correspond to the object containing it as in figure 70: 
~ Claim 1 I the sun rise morrow? 
Figure 70: Ambiguous representation 
There appears little way to avoid this. Notably however, this is not a problem 
peculiar to this type of representation and paradoxical sentences are well 
known.610 
Cognitive theories of diagrammatic reasonmg do not explore what shared 
understandings are and to this extent such cognitive theories actually say very 
little about the visual aspects of representations. In this respect the work of 
authors such as Bertin,611 Tufte612 and Horn613 are particularly relevant. Bertin 
and Tufte examine the components of diagrams, such as shape, texture, colour 
and size and how these components can be used to build more or less effective 
diagrams. Horn examines how diagrammatic components are commonly used 
to convey meaning. Horn goes so far as to argue that the emergence of 'visual 
61° For example, 'This is not a sentence.' Paradoxical drawings, such as those by M. C. Escher 
are also well known. 
611 Bertin, J ., Barbut, M., Semiologie graphique: les diagrammes, les reseaux, les cartes (2nd 
edition) (1973) Mouton. 
612 Tufte, E.R., Envisioning information (1990) Graphics Press. 
613 Horn, R.E., Visual Language: Global Communication for the 21st Century (1998) MacroVu, 
Inc. 
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languages' can be observed in which there is a 'tight coupling of words, images 
and shapes into a unified communication unit.'614 The emerging discipline of 
'information design' studies how such visuals can be used to communicate. 
Information design, which is 'the art and science of preparing information so 
that it can be used by human beings with efficiency and effectiveness' contrasts 
with other forms of design which value novelty, fashion and style over clarity of 
communication.615 Despite the work of authors such as Bertin, Tufte and Horn 
however, there is no general theory informing information design but only a 
series of ad hoc heuristics - visualisation remains an art. 
Consequently, in addition to the task, link and practical criteria, the above 
visualisation criteria can be added. The task criteria remain foremost amongst 
these criteria, though none of these criteria determine either the 
representation or a visualisation. The best that can be drawn from the criteria is 
an awareness of the need to represent those elements in the domain that are 
important to the task. This will make the representation more transparent than 
it would otherwise be. 
6.2. 7 Applying the criteria 
The use, link, practical and visualisation criteria do not provide an 
unambiguous classification of representations. These criteria cannot 
mechanically sort 'proper' from 'improper' representations. However, while the 
use, link, practical and visualisation criteria cannot determine representations, 
they do provide guidelines with which to examination representations. 
For example, although it is unclear whether Wigmore's charting system was 
designed as a means to analyse evidence structures as presented in already 
614 Ibid. 11-4. 
615 Horn, RE., 'Information Design: Emergence of a New Profession' in Jacobson, R. (Ed) 
Information Design (1999) MIT Press, 16. 
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decided cases or as a means to prepare evidence for trial, the ontology 
proposed by Wigmore has been claimed to be beneficial for both uses.616 To this 
end, Wigmore's charting system appears to be lucid, laconic, sound and 
complete and it appears relatively straightforward to determine what types of 
evidence correspond to the charting elements defined in the method. The 
system has been said to be unnecessarily complex however, making it overly 
difficult to use and learn. Similarly, the visual presentation of the method can 
be criticised. While the method visually distinguishes each type of evidence 
included in the evidence and the relationships that exist amongst that evidence, 
the visualisations adopted seem far from intuitively meaningful. It is highly 
probable that this contributes to difficulty in learning and using the method. 
As with Wigmore's method, it is difficult to determine precisely what use 
Toulmin's method was proposed for - whether as a method to analyse the 
structure of existing arguments or as a means to better construct arguments. It 
has been used in both capacities. In both cases however, the ontology provided 
is problematic. As a means to analyse arguments the ontology is problematic 
because it requires classification into objects that typically do not exist in 
arguments. For example, Toulmin's conception of Claim, Warrant and Backing 
are very narrow, and the method does not distinguish the dialogical nature of 
arguments. As a practical matter it can be difficult to determine when elements 
of an argument fit within one aspect of the representation rather than another. 
As a means to represent reasoning as a process of argument, the representation 
is problematic as it does not provide ontological objects with which to express 
aspects of reasoning wider than argument. The representation is lucid, laconic, 
sound and complete, despite it being difficult to encode actual arguments. The 
visual presentation of Toulmin structures is interesting for two reasons. First, 
the visualisation can be criticised for lack of clarity. For example, Toulmin did 
not visually distinguish between Data, Claim and Warrant. The only way to 
distinguish between these is through their spatial layout - Data always being to 
616 Anderson and Twining, above n. 510. 
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the left of a Claim and a Warrant always lying below and between the two. 
Secondly, the method simply connected elements with undifferentiated lines. 
For example, arrows were not used to indicate that Data supported Claim, 
rather than the converse, and no visual distinction was used to highlight the 
different role of Rebuttals in arguments. Although the choice of actual 
diagrammatic elements can be problematic, distinguishing diagrammatic 
elements is one, minimal, requirement. The alternate visual presentation used 
in RoomS addresses some of these problems. However, it is doubtful whether 
spatial inclusion is a more intuitive method to indicate support and attack than 
is the use of arrows. It would be interesting to compare comprehension of large 
argument structures visualised in traditional form and in RoomS to determine 
whether there is any difference in ease of comprehension of macro aspects of 
argument. 
IBIS is a general means for problem solving and provides a comparatively 
simple ontology for this task. However, the representation distinguishes far 
fewer aspects of argument than representations such as Toulmin or ARL. This 
makes IBIS less appropriate as a tool for argument analysis. However, for the 
use for which it was originally presented, the ontology appears to be lucid, 
laconic, sound and complete. Although the elements in IBIS are visually 
distinguished, there is nothing inherently meaningful in their presentation. 
Notably, commercial versions of IBIS provide greater visual distinction by 
liberally using icons. There is evidence that commercial versions of IBIS have 
been beneficial.617 
DRL is similar to IBIS in that it supports problem-solving. However, this has 
been highly tailored for use in creating and recording design rationale. The 
ontology provided in DRL is reflective of this. Like IBIS, DRL does not provide 
a rich vocabulary to discuss argument. For the original task however, the 
representation appears lucid, laconic and sound - although it can be difficult to 
617 Conklin, above n. 461. 
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encode elements within the ontology. Like IBIS, DRL provides minimal visual 
distinction between elements of the representation and there appears little that 
is intrinsic in the visualisation used. 
6.3 A class of legal sensemaking support systems 
There is much evidence that representations facilitate sensemaking. However, it 
is not just any representation that facilitates sensemaking - representations 
must be tailored for their context of use. A representation must be appropriate 
for the use that will be made of it. A representation must fit its use. 
Characterising use in more detail thus becomes central. In a broad sense, 'legal 
use' might be regarded as one use and thus a single representation expected to 
support all the sensemaking that occurs in law. Examination however, indicates 
numerous different tasks is law. A consequence of this is that multiple 
representations are needed to support legal sensemaking for these different 
tasks. Accordingly, there is a class of computer systems, each built around one 
of these representations, that support legal sensemaking. Each system in this 
class of sensemaking support systems is characterised by the use of visualisation 
in support of the augmentation of legal sensemaking. 
The class of legal sensemaking support systems is mapped by a combination of 
the representation provide for the domain and task which this system is 
designed to support, and a visualisation of this representation. It remains 
however that the task determines the representation - the representation must 
be appropriate to the task. A systematic classification of the tasks that need to 
be supported in legal sensemaking would therefore define the boundaries of 
this class of legal sensemaking support systems. With a systematic classification 
of tasks in law, it would be possible to more systematically explore the kinds of 
representations that could be provided to support legal sensemaking. 
Unfortunately a systematic classification proves elusive. 
256 
The tasks that legal sensemaking support systems might augment can be 
conceived in various ways. For example, the task might be to support general 
processes of reasoning - in which case an examination and classification of 
processes of reasoning would be necessary. Philosophy, psychology, cognitive 
science, and computer science all investigate precisely such general processes of 
human reasoning. For example, investigations of the role of deductive logic, 
inductive logic, analogising, abduction, expected utility theory, and reasoning 
to the best explanation all propose that the phenomena investigated are 
general processes of reasoning, processes evident in diverse areas such as 
science, medicine, philosophy and law. If such processes are indeed ubiquitous, 
then they could seemingly be used to inform the creation of representations to 
support legal sensemaking. In this sense, providing support for such reasoning 
processes would provide support for reasoning in a diverse range of situations. 
However, regardless of how systematic such classifications are or how universal 
such strategies of reasoning are, simply focusing on classifYing such strategies of 
reasoning appears insufficient. While such classifications can be useful 
conceptual markers and useful as a means to mentally separate and distinguish 
aspects of reasoning, providing representations at this level of generality 
provides limited benefit. Although people might be said to create and test 
explanations until satisfied they have the best explanation in a situation, unless 
they are engaging in self reflection and examining their own reasoning they 
largely do not make sense through consciously reflecting that 'I am engaging in 
reasoning to the best explanation'. Although labelling particular relations and 
moves as 'deductive', for example, might be part of building an understanding, 
it is certainly by itself insufficient. The whole benefit of one representation over 
another representation is that the representation is tailored for a particular task 
- the representation is tailored to highlight salient aspects of the task and 
hence facilitates reasoning about the task. Benefit comes through tailored 
specialisation. This strategy for constructing representations does not provide 
this. Moreover, if representations are tailored to use then the classification of 
general processes of reasoning, to an even lesser degree, defines how 
representations are useful. For when representations are tailored to use, it is 
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the criteria used to tailor the representation which are JUSt as important m 
shaping the resulting representation. There is thus little to suggest that 
focusing solely on general processes of reasoning could define a single 
representation appropriate to all aspects of sensemaking. Hence, even a 
systematic classification of processes of reasoning would not define the 
representation to be used for any particular task. It is difficult to conceive how 
focusing solely on such general classifications of processes of reasoning could 
define representations. 
The field of 'computer-supported cooperative work' provides an alternative 
view of tasks to be supported. Here computer systems are often examined 
according to whether they support things such as creativity, reasoning, 
argument, negotiation or presentation.618 For example, mind mapping was 
proposed as a means to support the creative aspects of problem solving and can 
successfully be used to stimulate ideas in diverse areas, including law. In this 
vem, Verheij distinguishes between arguments-assistance systems and 
argument-mediation systems.619 Research in computer-supported cooperative 
work highlights the importance of the social setting in which a sensemaking 
support system will be used. As with a classification of the processes of 
reasoning however, this type of classification does not define an exact 
representation for a use in a particular specific situation. For example concept 
mapping is a, slightly, different method to mind mapping whose creators argue 
can also stimulate creativity. 
Classifications of processes of reasoning and examinations of things such as 
creativity, negotiation and presentation are comparatively general. Work m 
artificial intelligence suggests an alternative approach to examining tasks. In 
618 E.g.: Smith, J.B., Weiss, S.F. and Ferguson, G.J., 'A hypertext writing environment and its 
cognitive basis' p. I 95, in Proceedings of the Hypertext '87 Workshop (1 987). 
619 Verheij, above n. 539. Though Verheij goes on to refer to Room 5 and GeoMed as 
argument assistance systems: ibid. 44. 
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artificial intelligence, researchers have attempted to analyse problem solving in 
terms of the 'generic' tasks that it involves.620 Generic tasks are said to be tasks 
that are universal across problem solving and are said to include 'diagnosis', 
'planning', 'classification', 'abstraction' and 'explanation', amongst others. Work 
in artificial intelligence and law has attempted to apply this methodology in 
system construction.621 
Generic tasks appear a potentially fruitful approach for systematically 
examining representations. Although there is some dispute over precisely what 
the idea of generic tasks covers - generic tasks are categorised differently by 
different researchers and the idea of generic tasks has itself been questioned622 -
whether or not the tasks are truly 'generic' and regardless of the particular 
classification provided for tasks, in many respects there is a lot of commonality 
across areas in the tasks that are said to b~ generic. Examining generic tasks 
might thus provide a systematic way to explore the range of representations on 
which sensemaking support systems might operate. Generic tasks might 
provide a way to map the domain of representations. 
However, even adopting any particular classification of generic tasks, there is 
still a need to specifY the application of tasks in the precise situation that it is 
sought to support. The types of task discussed in the generic task literature 
appear qualitatively different to those tasks typically discussed in the 
representational literature. For example, while Peterson talks of 
62
° For a criticism, see: O'Hara, K., Shadbolt, N., 'Locating Generic Tasks' (I 993) 5(4) 
Knowledge Acquisition 449. Note that the idea of 'generic tasks' is a specific approach in 
the AI tradition. Here the idea of 'generic' tasks is used more widely to cover all 
conceptualisation of tasks that are said to be in some way universal. 
621 E.g.: Valente, above n. 86; Visser, above n. 86. Note that these take a different view on 
tasks. 
622 O'Hara and Shadbolt, above n. 620. Valente and Visser in the field of AI and law have a 
slightly different conception of tasks. Valente provides a good discussion of the notion of 
tasks in artificial intelligence; Valente, above n. 86, 60-70. 
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representations to help land a plane, there is no 'landing a plane' task 
discussed in generic task classifications. Similarly, there is no 'argument' task in 
the classifications. Systems advocating the use of diagrams to support reasoning 
have been proposed for use in diverse types of situation. Systems have been 
designed for use solely by individuals and also to support group processes. 
Group oriented systems can be aimed at either users directly interacting with 
the system or use through a 'facilitator'. 623 Systems can be designed for friendly 
or hostile groups. A system used by friendly groups may need different 
representations and services than a system used for hostile groups. 624 Systems, 
both aimed at individual use and aimed at group use, can be designed 
primarily for use prior to the main stream of work, concurrent with the main 
stream of work or subsequent to the main stream of work. For example, a 
system could be used primarily as a means to prepare for meetings. 
Alternatively, the system could be used in real-time during meetings, as a 
means of stimulating discussion, or after meetings as a means to solidify and 
archive the results and ideas generated during the meeting. The system could 
be synchronous or asynchronous. Each of these potentially requires the 
representation of different things. In the educational setting, systems are likely 
to be quite different from those for use in practice. Educational systems might 
623 The facilitator mediates between the system and participants in a discussion - interpreting 
the reasoners and expressing their reasoning in the representation used by the system 
thereby reducing the need for each participant to learn all the intricacies of any particular 
representation and any particular system. The practical benefit of having a facilitator has 
been argued by, e.g.: Rodhain, above n. 422, 52; Saeedi, M.H., Sillince, J.A.A.A., 
'Incorporating rhetorical and plausible reasoning in a system for simulating argumentation' 
(1 999) 12 Knowledge-Based Systems 113, 117. Nunamaker gives the facilitator a wider role, 
that of "sense-giver" - one who directs the process and point to salient information: 
Nunamaker, J.F., 'Future research in group support systems: needs, some questions and 
possible directions' (1997) 47 International Journal of Human-Computer Studies 357,379. 
The drawback is that in a facilitated system all work must pass through the facilitator, 
potentially slowing work and making it less fluid. 
624 Work on 'Negotiation Support Systems' explores some of the 1ssues relevant to this 
difference. 
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be expected to provide more detailed ways to breakdown and classifY 
arguments than systems for legal practice. Systems for post-hoc argument 
analysis may be different from one for pre or concurrent argument 
construction. The former might only need to represent supports or detracts 
relationships but not things such as issues and possible answers. In contrast the 
former might need to represent more detailed aspects of argument such as the 
degree of support between a claim and a conclusion and it might need to allow 
the direct classification of statements in terms of whether they are 
generalisations, or inductions, or analogies etc. A system for concurrent analysis 
in contrast would likely not need to make use of such fine grained 
representations of strength relationships between claims and conclusions. The 
point is not that these requirements are mutually exclusive or that all of these 
factors cannot be subsumed into a task analysis. It might be possible to analyse 
all of these requirements in terms of the universal tasks typically discussed in 
the artificial intelligence literature. However, how this would be done and how 
specific representations would be achieved from an analysis of such universal 
tasks is unclear. It remains that representations are specific and the factors that 
influence the design of a representation are potentially many and varied. 
As Visser discusses, classifications of generic tasks are non-specific and require 
decomposition into sub-tasks, sub-sub-tasks, and so on.625 As when examining 
processes of reasoning, generic tasks are not tailored to any specific situation 
and consequently will not focus on and highlight those aspects of an area that 
are specific and important to reasoning in the area. However, as a 
representation becomes more and more specifically tailored for a particular 
problem solving application, it is less the classification of generic tasks which 
defines the representation and more the tailoring itself. 
These classifications of genenc tasks are based on a problem solving 
perspective - on examinations of the ways that people approach and resolve 
625 Visser, above n. 86, 63. 
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problems. As Valente notes however, classifications of legal tasks can be based 
on other perspectives. As an example, Valente cites Bench-Capon who 
examined legal work in terms of: 'adjudication'; 'policy making'; and 'advice 
giving'.626 Similarly, Valente notes the work of Clark and Economides who 
examine legal work in terms of: 'transacting'; 'advising'; 'negotiating'; 
'representing' and 'structuring'.627 According to Matthijssen 'making a contract' 
is a legal task and generally, a task is 'a group of activities and procedural steps 
that are directed towards a common goal. '628 Each of these classifications 
provides an alternative classification of tasks and an alternative perspective 
from which to attempt to systematically support representations for 
sensemaking. Suffice to say that with each of these classifications, problems of 
specialisation and tailoring arise. Moreover, every task classification provides an 
apparently alternative means to delimit legal tasks. However, these 
classifications are not mutually exclusive. For example in a task primarily 
involving planning, creative elements can be envisaged, as can argumentative 
and presentational aspects. A task involving adjudication could involve 
planning and would likely involve some creativity. To a large extent then, task 
classifications simply provide alternative viewpoints for looking at legal work. 
Observing that task classifications do not define representations ts not to 
disparage the benefit of such classifications. This says nothing, for example, 
about the benefit of focusing on generic tasks as a method in artificial 
intelligence. It is only to argue that in examining representations to support 
sensemaking it is extremely doubtful that focusing on generic tasks can itself 
define exact representations for use in specific situations. Though useful, even a 
systematic breakdown of tasks provides limited information for designing 
representations. 
626 Valente, above n. 86141. 
627 Ibid. 141-2. 
628 Matthijssen, L., 'A Task-Based Interface to Legal Databases' (1998) 6(1) Artificial 
Intelligence and Law 81, 84 
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Without a comprehensive model of tasks, devising diagrammatic 
representations to support legal sensemaking remains a partially ad hoc affair. 
Focusing on tasks and attempting a comprehensive classification of tasks is a 
'top-down' approach to representational design and system construction. 
However, when this is inadequate the only alternative is an, at least partial, 
'bottom-up' focus in which systems are iteratively conceived, constructed, tested 
and refined. Here, representations and systems using those representations, 
are designed with specific application in mind, rather than from within a 
classification of tasks. System creation here proceeds from an appreciation of 
need rather than an examination of all the tasks that might exist and how they 
might be supported. In this vein, incremental construction and formalisation of 
representations have been suggested as means to address the difficulties 
inherent in choosing representations with which to work.629 Incremental 
construction and formalisation hold some promise as means to construct 
representations. However, while flexibility in representations may be desirable, 
simply letting the problem solver develop their own representations is 
insufficient. 630 
Moreover, an important aspect of computerising the construction and 
manipulation of representations is that this facilitates automation. Importantly, 
this automation is not of reasoning itself, however, nor need it be simply the 
layout and manipulation of the graphical elements in a representation. 
Computerisation can facilitate collection of information about the 
representation that is constructed. For example, when using the standard 
method of argument diagramming, a computer system could keep track of all 
statements that are unsupported, what the support for each statement is, all 
629 Shipman, F.M., McCall, R.J., 'Incremental Formalization with the Hyper-Object Substrate' 
(1999) 17(2) ACM Transactions on Information Systems 199. 
630 The very raison d'etre of providing representations to support sensemaking is to facilitate 
the task being performed - to scaffold a user's reasoning. 
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arguments that are linked and all arguments that are convergent. In a 
representation that accounts for dialogical aspects of argument, automated 
services could keep track of such things as all the arguments that are 'attacked' 
by opposing arguments, all arguments that are undisputed, and those 
arguments that are disputed but to which a response has yet to be made. In 
general a system could keep track of all types of statements that have been 
made. In representations which cover aspects of reasoning, such as IBIS, 
automatic services could keep track of things such as all Issues that have been 
raised, all Positions that have been proposed in response to given Issues, all 
Issues that have no Positions linked to them (indicating that they have not been 
considered) all Arguments that weigh for a given Position and all Arguments 
that weigh against a given position. The system could track all Issues that have 
been decided and all Issues that remain to be decided. In general, a system 
could list nodes according to how much argument or discussion occurs around 
them. Those nodes which are highly linked to other nodes are more likely to be 
controversial than nodes linked to comparatively little discussion or argument. 
In a representation tailored for legal use, the representation might provide 
'Fact', 'Rule' and 'Authority' objects. With such a representation, a computer 
system could for example, track the disputed and undisputed facts, and which 
rules and authorities have been relied upon. More complexly, the system could 
keep track of dependencies between arguments and options, such as occurs in 
SIBYL. Further, limited systems of inference could be implemented - in an 
argumentation system for example - to keep track of which argument is 
'winning' such as occurs with ArguMed. Rather than automating reasoning, 
such automation 'informatises' - by using computers to construct and 
manipulate representations, information is provided about argument and 
reasoning that would otherwise not be available. 
Little consideration has been gtven m the literature to the full range of 
possibilities provided by such automation. Although research into computer-
based argument investigates the formalisation of argument status, this is not 
immediately directed at the more general aim of supporting argument through 
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simple provision of information. Similarly, Lee's work on SIBYL is directed at 
automating reasonmg management and not simply at the provision of 
information about the flow of reasoning. Each different representation will 
allow different automated services. There is an inherent link between the 
representation and the potential automated services. In general however, 
automation allows the system to perform services that the user would otherwise 
have to perform themselves. It allows a system to perform services that would 
otherwise be onerous to perform because they are repetitive or because effort is 
required simply to remember to perform them. Automation can be highly 
beneficial. However, automation requires formalisation. Automation requires 
formalisation of the representation and the use of the representation. Systems 
that seek to support incremental formalisation must support the formalisation 
of the processes of representational use and not just representational creation. 
Given the range of possible representations to support legal sensemaking, 
comparatively little work has been performed on legal sensemaking support 
systems. Systems have been built for evidence assessment, for argument 
construction and analysis, for teaching statutory la,w, and for geographical 
mediation. There appears to be much that has not been explored. It is 
interesting to consider systems that might be constructed. For example, the use 
of computerised negotiation support tools in law remains unexplored. As do 
the potential benefits that a corporate memory, a precedent bank, using 
visualisation of relationships within documents and between documents. The 
educational systems that have been discussed have focused on providing 
representations of argument or providing a graphical proof tree for statutory 
provisions. Other educational applications can be envisaged. For example, it 
has been argued that legal argument displays a 'crystalline' structure in which 
standard justifications are used in arguments.631 This idea has been adopted in 
artificial intelligence and law m attempts to tmprove automated 
631 Balkin, above n. 239. 
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argumentation. 632 Automated argumentation proves difficult for the reasons 
previously discussed. However, providing a database of classified hierarchical 
argument justifications could prove useful in a system to teach students about 
the structure of legal argument. The system could provide a student with a list 
of typical 'warrants' used in law and require all arguments to ultimately be 
justified by such warrants. The system could inform both when an argument has 
not been so justified and also allow comparison of the justifications that are 
used. In a similar vein a system could provide a database of argument fallacies 
which students could select and use as the 'templates' for the criticism of 
arguments entered into the system. While the former system teaches students 
about argument justification, this system would teach students about argument 
refutation. Again, such systems are not envisaged as automatically constructing 
arguments, automatically determining what the next argument move should be, 
nor automatically determining which argument wins - only to support students 
in learning about argument. 
It is not only to teach argument or to structure group decision making that 
sensemaking and visualisation could be useful. Just as tools can be envisaged to 
support learning and sensemaking in an educational context, systems for use in 
legal practice can be envisaged. Again, different representations are necessary. 
For example, contrast pure argument analysis where simple claims and 
conclusions might suffice, with a system for evidence analysis where 
differentiations of types of evidence might be useful. Wigmorean evidence 
analysis can be both a means to ex post facto assess the proof in trial and a tool 
to clarifY thought processes in preparation for trial. However, Wigmore's 
method is a method which only supports some of the sensemaking processes, 
632 Skalak, D.B., Rissland, E.L., 'Argument Moves in a Rule-Guided Domain' p. 1, in The 
Third International Conference on Artificial Intelligence and Law: Proceedings of the 
Conference (1991) ACM Press; Palmer, J., 'Legal Merit Arguments, Legal Semiotics and 
The Design of Legal Knowledge-Based Systems' p. 198, in The Sixth International 
Conference on Artificial Intelligence and Law: Proceedings of the Conference ( 1997) ACM 
Press. 
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those tightly revolving around the chain of proof itself. It does not support 
more tangential exploration of or establishment of that chain of proof. 
When preparing a matter for trial, for example, it is not only the chain of proof 
nor the argument that has to be organised. Facts themselves have to be 
established. Typically, some facts will be agreed and only some facts will be in 
dispute. The plaintiff will challenge some of the disputed facts while the 
defendant will challenge others. Undisputed facts will be established by pieces 
of evidence, be they documentary, or oral, while the attempt is to support 
disputed facts with evidence which is itself undisputed. In a reasonably complex 
matter, tracking all these facts, be they agreed or disputed, and their precise 
relation to the evidence, can be complex. Support for the management of such 
information is an ideal task for computer support. Such support might involve 
simply providing chronological lists of all the facts in the dispute, listing those 
facts asserted by the plaintiff, those facts asserted by the defendant, and those 
agreed and those in dispute. Support can be more complex however. Facts are 
not disputed in a vacuum, and disputed facts will be relevant to establishing 
issues relevant to the dispute. A system to support trial preparation could be 
constructed to provide support for management of the issues in the dispute. 
The system could be used to highlight the issues in dispute and the arguments 
that weigh upon the resolution of those issues. The system could maintain a list 
of facts that are relevant to establishing or negating each issue and could store 
arguments about the facts, such as why one version of the facts should be 
accepted in preference to an alternative version of the facts. Such arguments 
could themselves link to further issues and facts that support those arguments. 
Prior to trial, it is likely that work remains in order to actually establish all the 
facts and to strengthen the particular reading of the facts being relied upon. 
Further questioning of witnesses may be necessary, further documents and 
other evidence may be required. A system to aid trial preparation could help 
maintain a list of all the uncertainties in a case, and the facts and issues that 
they bear upon, as well as strategies for resolving those issues - such as 
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questions that need to be asked of witnesses, documents that need to be located 
or evidence that needs to be gathered. In such ways the system could help 
manage the process of fact finding, and fact interpretation, as well as issue 
management and argument construction, that are inherent aspects of case 
preparation. Given the utility of such a system, it is unsurprising that a system 
similar to this has been developed. 
6.3.1 CaseMap 
CaseMap633 is a tool to aid 'case analysis' and operates along the lines outlined 
above. According to its creators: 
Complexity obstructs effective thinking ..... [Cases] involve dozens of 
witnesses and organizations, hundreds of critical facts, and hundreds, if 
not thousands, of documents. Brainstorming sessions can help you deal 
with case complexity problems. 
Early in case preparation, brainstorming helps you flesh out the critical 
factual disputes and set goals for discovery. As trial approaches, 
brainstorming helps you assess case strengths and weaknesses, develop 
themes, and finalize trial strategies. 634 
Although its creators talk of 'brainstorming' this does not revolve around idea 
generation, and is actually more akin to case organisation and case analysis. 
Case analysis in CaseMap revolves around four main things: Facts, Objects, 
Issues and Questions. For example, in a hypothetical dispute about breach of 
contract between a department store and a supplier, facts include such diverse 
things as that 'Diamond is a California-based department store', that 'SDS is a 
wholesale distributor for West Coast area' and that 'SDS was already doing 
business in Southern California before SDS service Agreement for Southern 
633 www.casemap.com 
634 Krehel, G., 'Brainstorming Your Way to a Winning Case Strategy' (1999) CaseSoft 
publication. Available at http://www.casesoft.com (accessed 2/3/2001). 
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California'. Facts are stored, amongst other things, with the date they occurred, 
the source for the fact, whether the fact is disputed and the issues in the case 
that the fact is relevant to. Building a database of facts is important in order to 
build a chronology of the events in the dispute and to support subsequent 
arguments. Facts can be linked to the documents in which they are established 
and to the issues to which they are relevant. 
Objects in CaseMap are used to reference things such as all the individual 
participants in the dispute, all the organizations in the dispute, and all the 
documents, pleadings and physical evidence that have been collected. Objects 
can be linked to the Issues that they are relevant to. 
Issues in CaseMap reference elements of the dispute such as whether the 
contracts were written or oral, whether equitable estoppel bars any claim and 
what damages might be payable upon breach of contract. 
Questions are used to reference things that must be addressed in preparation 
of the case. Example questions are 'Who will be our expert witness for 
damages?' and 'Do we have records documenting Sunrise growth following 
business dealings with Diamond?'. Questions can be linked to facts, objects and 
issues that they relate to. 
By orgamsmg information with CaseMap, its creators argue that the 
chronology of facts, the 'cast of characters', the document index, the hierarchy 
of claims and arguments, and the lists of questions that are generated, all 
provide better insight into and hence management of a dispute. CaseMap 
provides various flexible search and display tools to help manage all the 
information and provides tools to help understand the evidence. CaseMap uses 
a 'data refinery' that allows information that meets desired criteria to be 
searched for and highlighted. For example, all facts disputed by the opposition 
can be listed separately. Documents produced by a certain person or after a 
certain date can be listed. All the facts that are relied upon to establish an issue 
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can be displayed. All the disputed facts relevant to an issue can be displayed. All 
the questions that remain to be answered can be listed. 
CaseMap displays all information in tables, figure 71 displays an example fact 
table. 
Figure 71: Fact table in CaseMap 
However, the use of tables can make it difficult to 'see' all the relationships in a 
case - for example, to quickly see all the issues in a case, the arguments 
supporting each issue in the case and the evidence supporting each argument. 
Diagrammatically displaying case information would be beneficial so that the 
network of relationships between issues, arguments and evidence could be 
easily perceived and navigated. 
CaseMap is an interesting application and provides a type of support not seen 
in other programs. It directly supports sensemaking by allowing a 'picture' of a 
case to be constructed and by allowing that picture to be selectively filtered and 
explored. CaseMap has been tailored for a specific legal task and provides a 
representation of the task to support this. CaseMap has limitations however. 
For example, although allowing the storage of issues, the system is more 
strongly aimed at management and preparation of facts and evidence. Support 
is limited for issue exploration and structuring, and argumentation. Although 
issues can be arranged in hierarchies with indented lists, issues cannot be 
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interrelated. This is most limiting in that the only way to enter arguments in 
CaseMap is to deem them to be issues. However, since issues cannot be linked 
with each other there is no intuitive way to indicate that one argument (issue) 
supports another argument (issue). Notably, although CaseMap uses similar 
terminology as in programs such as IBIS, the focus is slightly different. IBIS has 
a clear conceptual separation between Issues, Positions and Arguments. Issues 
in CaseMap cover what would be both Positions and Arguments in IBIS. 
Essentially, the methods for structuring problem decomposition in CaseMap 
are not as explicit as in systems such as IBIS. The focus of CaseMap is more 
heavily on making sense of and managing the evidence. 
6.3.2 Information foraging 
Sensemaking and visualisation can also provide new approaches to information 
retrieval. Information retrieval is a widely examined task and many approaches 
to information retrieval have been investigated in law. Research on information 
retrieval typically focuses on how to improve precision and recall in retrieval. 635 
Researchers examine ways to manage the assignment of keywords to 
documents, and to otherwise provide 'extra' information on which to search 
documents.636 Much work also examines the uses of visualisation in information 
retrieval, both visualisation during search construction and visualisation of 
search results as an aid to their comprehension. This is simply based on the 
idea that it is easier to understand visual indicators of a document's relevance 
than it is to interpret a list or understand a numerical measurement indicating 
relevance. Visualisation during search construction and visualisation of search 
635 Recall measures how many of the relevant document in a corpus are returned by a search. 
Precision measures the degree to which the documents returned by a set are relevant to the 
search. Recall is the proportion of relevant documents retrieved. Precision is the density of 
relevant documents among those retrieved: Kowalski, G., Information retrieval systems: 
theory and implementation (1997) Kluwer. 
636 E.g. Dick, above n. 303. 
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results both atm to provide the user with a better understanding and easier 
management of information. 
However, much of this work on information retrieval tends to view searching as 
a 'one shot' process. A search is typed into a database, which then returns a 
group of documents. The user then analyses those documents, and based on 
this analysis, either ceases to search for information or reformulates the query 
and re-types the query into the database. The only support provided is in 
construction of the search and, perhaps, management of the results. However, 
individual searches do not arise spontaneously. Each search request is a 
response to perceived failures of earlier search efforts and from questions that 
arise during these search efforts. Searching is an iterative process in which 
searches are refined and redirected according to the results of prior searches. 637 
As TiBen states, it is an 'inherently interactive', 'navigational and exploratory 
information-seeking process'.638 The results of one search are used as the basis 
for exploration and as the basis for decisions as to where to search next. 639 As a 
user explores the available information the very focus of the search may 
change. No support is typically provided for the evolutionary and exploratory 
aspects of information searching. Searchers are left to reformulate queries and 
run them through the database, to keep track of past search strategies and the 
results of those search strategies, how each search strategy related to others, 
and what future directions remain to be explored. Information retrieval systems 
generally do not allow the user to construct an ongoing visualisation of their 
search strategy. In typical search environments, how searching widens and 
637 O'Day, V.L., Jeffries, R., 'Orienteering in an Information Landscape: How Information 
Seekers Get From Here to There' p. 438, in Proceedings of INTERCHI'93 (1993) ACM 
Press; TiBen, A., 'A Case-Based Architecture for a Dialogue Manager for Information-
Seeking Processes' p. 152, in Proceedings of the fourteenth annual international 
ACM/SIGIR conference on Research and development in information retrieval (1991) ACM 
Press. 
638 TiBen, ibid. 152. 
639 O'Day andJeffries, above n. 637, 438. 
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narrows, and how the very question to be answered may change, all remain 
implicit. That is, the searcher has to remember the actual question that they 
want answered and has to formulate words and phrases to run through the 
database in order to try and answer that question. If, after browsing the 
documents retrieved with the search, the documents are not found to be 
appropriate then the search has to be discarded and a new search started. The 
searcher will have to mentally formulate a new strategy. They will have to 
deduce what was wrong with the previous strategy and attempt to divine what 
search might actually answer their question. This new search will return another 
set of documents which itself may or may not be appropriate. The refinement 
of the search strategy and the formulation of new searches will iteratively 
continue until a satisfactory set of returned documents is achieved or until the 
user becomes convinced that all useful strategies have been exhausted and that 
the database does not contain useful documents. 
In a typical search system each time a new search is performed the old 
document set is discarded and the new search is typed in and run. Although 
some systems allow a list of previous searches to be maintained this is typically 
only the list of words or phrases that has actually been run through the system; 
and even this storage may not remain longer than a single use of the database. 
Systems generally do not store the actual question that it is sought to answer. 
Moreover, the reasons why a particular search was felt unsuitable, or the 
reasons why a search was refined in a particular way and turned into another 
search, are not stored. Other information, such as which documents were 
actually looked at, and whether the user felt them to be useful, is not recorded. 
It is left to the user to maintain a history of their searches - perhaps in their 
head, perhaps on scraps of paper, or perhaps implicitly through the structure 
and content of a document that is being written. In all cases though, the actual 
search strategy and the search information specific to individual searches (such 
as which documents were looked at) is not externalised. 
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The acuteness of this lack of support becomes more manifest as the duration of 
searching grows longer. If a search is typically finished in one short session, or 
even during the course of a day, the lack of express external information about 
the search strategy itself may seem less problematic. However, as searching is . 
extended over days, weeks and months, the difficulties with lack of express 
external expression of the search strategy become more apparent. As time 
passes it becomes more and more easy to forget why searches were performed 
or indeed what searches were performed. It becomes increasingly easy to 
forget, or rather, increasingly difficult to remember, what documents were 
looked at and what was thought of them. Clearly, for efficient searching it is 
desirable to remember both what searches were run, why those searches were 
run, the results of those searches and thoughts on how they related to the 
question that was being asked - and indeed, how the question being asked has 
slowly mutated.640 A system that allows storage of all these things would be 
desirable, and a system that allowed all these things would most likely benefit 
from the use of external diagrams to map the search strategy and its 
progress. 641 
A skeletal system to support information foraging can be imagined, based on 
the types of representation that have been previously discussed. For example, 
rather than beginning a search directly with a series of search terms, a searcher 
could begin by entering the question that they are trying to answer: 
640 O'Day and Jeffries have argued for similar requirements: ibid. 444. In general, Wexelblat 
argues that computerised tools suffer from a lack of "interaction history" and say that 
providing such interaction histories opens new possibilities: Wexelblat, A., Maes, P., 
'Footprints: History-Rich Tools for Information Foraging' p. 270, in Proceeding of the CHI 
99 conference on Human factors in computing systems: the CHI is the limit (1999) ACM 
Press. 
641 O'Day andJeffries, above n. 637, 445. 
How can 
visualization be 
used to support 
legal work? 
Figure 72: The search question 
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This question could then either be broken into sub-questions, or directly into 
keyword searches that are used to retrieve documents. Figure 73 is an example 
of the latter. 
Document A 
DocumentB 
DocumentC 
DocumentD 
Figure 73: Keywords approximate questions 
When a search produces too many results, or indeed too few results, although 
the general question to be answered remains the same, the words used to 
search might change, perhaps several times. 
Document A 
DocumentS 
DocumentC 
DocumentD 
DocumentC 
Figure 74: Reformulating searches 
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In the hypothetical search in figure 7 4, the second search did not produce any 
results, while the third search produced three results. However, these proved to 
be off-point. At this stage, the search appears to have reached an impasse and 
the researcher might choose to temporarily leave the search and pursue 
another strategy. For example, it can be imagined that after reading materials 
on computing and legal argument, the name T oulmin is consistently 
encountered. The researcher could then return to the search and try to locate 
documents that relate to Toulmin. As illustrated in figure 75, this search 
returns numerous relevant documents; the first of which appears immediately 
relevant. After reading this document, it is set aside for latter use and hence 
stored for future reference. This document might indicate that IBIS could 
provide an interesting approach in visu~lising legal work and so a new search 
could be performed on that. This search however, does not return any 
documents. 
DocumentS 
DocumentC 
DocumentD 
Document A 
DocumentB 
DocumentC 
DocumentD 
I Document A I 
Figure 75: Successive searches 
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It is not that the incremental refinement of searches could only occur with a 
system such as above - this could clearly be done with, or without, pen and 
paper. Doubtless people already informally collect much such information -
they remember searches they have performed or develop ad hoc strategies for 
recording them and they remember which articles they have read and where 
search terms came from. Rather, it is that explicit support for this and partial 
automation and management of the progression and evolution of a search 
strategy is beneficial. It allows constant review of what has been searched for 
and the results of those searches - information that is lost in systems where 
each new search presents a new list of information. A system such as the above 
collects all the information in one place, makes it explicit and makes it 
persistent so that it can be returned to days, weeks months or years latter. 
More and more capabilities could be added to such a system, for example: 
linking search terms to the documents which first suggested them; allowing 
documents that are returned in multiple searches to be linked to each of those 
searches, hence providing and indication of their centrality; and allowing 
attachment of notes and annotations to searches, search results and individual 
documents. Moreover, as a search builds up and more and more searches are 
performed, more and more documents are found and more and more notes of 
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vanous kinds are made, the system begins to form the skeleton for an 
argument construction system - although the precise support needed for each 
remains different. Similarly, examples of search strategies used by experts can 
be stored and provided to learners to help teach them both about particular 
areas oflaw and about search skills.642 
The important point with the system sketched here is that it is only one possible 
outline illustrative of the diverse range of applications in which providing visual 
representations of argumentative and reasoning tasks could be beneficial in a 
legal context. It is not intended as a definitive specification of what a good 
system should contain. Nor has an actual system been built and tested. This 
outline simply illustrates that in addition to work on specifYing searches visually 
and the visualisation of search results, visualisation of search strategy could be 
beneficial. 
6.4 Discussion 
There is abundant evidence that diagrammatic representations can benefit 
legal sensemaking and there is abundant evidence that computer systems could 
support the construction and manipulation of diagrammatic representations 
for legal sensemaking. Examination of diagrammatic representations however, 
reveals a huge diversity amongst them. The necessity is thus to find a structured 
way to construct useful representations. However, while a principled method is 
desirable for choosing amongst diagrammatic representations to support legal 
sensemaking, examination of theories of representation provide limited 
642 In a similar vein, O'Day and ] effries suggest the creation of 'retrieval mediators' which are 
'small, special-purpose packagings of the retrieval expertise necessary to handle a 
prototypical information question in a particular domain': ibid. 438. It is unclear however, 
precisely what role is envisaged for retrieval mediators. TiBen appears to propose a similar 
idea, to be used however, as the basis for automated guidance in information retrieval. As 
she notes however, one 'of the main problems is to find a set of base cases of information 
seeking strategies.': TiBen, above n. 637, 161. 
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guidance. Similarly while work on diagrammatic reasonmg reinforces the 
usefulness of diagrammatic representations it says little about how to 
systematically construct the best representation for a given task. The study of 
diagrammatic reasoning is relatively new and little consensus exists as to how 
reasoning with diagrams operates. Indeed, it is a matter of argument as to what 
actually amounts to a diagram. 643 According to Gurr: 
there does not exist the fully fledged foundation to a theory of 
diagrammatic communication 
that could determine what makes for effective diagrammatic communication. 644 
However, while theories of representation do not determine choice or design of 
representations, the use, link, practical and visualisation criteria do provide 
general guidelines for the choice and design of diagrammatic representations. 
Primary amongst these is the use criteria - representations must be tailored to 
support the specific task that it is sought to perform. 
According to Halasz, two generations of hypermedia systems are observable. 
The first generation is based on large computers, focused on text nodes with 
little graphics, and for use by large groups. The second generation is similar to 
the first but has more advanced user interfaces with graphics and animation, 
and are generally for single users or small groups.645 To this can be added a 
third generation of systems - systems tailored for specific tasks. This third 
generation of hypermedia system can be used to augment legal sensemaking. 
Mapping this third generation of systems is problematic however. There is a 
huge diversity of legal tasks that could be supported with diagrammatic 
representations. Without a systematic breakdown of legal tasks, it is difficult to 
comprehensively predict, or predict in detail, systems that might be 
643 E.g. see: Shimojima, above n. 254. 
644 Gurr, above n. 253, 317. 
645 Halasz, above n. 404, 840. 
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constructed. As Nunamaker concludes, there ts no overarching theory that 
enables prediction about how a system: 
should appear, what features and functions it should have, how it should 
be developed and what specific impacts it will have on organizations, 
teams and individuals that use it. 646 
Suffice to say that in such a situation, advancement comes not from global 
analysis of tasks but from implementation and iterative refinement in specific 
situations.647 Only a long stream of future research can determine whether 
systems actually work and how they can best be designed. 648 
646 Nunamaker, above n. 623, 363. 
647 Interestingly, numerous common technologies have had a slow evolution. Technological 
evolution appears ubiquitous: Petroski, H., The Evolution of Useful Things (1994) Vintage 
Books. 
648 Hua and Kimborough, above n. 85, 268. 
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7 Conclusion 
The best way to get something done is to begin. 
Anonymous 
In an environment in which the nature of work is changing, a shift in the 
pattern of work and the composition of the workforce is observable. Knowledge 
work, performed by knowledge workers, predominates. The efficient 
performance of new forms of work, however, requires new tools. 
Legal work is a paradigm of knowledge work and exemplifies the need for new 
tools for its efficient performance. However, despite computers having been 
used for decades in law, legal workers are currently suffering a 'knowledge 
processing lag'. Research on using computers to aid legal knowledge work has 
been dominated by a paradigm based around automation. Research seeks to 
automate legal knowledge work. In contrast to the currently prevalent 
conception of legal knowledge-based systems automating legal work, this thesis 
has proposed an alternative, wider, conception of legal knowledge-based 
systems. This is a conception of legal knowledge-based systems augmenting 
legal knowledge work. Investigating computer systems that augment legal 
knowledge work has been the central concern of this thesis. In particular, this 
work has proposed a new class of legal knowledge-based systems - systems 
which augment legal knowledge work through supporting the visualisation of 
processes of legal reasoning. 
7.1 The automation of legal knowledge work 
While computers exist to support processing of legal information, computers 
are ineffective in processing legal knowledge. Chapter two of this work 
examined research on the creation of legal knowledge-based systems which 
seek to address this knowledge processing lag. It was argued that the dominant 
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conception of legal knowledge-based systems is based on the use of artificial 
intelligence to create computer systems that automate legal reasoning. 
However, the creation of computer systems to automate legal reasoning has 
had limited success. The intractability of legal problems and the lack of precise 
knowledge about how processes of legal reasoning operate confound attempts 
at automation. It is not currently possible to automate legal reasoning to any 
significant degree or to automatically solve legal problems in anything but the 
most controlled and artificial of situations. 
In contrast to this paradigm of automation chapter two introduced the concept 
of augmentation. The notion of computers augmenting human competencies is 
a potent one and holds promise for developing new tools to support legal 
knowledge work. 
Research in artificial intelligence and law is founded on a particular conception 
of legal knowledge work - a conception which ignores central aspects of legal 
knowledge work. Research in. artificial intelligence and law draws on legal 
theory which represents law as composed of rules, cases and principles and 
which represents legal reasoning as simply a matter of applying those rules, 
cases and principles. Through the application of techniques developed in 
artificial intelligence, the field of artificial intelligence and law seeks to create 
legal knowledge-based systems that automatically apply legal rules, legal 
precedents and legal principles. However, focusing exclusively on the rules, 
precedents and principles which are evident in law- the objects that constitute 
the law - misrepresents central aspects of legal reasoning. Rather than viewing 
it as a process determined by these legal objects, legal reasoning can be 
productively viewed as a process of sensemaking. Chapter three argued for a 
sensemaking perspective and outlined what such a perspective looks like. With 
a sensemaking perspective on law and legal reasoning, the legal problem solver 
becomes central and the perception of the legal environment by that problem 
solver becomes all important. In particular, the manner in which the problem 
solver represents legal problems, quite literally, the manner in which the 
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problem solver visualises a problem, is determinative of the resolution of such 
problems. In chapter three it was argued that information visualisation is an 
important element in sensemaking and that techniques for visualising processes 
of reasoning are highly valuable. A sensemaking perspective on legal reasoning 
suggests an avenue for the construction of legal knowledge-based systems that 
augment legal work. Legal knowledge-based systems can support legal 
knowledge work by supporting the visualisation of processes of legal 
sensemaking. 
7.2 Augmenting legal knowledge work - representation and computer 
tools to augment legal knowledge work 
With a focus on augmentation rather than automation, the central question 
becomes how to create knowledge-based systems that augment legal work. 
Chapter four of this. work examined techniques for diagramming processes of 
argument and reasoning that are integral to legal sensemaking. This chapter 
attempted to apply these diagramming techniques to the diagramming of legal 
judgments. Numerous problems were encountered however. In particular it was 
found very difficult to 'massage' the representation of legal judgments into the 
forms required by the diagrammatic representations examined. 
An inherent aspect of diagrammatic representations, and representations more 
generally, is that they filter the view of the domain that they are being used to 
represent. Representations highlight aspects of a domain and occlude others. 
As such, diagrams and other representations mould reasoning. In order to 
augment legal sensemaking it is thus centrally important to make use of 
appropriate representations. 
Chapter five of this work reviewed numerous computer systems that have been 
constructed in attempts to augment knowledge work through the provision of 
support for diagramming. Striking amongst these systems is the diversity of 
representations upon which they are founded and the diversity of uses to which 
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they have beer;_ put. This diversity of existing systems not only highlights the 
diverse uses of diagrammatic representations for augmenting sensemaking but 
also the diversity of representations on which those systems are based. This 
diversity again highlights the necessity of using a representation appropriate to 
the task at hand and raises the question as to what amounts to an appropriate 
representation. In particular it raises the question of what amounts to 
appropriate representations to augment legal work. 
In an attempt to determine what representations are appropriate for legal 
work, chapter six examined theories of representation provided in philosophy 
and cognitive science. This chapter argued that such theories of representation 
are not capable of specifYing what amounts to a good, an appropriate, 
representation for a given use. Theories of representation do indicate however, 
that representational appropriateness can be assessed according to task, link 
and practical criteria. Primary amongst these are the task criteria which require 
representations to be appropriate to the task they are being used to support. In 
exammmg representations to support legal knowledge work however, no 
definitive specification of legal tasks ts available. Hence designing 
representations to support legal knowledge work remains imprecise. Moreover, 
theory does not definitively specifY how representations should be visualised. 
Representation and visualisation thus retain an element of art. 
The dependence of representations on the task that they are being used to 
support does however, indicate the existence of a new class of legal knowledge-
based system. This class of legal knowledge-based system is based on the use of 
diagrammatic techniques to support the sensemaking that is inherent in legal 
reasoning. Chapter six provided two hypothetical examples of computer 
systems that exist within this class of legal knowledge-based system. 
Thus, while the automation of legal work remams problematic and whilst 
augmentation provides an alternative paradigm for the creation of legal 
knowledge-based systems, much remains to be explored. Whilst a sensemaking 
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perspective on legal reasonmg provides a basis for the creation of legal 
knowledge-based systems, whilst there is much evidence that argument and 
reasoning diagramming are useful and that computer support for such 
diagramming is useful, determinate methods for the creation of legal 
knowledge-based systems remain elusive. Although currently available criteria 
can guide work, the creation of legal knowledge-based systems remains largely 
uncharted. 
7.3 Future work 
While this work has argued the benefit of systems to augment legal knowledge 
work and the benefit of diagrammatic representations for this, much remains 
unexplored. 
Primary questions raised by this work concern representations themselves. 
Current theories of representation provide limited guidance for the actual 
creation of representations. While theories of representation indicate that 
representations must be tailored for use, how this is to be achieved remains 
unclear. In this context, more work is needed to inform how the tasks, the 
performance of which representations support, can be usefully decomposed. In 
particular, how legal tasks can be usefully decomposed and classified, and how 
different conceptions of legal tasks can be integrated, remains unclear and in 
need of further examination. Research is needed into legal task classifications. 
Representations can also be examined according to their user group. In law for 
example, it is uncertain whether, and if so how, representations might differ for 
judicial applications, for legal practice, or for non-expert use amongst others. 
Moreover, the analysis of tasks needs to be integrated with this analysis of use. 
Research is needed on the use of representations, how different representations 
are used by different groups and for different tasks, and their effects on 
reasoning. It would be productive to explore how to systematically map legal 
tasks so as to explore the class of legal sensemaking support systems. 
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Associated work is required on the visualisation of representations and 
specifically visualisation to support legal sensemaking. It is unclear if there is 
any most 'natural' way to visually represent legal sensemaking relationships. 
More broadly, it is unclear whether visualisation is more useful ~or certain 
groups or for particular tasks than others. Generally, investigating such 
questions would contribute to the further development of general theories of 
representation and visualisation. 
In the absence of systematic and detailed theory classifYing legal tasks, work can 
productively be conducted on the actual construction of systems to support 
legal sensemaking. Such construction will itself contribute to theoretical 
understanding of legal tasks and representations to support legal sensemaking. 
It remains to be seen whether augmentation through diagramming proves 
more useful for particular tasks or particular users than for others. The 
construction of systems will begin to answer such questions. The effectiveness of 
systems that are constructed needs verification. While the literature reports 
tentative experimental results showing that users have better recall of 
arguments constructed as diagrams than as texts, empirical testing is needed to 
ensw·e such benefit is transferred to representations other than those tested 
and to different tasks and groups of users. 
It is unlikely that diagramming could completely replace textual presentation, 
and indeed this is not the aim. Hence it remains to be explored how legal 
sensemaking support systems can integrate with 'traditional' uses for computers 
in law, such as information retrieval and document management, and how they 
can advance aims such as knowledge management and organisational learning. 
In the absence of determinative criteria for the construction of systems, iterative 
creation, testing and refinement points the fruitful way forward. 
The class of legal knowledge-based systems to augment legal knowledge work 
through visualisation remains fertile ground for research. Although a handful 
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of systems have been constructed to support evidence analysis, legal argument 
construction, and legal education, the range of legal tasks that constitute legal 
work and the specificity of representations that support legal tasks indicates a 
broad space of potential but as yet unexplored systems. 
It is hoped that this work contributes to future research in the use of computers 
in law, and particularly future research in legal knowledge-based systems, by 
pointing a way to construct useful legal knowledge-based systems that augment 
legal work. It is hoped that this work will motivate construction of legal 
knowledge-based systems designed to augment legal work and to the testing 
and iterative refinement of such systems. More generally, it is hoped that the 
creation of systems will inform how systems can advance augmentation of 
knowledge work and how systems can support knowledge workers faced with a 
changing work environment. 
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